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By Jeffrey M. Listak, Gregory J. Chekan

The U. S. Bureau of Mines is investigating longwall panel layouts to maximize coal recovery and minimize interactive problems in multiple-seam operations. When coalbeds are longwall mined in descending order, the transfer of stress from overlying gate roads is a major design constraint affecting pillar stability in the lower mine. The lower mine gate road pillars must be properly designed to withstand the additional load transfer if gate roads are superpositioned in successive seams. The Bureau's MULSIM/NL model, a boundary element computer program, was used to analyze load transfer mechanics for superpositioned gate road pillars. Analysis of Longwall Pillar Stability (ALPS), an empirically based design method for longwall gate road pillars, was used to calibrate model input parameters. ALPS provided a basis to verify model trends and to recommend limits for safe pillar design when superpositioning longwall gate roads. The attributes of the MULSIM/NL model and ALPS were combined to develop a modified method for estimating pillar stress for multiple-seam cases. The modified method uses a multiple-seam factor (MS) to estimate the stress on superpositioned lower mine gate road pillars. Numerical analysis shows that MS depends on the interburden thickness and pillar width.

Jan 1, 1992

By L. W. Scott, T. H. Dubaniewicz, F. T. Duda, P. G. Kovalchik

Recent research conducted by NIOSH, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory showed that electrical current levels permitted under parent regulations may not limit cable temperatures to less than 90 °C in reeled trailing cables. Reeled cables, tightly wrapped with many turns, ell carrying current in an enclosed space, can become overheated due to poor heat transfer. This overheating can cause the cable insulation to soften and become easily damaged. The damaged insulation reduces the life of the cable and can lead to shock, electrocution, and mine foes. This paper describes a method of measuring the conductor temperature of untie trailing cables during no anal operation. The temperature is measured using a 50/175 micrometer Graded Index Multimode Optical Fiber located in the center of the metallic conductors. Distributed temperature measurements arc made using an Optical Time Domain Reflectometer (OTDR). This system is capable of measuring temperature with an accuracy of plus or minus one degree centigrade over a length of 4 km at 1-m intervals. With this unique way of measuring temperature, tests can be conducted simulating actual mine conditions and provide important data to allow MSHA's Approval and Certification Center to develop approval criteria for cyclically rated reeled machines.

By T. E. Marshall, D. R. Dolinar, C. S. Cornpton, L. J. Prosser, A. T. Iannacchione, D. C. Oyler

The U.S., Australian, and United Kingdom coal and the Canadian hard rock mining industries have long recognized the significance of high horizontal stresses as a factor affecting the stability of roof and rib conditions in underground mines. Recently, a growing segment of the U.S. underground stone mining industry has also begun to recognize that horizontal stresses occur in some of its more than 90 mines. Considering the typically high strength and massive nature of limestone, this fact is a revelation in itself. High horizontal stresses produce extensive and sudden rock failures and, in some cases, resulted in injuries to mine workers. Through the years diverse control strategies have been proposed and experimented with. Reorientation of mine entries to reduce stress concentrations have proven successful and are widely accepted in practice. Other solutions, like rock reinforcement, are poorly understood and less accepted in practice. It is the purpose of this National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) study to develop a better fundamental understanding of these ground control strategies under high horizontal stress conditions through a series of field and laboratory studies. To this end a design technique is presented which provides stone miners with a method for making stability assessments. The consequences of widening rooms, changing geology and horizontal stresses, and different rock bolts on roof beam failures are discussed.

