Bituminous Industry Drifting Toward Further Trouble

SINCE 1917, the bituminous coal industry has surged, violently at times, across the nation's social, industrial and economic foreground. To-day a silent, yet more active, force is working within the industry, and the movement now taking place, if allowed to continue, will cause serious consequences when coal is again wanted at the rate of 550,000,000 tons annually instead of at the rate of 400,000,000 tons, the apparent requirement for 1921. I refer to the shift of tonnage from the highly unionized fields of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois to the non-union fields of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Alabama and certain western states, and to the so-called union fields in Kentucky and Colorado, on which the union saddle rests lightly. This movement, in the absence of the usual winter transportation shortage, is taking place rapidly and will be accentuated if, as is probable, work is suspended in the union mines on March 31 next. This drift of tonnage has been made possible by the unit wage reductions in the non-union fields and by the modification of the so-called conditions that have been saddled on all mines wherever the United Mine Workers have gained a foothold; these changes permitted the first reduction in mine cost, which made possible the securance of contracts; better running time assisted in making further reductions, and the transfer of ton-nage served to increase the unit cost in the field from which it was transferred. This situation not only opposes the highly unionized operation but brings about a transfer of traffic from the roads serving such mines to those that serve in a primary or secondary manner the more favored localities. The net result is evidenced in (a) the migration of union labor to the non-union mines; (b) the deteriora-tion and decadence of union properties; (c) the neces-sary curtailment in the purchase of new equipment and in the maintenance of existing equipment and track facilities on the part of the carriers serving the union fields. This, in turn, when business is restored to normal or to the point above normal that invariably follows an adverse swing of-the business pendulum, will cause (d) a shortage of coal and coal transportation facilities; (e) an era of coal speculative debauchery with exorbitant prices and serious deflection in the matter of quality; (f) a period of labor unrest followed by de-mands for increased wage rates supplemented by a marked loss in individual efficiency, with, resultant strikes, business unrest, and the pressure of new eco-nomic theories. In 1918, the labor status with respect to relative tonnage produced was approximately as follows: pro-duced in highly organized fields, 62 per cent.; produced in partly organized fields, 21 per cent.; produced in unorganized fields, 17 per cent. During the strike of November and December, 1919, the mines that remained at work attained 35 per cento of the nominal production of soft coal, a situation made possible by the migration of union labor to non-union mines and the concentration of the nation's coal trans-portation facilities on the rails of the carriers serving the non-union fields. The history of the efforts made by the carriers to untangle the car scrambling which took place during this period and which sent the self clearing battleship type of car into western territory where it could not be readily unloaded, and the western gondola type of car to New England and the seaboard, is yet painfully recalled. -This confusion proved a serious factor in the coal car shortage that continued throughout the following year. We are drifting toward a similar situation now, propelled by economic forces rather than by a sudden strike.