Metals Industry Capacity- - An Overview and Reader's Guide

INTRODUCTION Nonfuel mineral markets have always tended to be volatile due to the cyclical nature of demand and the difficulty of fine-tuning capacity and output levels. Experiences over the past two decades, however, have been especially perverse. This short volume attempts to provide insights into this era and some guidance for the future. The papers are linked together by their focus on issues of productive capacity. At the same time, they provide a useful description, explanation and evaluation of the industry's evolution and its implications for the near-term. The regnant pessimism of the 1980s was very much alive during the early months of 1987 when the theme of this symposium was formalized. Indices of real metal prices had only inched-up from all-time lows in 1986. The hemorrhage of corporate red-ink was still a powerful memory. Frustration with the apparent inability of closures and reduced capacity utilization to re-establish market balance was strong. To the more pessimistic, the industry appeared destined to a quarter century of persistent excess capacity and nonremunerative prices. The conditions to support this pessimism were readily apparent. Economic literature tells us that surplus capacity is a complex, usually unexpected and often long-lived phenomenon caused by the interaction of at least three factors. The first is a rising capital-intensity of production. The second is the presence of aggressive new entrants whose capacity additions are typically (1) trade- dedicated because local market absorption is low; (2) cost-competitive for natural or policy-support reasons; (3) heavily burdened by debt-repayment obligations; and (4) viewed as important sources of employment, regional development and foreign exchange. The third, and often decisive, factor is an unanticipated decline or stagnation in demand growth for the sector's output. The first two factors combine to increase competitive pressures and to raise the actual or perceived cost of idle capacity. Market rigidity reduces responsiveness to price signals and distorts the burden of adjustment. Demand atrophy exacerbates these pressures especially on unprotected producers in the higher quadrants of the global supply function. In the mid-1980s, evidence of the existence of all these factors were easy to cite. Culprits were often identified. Claims for protection, global sharing of adjustment burdens, and imposition of disincentives to new capacity regardless of inherent economic status were co-dominant themes with the buzz-words of "competitiveness" and "level playing fields." This, notwithstanding the suggestions of the same economic literature that excess capacity persists longest when interventionist remedies permit it to continue. Today, only eighteen months later, the mood is decidedly more buoyant and most analysts are cautiously optimistic about the next few years. Many informed analysts have concluded that the excess capacity of the recent past has disappeared. For the present, the marketplace seems to have restored a balance between supply and demand. That the adjustment took five or six years longer than anticipated attests to the dramatic structural changes which have characterized the industry. The implications of these changes for the future are unclear. Were the macroeconomic shocks, coupled with industry transitions, so extraordinary in magnitude and timing that experiences were unique? If so, the next years may hold more stable and cautious times for the industry. Alternatively, is the inherently volatile metals industry facing a future of cycles equally perverse in terms of amplitude and duration due to economic uncertainities and inflexible industry response capabilities?