By James Rowland

On June 1, 2004, the underground coal mine ventilation safety standards under the Code of Federal Regulations (Title 30, Part 75) became effective for the use of a conveyor belt entry as an intake air course to ventilate working sections. These standards, also known as the Belt Air Rule, contained a section which limited the air velocity in the conveyor belt entry to no greater than 500 feet per minute unless otherwise approved by the US Mine Safety and Health Administration in the fire suppression system section of a mine?s ventilation plan. The Belt Air Rule included a requirement dictating compatibility of air velocity with fire suppression systems. The final rule of limiting air velocity in the belt entry was challenged in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court granted that petition and vacated the requirement on the air velocity cap, according to MSHA. The removal of the air velocity cap from the final rule, paired with the compatibility requirement, led to a need for research on high air velocity?s influence on fire suppression system performance in belt entries. Test data was needed that illustrated the relationship between fire suppression system performance and air velocity, especially with the increased use of wider belts in underground coal mines, so National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and MSHA collaborated to obtain the data. However, this work was initiated before the revised Belt Air Rule was promulgated on December 31, 2008, when 1000 fpm air velocity became a requirement. Four different

Jan 1, 2009

By E. J. HOFFMAN, L. A. SCHOLL, J. c. W. FRAZER

The danger from coal dust in mines has been thoroughly demon- strated by experiment, and consequently the study of the inflam- mability of coal dust suspended in air, that is, the readiness with which a cloud of coal dust inflames, is of decided importance to those engaged in coal mining. Much knowledge has been gained from the work done in the large galleries constructed at official and semiofficial stations in this country and abroad, but the study of the coal-dust problem in these galleries requires so much time and is so costly that there is need of a reliable laboratory method for obtaining a classi- fication of the great variety of dusts that occur in mines. The investigation described in this paper was an attempt to devise such a method. It was a preliminary investigation, and work in the same direction is being continued by the Bureau of Mines. As Mr. Frazer has severed his connection with the bureau, it is deemed advisable to publish the results of his study substantially as he prepared them, with little attempt to draw conclusions or to show the bearing of the results on other studies now in progress. The results of these studies and a full discussion of the significance of the laboratory investiga- tions will be published in future reports of the Bureau of Mines. The reader should remember that any laboratory method, since it involves conditions that differ so greatly from those of actual mining, should be thoroughly tested, and the results obtained by it should be confirmed by experiments conducted on a scale simulating mining conditions before final conclusions are drawn. The need of a laboratory method has long been felt, and several investigators have devised apparatus and methods. The work done by Vital, Holtzwart and Von Meyer, Bedson and Widdas, Le Chate- lier, and that of the British Coal Dust Commission is of great interest in this connection. Bureau of Mines Bulletin 20 contains a sum-

Jan 1, 1913

By Bruce K. Cantrell, Stephen W. Stein, Kenneth L. Williams, David Hassel, Harvey Patashnick

In June 1992, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) published the "Report of the Coal Mine Respirable Dust Task Group, Review of the Program to Control Respirable Coal Mine Dust in the United States." As one of its recommendations, the report called for the accelerated development of two mine dust monitors: (1) a fixed-site monitor capable of providing continuous information on dust levels to the miner, mine operator, and to MSHA, if necessary, and (2) a personal sampling device capable of providing both a short-term personal exposure measurement as well as a full-shift measurement. In response to this recommendation, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Pittsburgh Research Center, initiated the development of a fixed-site machine-mounted continuous respirable dust monitor. The technology chosen for monitor development is the Rupprecht and Patashnick Co., Inc. tapered element oscillating microbalance. Laboratory and in-mine tests have indicated that, with modification, this sensor can meet the humidity and vibration requirements for underground coal mine use. NIOSH is continuing that effort by developing prototypes of a continuous dust monitor based on this technology. These prototypes are being evaluated in underground coal mines as they become available. This effort, conducted as a joint venture with MSHA, is nearing completion with every promise of success. The immediate benefit of this effort will be to researchers, regulatory personnel, and mine personnel, by permitting evaluation of specific mining practices to see which expose mine workers to excessive dust levels. Using this information, mine personnel can optimize mining procedures to reduce dust exposure. MSHA and the operators will also be able to use the dust concentration data to judge whether dust plan parameters are adequate to continuously maintaining environmental dust levels below the applicable standard. The second development recommended by the Dust Task Group was a person-wearable version of the continuous dust monitor. It will be a monitoring system designed to provide a measurement of worker exposure to respirable dust, both during and at the end of the shift.

