French Occupation of the Ruhr

MY REMARKS, which I feel highly honored in being invited to make, shall be limited to a consideration of -the mining and metallurgical problems involved in this question; in fact, these problems alone might well be considered as suffi¬cient to explain the existence of the Ruhr situation and to justify the steps taken by France in this affair. Comparing the France of pre-war days with the France of the period following the Versailles treaty indicates clearly how the Ruhr question is a direct consequence of the new economic conditions which have prevailed in Europe since peace was signed between the Allies and Germany. Before the war, in 1913 for instance, the French out¬put of iron ore was 22,000,000 tons. This output, which decreased considerably during and immediately after the war, has about regained its previous level. It should be noted that 96 per cent. of the production of iron in France is obtained from the eastern part of the country, in the districts of Nancy, Briey,. Longwy, Metz, and Thionville. This concentration of practi¬cally all the iron mines into one district creates a very serious problem for France, involving strategic and economic consequences. The strategic problem arises from the fact that the whole iron resources of France lie close to the frontier of Germany, at a distance of only a few miles; hence it is of the' utmost importance for France to be assured that her eastern frontier shall not be at the mercy of a sudden invasion by an army which could in a few hours deprive France of her iron resources and render her powerless to defend herself. Invaded by her Eastern neighbor three times during the past 100 years, France has had dire experience with what such invasions mean for her. Wherever the German armies have passed, they have left an inefface¬able trail of desolation. France, therefore, intends to protect herself by sufficient and efficient guarantees against renewed invasions of her territory.