Copper prices : History not necessarily precursor to future

- Organization:
- Society for Mining, Metallurgy & Exploration
- Pages:
- 2
- File Size:
- 298 KB
- Publication Date:
- Jan 1, 1989
Abstract
This article is part of a presentation Strauss made Dec. 3, 1988 at the sixth annual American Mining Hall of Fame (AMHofF) banquet in Tucson, AZ. At the banquet, the Mining Club of the Southwest honored Strauss by naming him the 1988 recipient to the AMHofF. (Industry newswatch, page 6). Introduction In the last two decades, there have been two previous periods of sharply rising copper prices. One was in 1973-74; the other in 1979-80. In both cases, a short period of high copper prices was followed by steep and prolonged periods of low prices. In the language of the market analyst, the high prices were called spikes. Is it likely, then, that three or four years from now the present price of copper will show up as a spike in the charts? There are substantial differences between the current position and the markets of 1973-74 and 1979-80. In 1973-74, US copper prices were subject to government-imposed price ceilings of $0.60 per lb through early December, 1973. These were increased to $0.68 per lb through May, 1974. Meanwhile, mines outside the United States were free of restraint. Rising demand in London pushed the price above $1 per lb in the third quarter of 1973. In early April 1974, it reached a peak of $1.50 a lb. In May of that year, the US ceilings were removed and the domestic price began to rise. What were the causes of this price strength? While ceilings held the domestic price below the world market, domestic consumers acquired all the tonnage offered by US mines. Meanwhile, in the world market, buyers feared prolonged shortages. The Club of Rome had warned that world economic growth would be limited by impending depletion of mineral resources. There was al so concern about a copper cartel that might increase copper prices even more. In early 1974, at a special United Nations session, developing-country spokesmen warned the industrialized world to expect high commodity prices. Also adding to the concerns of copper buyers was the fear that when US wage contracts expired in mid-1974, protracted strikes might ensue. The combined effect of this atmosphere was that consumers accumulated large amounts of copper, far above their normal carry. By midsummer, the position changed radically. While some strikes did occur in the United States, they proved short-lived. The most significant development was a massive economic recession. The energy crisis was causing enormous dislocations in the world economy. Construction activities were sharply reduced and automobile sales plummeted. Public confidence was shaken. Copper sales fell precipitately as consumers decided to draw down their swollen inventories. The price came down too. In April 1974, the London price- as noted-was $1.50 per lb. By the end of the year, it was down to $0.57 per lb. In 1973-74, the copper price rise was fed by fears of shortages, cartels, and strikes. In 1979-80, the market rose on the strength of good demand plus political and military instability. The price rise was also fed by inflationary trends, exemplified by speculation in precious metals. Prior to this second spike in copper prices, the market had been depressed despite economic recovery. Despite reduced US output, copper production in the rest of the world was increasing. Though consumption was rising, surplus stocks reached unprecedented levels. At the end of 1977, the aggregate of stocks at the refineries and in the exchange warehouses was 1.5 Mt (1.67 million st). That was more than three months' shipments at then rates of consumption. In 1978, the statistical position improved. Shipments of refined copper that year were 8% greater than in 1977. The result was reduced visible stocks but -just as was to be the case in 1984-86 - the price remained depressed. In 1979, an even sharper drop in visible stocks occurred as shipments rose by another 4%. This time, though, the price responded. In December 1978, the price in current dollars had been less than $0.70 per lb. By the end of 1979, it was above $1 per lb. And in the first quarter of 1980, it averaged more than $1.20 per lb. Military and political developments were a factor. The hostage crisis in Iran was followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. To many, it appeared that war might result if the Soviets pushed on into Pakistan. At the same time, speculation drove gold and silver prices to incredible levels. As silver prices rose above $40 per oz), copper above $1 per lb did not seem unreasonable. Then, in March 1980, the precious metals price boom collapsed. Copper prices also retreated, though not as much. In February 1980, the copperprice averaged $1.32 per lb. By December, it had dropped to $0.85 per lb. In 1981 and 1982, the decline continued. The present copper situation Why is the current situation different from these two previous episodes of high prices? First of all, today's inventories are far lower than they were in either 1974 or 1980, when the price declines began. The stocks at refineries and in exchange warehouses are substantially less than they were then. More significantly, consumers today have very limited holdings compared with stocks they carried in 1974 and 1980. Even if faced with a downturn in their own business, copper consumers will not be able to stay out of the market. To the extent they have any business at all, they will have to buy copper. And on the supply side, there is also a significant difference. The year 1988 has been unusual. US production is up sharply, responding to higher prices. But production is little changed in the rest of the Free World. Indeed, several of the major producing countries have mined less copper this year than in 1987 despite the prices increases. Peru has had labor problems that have cut its output. Zambia and Zaire suffer from shortages of expatriate technicians, not to mention spare parts. They also suffer from the failure to maintain equipment or perform adequate development. In Chile, the two largest mines, Chuquicamata and El Teniente, have not met their production targets. Chuquicamata is struggling with high arsenic content in its ore. And, in late 1987, severe rockbursts hampered operations at El Teniente. In addition, depletion of some mines in Australia and South Africa has offset rising output at other properties. Indeed, when final mine output figures for 1988 become available, it may well be
Citation
APA:
(1989) Copper prices : History not necessarily precursor to futureMLA: Copper prices : History not necessarily precursor to future. Society for Mining, Metallurgy & Exploration, 1989.