By Lisa Steiner

Almost every process has a predecessor, and studying the predecessor helps to define needs and shortcomings to be addressed in the new design. It also suggests what information is needed by the users in order for them to be able to operate safely and effectively. The end users of a system can provide important feedback to better evaluate the current and proposed designs. When new technology is introduced into a system, mishaps may occur before it is realized that human-system interactions were not considered adequately in the design process. A systematic methodology to evaluate the causes of these injuries and to develop remedial recommendations can enhance safety. This paper illustrates how such an approach was used to assess remote machine operation in underground coal mines. The dynamic work environment of underground mining with its unpredictable geologic anomalies can result in numerous hazards. Many of these hazards, including mine roof collapse, occur near the working face where coal is being extracted. The face area is also where the most intricate interactions of people and equipment occur. For these reasons, a high priority has been placed upon minimizing hazards to the workers at the face. A remote control operation was introduced to provide a safer working distance from these hazards. As the remote control technology began to be widely used for extended cut mining operations, new issues became evident. It was essential to develop mechanisms for mines to evaluate these issues in order to predict and reduce injuries. Mining methods and equipment changes must allow for the ability of workers to adapt to changes in their dynamic mining environment. Consideration should be given to how the worker will use familiar information to make decisions in now unfamiliar situations. There will be both intended and unintended consequences [Merton, 1949]. Designers try to anticipate and eliminate surprises, but it is impossible to eliminate them all. How, then, will the new system affect the tasks to workers which are currently accustomed? As suggested below, this question may be addressed and more of the unintended outcomes predicted with a planned design process which includes strong human factors input to determine interactions and behaviors of participants.

Jan 1, 2005

By Christopher Mark, Anthony T. Iannacchione

Falls of ground continue to be one of the most serious causes of injury to U.S. miners. Of the 256 fatal injuries that occurred in mining between 1996 and 1998, 59 (23%) were caused by falls of ground (Table 23.1). Falls of ground affect some sectors of the mining industry more severely than others. For instance, nearly 40% of the 98 coal mine fatalities between 1996 and 1998 were caused by falls of ground. Underground miners are at much greater risk than surface miners. Nearly half (45 out of 101) of underground mine fatalities were attributed to roof, rib, and face falls, while only 6% of the 155 surface fatalities were caused by falls of highwalls or slopes. The goal of this chapter is to provide guidance to safety professionals tasked with preventing ground fall injuries. This chapter combines an analysis of the Mine Safety and Health Administration's (MS HA) accident and injury data with a survey of industry "best practices" to safeguard miners from ground falls. Ultimately, this approach can help to form the basis of a sound, proactive ground control program for the mining industry. SOURCES OF DATA All the injury data examined in this study were derived from MSHA's fatal investigation reports and the MSHA accident database. Because falls of ground often result in serious injury, MSHA "Fatalgrams" and fatal investigation reports provide a useful snapshot of ground control issues in the mining industry. These reports are available to the public (on the M FHA Web site at www.msha.gov). Fatalgrams, are one-page summaries that are usually published within a month of an accident. They contain very basic information about the accident with a graphic and a short section on relevant best practices. Fatal investigation reports are the official accident investigation reports filed by MSHA personnel. These reports contain general information about the mine, a, description of the accident, physical factors involved in the accident, a conclusion, and enforcement actions, Enforcement actions typically identify citations and discuss violations to the Federal Mining Law. MSHA also maintains comprehensive statistical data on the mining industry's accident and injury record. The law requires that mines file a report on every reportable accident that occurs, containing information on the accident's location, severity, classification, activity, and nature of injury A short narrative is generally included as well. Accident reports can be searched by many of the above fields.

