Economic Solution of After-war Problems

IN SEVERAL papers and addresses during the past two years, I have dwelled upon some of the economic consequences of the war. The fundamental thought that I have sought to convey is that the world became immensely poorer by the war, not only in material wealth and population, but also in the psychology and morale of the people. I do not see how there can be any intelligent dissent from that statement. All the ideas of post-war prosperity were manifestly fallacious, manifestly fallacious from the outset. If there had been any truth in them it would have followed logically that a great war, with all its destruction of wealth, health and life would be a good thing. Therefore, let us have a great war every ten years or so. Such an idea would be both monstrous and absurd. Assuming then the acceptance of my premise, I have tried to show that the losses by the war could be made good in a short time, i.e., in a relatively short time, only by doing things a great deal better than formerly, and that the accomplishment of such a result called for greater transparency in industry, for industrial cooperation, for thinking in terms of industries as a whole, and for the greater exercise of engineering functions. All of this introduced, of course, the position and psychology of labor. I say frankly that I do not look for labor to contribute any constructive thought to the upbuilding. I neither expect it nor hope for it. This is a pity, for it could do so much for its own economic advancement if it would. However, it never has done so, but rather has benefited only from the exercise of the talents of the few, and the main hope now is to bring it into a passive state, dispelling the resistive fallacies that developed during the war. Let us briefly examine the nature of these.