This chapter focuses on smoke as it relates to escape from underground mine fires. Among the topics discussed are the measurement of visibility in smoke; smoke-related hazards such as the production of CO, hydrochloric acid (HCI), or other byproducts of combustion; and miners' personal experiences while escaping through smoke. Smoke Measurement and Visibility In general, smoke consists of hundreds of thousands of very small particles. These particles have some "size," usually expressed in terms of their diameters, and they have some concentrations, usually expressed either in the number of these particles per unit volume or the total mass of the particles per unit volume. Humans cannot see individual smoke particles because they are too small. Similarly, "umber concentrations" and "mass concentrations" of smoke particles do not have much meaning to people unless they are trained technically. Still, individuals know that they can see smoke, independent of all the technical jargon used to describe it. Also, they know that when the smoke level gets too high, it is no longer visible. In fact, nothing is visible because the smoke absorbs all of the light in its surroundings. The eye is only sensitive to light in the wavelength region from about 400 nm to about 700 nm. The maximum sensitivity of the human eye is to light that has a wavelength of about 555 nm. It is important to know how the eye responds to light because if its response is known, it is possible to use a light detector that has almost the same response as the eye. Such a detector can then be used to quantify the visible characteristics of smoke because it responds in the same manner as the human eye. Smoke is visible because it either scatters or attenuates (diminishes) light. In some instances, smoke is visible because the smoke particles reflect light which is then detected by the eye. The eye actually "sees" an intensity of light that has been reflected from a cloud of smoke particles. Imagine shining a flashlight into a cloud of smoke. Someone off to the side can actually "see" the beam of light as it traverses the smoke cloud. This is called scattering. Smoke is also visible be¬cause it attenuates light. Imagine having someone shine a flashlight into your eyes. As smoke begins to build up along the beam of the flashlight, the light begins to dim. The smoke is visible because it is now reducing the intensity of light that falls upon the eye. As the smoke level increases, it is said to obscure our visibility. When the beam is no longer visible, the smoke obscuration is said to be 100%. In other words, none of the light energy from the flashlight makes its way through the cloud of smoke. Another way of saying that the obscuration is 100% is to say that the transmission of light through the cloud is zero.

Jan 1, 2000

By J. M. Harrington, C. W. Owings

"The transportation of explosives, and especially their distribution from the supply magazines of the manufacturers or dealers to the mines, quarries, or other points where they are to be used, by means of horse-drawn vehicles is an old-time practice, and the records of accidents of the past show this to have been a hazardous undertaking requiring for safety the taking of many precautions not required in the transportation of other merchandise.Displacement of the horse-drawn vehicle by the motor vehicle for the transportation of explosives is increasing rapidly. A consideration of the facts that the vehicle is operated by an explosion engine, using easily vaporized liquid fuel; that the charges in the engine are fired and the vehicle lighted by electricity; and that the vehicle, being operated insulated from the ground, may accumulate static charges led to the conclusion that new hazards are being introduced into the transportation of explosives through the use of motor-operate& vehicles, and that therefore additional special precautions must be taken against these additional hazards.That accidents have already occurred in this use of motor-vehicle transportation is evidenced from the following examples:Recently in California a driver loaded a box of granular powder in the rear of an automobile truck and a box of electric detonators in the front. Suddenly, while traveling along a highway, the explosives detonated, demolished the truck, and blew the body of the driver into small pieces. No evidence was left to show the cause of the explosion, but it is assumed that a jar or other means caused the detonators to fire, and that they in turn detonated the explosive. It should be recognized that it is unsafe to transport detonators and explosives in the same compartment, and this rule should be strictly enforced. At present this rule appears to be either unknown or, at least, frequently ignored.There are usually so many possible causes of ignition or detonation of a truck load of explosives that it is often impossible to state definitely the exact cause in a given case. This is well illustrated in the following account of an accident: A trucking company was hired to haul a truck load of explosives about 200 miles. The driver had had experience in driving trucks of explosives, and it was stated that he inspected the truck carefully before leaving the garage. Eighty 50-pound boxes of explosive were placed in tiers on each side of the truck and 265 25-pound kegs of black blasting powder were placed in the center of the truck. The boxes were placed flat and the kegs were placed on end, arranged in tiers. While the truck was being driven along the highway there was a muffled explosion. When some men, who were about a quarter of a mile away, arrived at the scene the truck was in flames and they could get no nearer than 100 feet. The driver was sitting in his seat and had apparently been killed instantly either by shock or fumes. When the flames were finally quenched, the driver's body was recovered, badly charred. It was, found that several boxes of explosives had been thrown about 40 feet by the initial explosion but were uninjured. A total of half a ton of dynamite was recovered. The cover to the gasoline tank could not be found."

Aug 1, 1930

By S. Gallagher

If we consider ergonomics to be an exercise in matching job demands to worker capabilities, one of the principal capabilities we must be concerned with is that of human strength. Our ability to evaluate different characteristics of muscular strength has increased dramatically over the past couple of decades with the development of new and increasingly sophisticated instrumentation. One would think that armed with such advanced techniques, we might be able to develop methods to conclusively identify workers at risk of injury in physically demanding jobs. Unfortunately, this has not yet proven to be the case. Instead, what these instruments have continued to point out is how intricate a function muscular strength really is, and how complicated and ambiguous its relationship is to musculoskeletal injury. While we cannot just use isolated tests of strength to specify precisely who may be at risk of injury, studies have indicated that strength testing can be a useful tool for job design and, under certain circumstances, selection of workers for demanding jobs. However, because strength is such a complex phenomenon, there has often been some confusion regarding the proper application and interpretation of strength tests in ergonomics, especially among persons not thoroughly familiar with the limitations and caveats associated with the available procedures. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss some of the fundamental principles of strength assessment in ergonomics, so that these procedures can be better applied to control the risk of musculoskeletal disorders in the workplace 1.1. What is Strength? (And what are we Measuring?) Many of the complications associated with strength assessment arise from the simple fact that even our most sophisticated machinery does not directly measure the force or tension developed by a muscle in a living person. Instead, we can only observe the consequences of force development by a contracting muscle, or more likely, by a combination of muscles There are many ways in which we can measure the effects of muscular contraction, and the techniques we use can have a dramatic impact on the strength readings we will obtain. Consider the situation illustrated in Figure 1. In this example, the muscle exerts a constant force of 1000 Newtons (N). However, the forces we measure can vary quite dramatically depending on where we place the force cuff - from 167 N if we place it near the wrist to 500 N if we place it near the elbow. Which value should we select as properly representing the muscular strength for this elbow flexion exertion? The preceding example illustrates some important points with regard to strength assessment. Perhaps the most important is that "muscular strength is what is measured by an instrument" (Kroemer et al. 1999). It should also be clear from this example [ ] that two researchers could perform an elbow flexion strength experiqent on the same group of subjects, but if each selected different force cuff positions, they might end up with wildly differing estimates of strength. Differences in the strengths of various muscle groups in the published literature may be the results of differences in the procedures and measurement methods used by the experimenters Thus, it is critical that any strength data presented be accompanied by a detailed account of the manner in which the data were obtained. A few additional points need to be made with regard to the testing of human strength. We must be clear that what we are obtaining in such tests are not a person's maximal strength capability, but their maximal voluntary strength. The voluntary nature of the exertion introduces an unknown, but surely substantial, amount of variability in our measurements of strength. One can imagine two subjects with identical muscular strength capabilities, but with varying levels of motivation or discomfort tolerance, for example. We are likely to observe considerable differences in the voluntary force exerted by the two, but it should be understood that such results may be largely the result of psychological factors, and not differences m muscular strength per se. The important point to be made here is that not only are we unable to directly measure muscular force, what we are able to measure is modified by an invisible filter - a filter subject to a wide variety of influences and which will differ considerably for every person we test To make matters worse, this filter would be expected to change even within a given individual on a given day. From the foregoing discussion, one can perhaps better appreciate some of the difficulties with establishing a definitive relationship between an individual's measured strength and that individual's risk of injury.