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By Carl L. Renzoni

INTRODUCTION This paper defines equity as the issuance of a permanent interest in the business on a broadly distributed basis. As such, it excludes the issuance of equity to either a merchant bank or to another corporation. Nearly twenty years ago the equity markets were very simple: The instruments used were primarily common shares, convertible debentures or convertible preferred shares. Another equity-type option often used, especially by junior companies, was the sale of joint venture interests. Issue sizes were generally in the order of $25 - $100 million and issues were syndicated primarily in North America and Europe by one or two investment dealers. Mining corporations today benefit from a market with much more depth. Issues are syndicated by dealers on a truly international basis, and issue sizes now often range up to $300 million. Moreover, dealers are now willing to take significant risk in buying the issues for redistribution. This discussion of trends in equity markets will encompass: 1) common shares 2) warrants to buy common shares 3) convertible debentures 4) commodity backed instruments A review follows of events that affect the mining industry and investment dealers as they have a bearing on the equity markets for the metal producers. FACTORS AFFECTING THE MINING INDUSTRY The current business cycle, up to October 1987, had been characterised by a buoyant stock market and depressed base metal prices. Mining companies entered this period with weak balance sheets and little prospect of cash flows meeting capital needs. The issuance of equity and the sale of assets were used extensively to reduce debt to manageable levels. During this period, the relative high price for gold, and more important, the very high earnings and cash flow multiples afforded to gold producers, caused companies to target gold as the only game in town. The need for capital to acquire and develop gold properties prompted an unprecedented volume of equity issues. (Burns Fry led or co-managed over $1 billion of mining equity issues per year during this period). This high demand for equity capital by the industry prompted an increase in the use of equity instruments, such as commodity backed instruments. In addition, government tax incentive programs in Canada, such as flow-through shares, allowed smaller companies to raise significantly more equity than would otherwise have been possible. Over $1 billion in flow-through equity was raised in 1987 alone. The abundance of flow-through capital in Canada made it easy to form a new company. One flow-through share fund developed a system of providing the working capital required for a company to be eligible to receive flow-through share capital so that an entrepreneur required only a mining property to get started. Many new companies were formed and several flourished in a buoyant stock market environment to the point that market capitalizations grew to $100 million or more. The current period is in stark contrast to that before October 1987. The equity markets are generally available to the resource industry only on a window basis and only for senior companies and for special situations. The industry is benefitting from buoyant metal prices, and bankers are anxious to provide debt capital. Investment dealers previously processing several equity issues

Jan 1, 1990

By Jan H. Hommen

TRENDS IN MINE FINANCE Reviewing historical trends may help in dealing with future funding strategies. The first trend is the increase in the use of debt to fund corporate America. Surprisingly, when comparing that with other corporates in the global marketplace, the U.S. does not look too poorly. Japanese, in particular, but also German companies, are much more leveraged than their U.S. counterparts. Note that in Japan and Germany the government and the consumer have shown substantial restraints when it comes to credit. Not so in the U.S. where the savings rate (4%) is much lower than that in Japan (20%) and in Germany (14%). As a result, the cost of leverage is substantially lower in Japan and in Germany than in the U.S. Lower debt costs in these countries allows one to obtain more of it for the same price. The close relationships between financial institutions, corporations and governments in Japan and Germany also make the risk of leverage more bearable and understandable. Also note that interest rate volatility in these countries is more subdued. The investor base in common stock is also changing. Private pension funds have been net sellers of equities during the last few years while public pension funds have been net buyers. Individuals are basically out of the market. It is estimated that over $330 billion of equity was retired in the U.S. through 1986-1988. The reasons are well known: restructurings, buy-backs, takeovers, mergers, and buy-outs. This de-equitization is likely to continue as the cost of equity capital is higher than the cost of debt capital, even on a before-tax basis. Because there has been no market for equity since October 19, 1987, junk bonds have replaced equity capital in the corporate finance structure. The non-investor-grade borrower has access to the public markets through high-yielding debt securities that often look like senior equity. Deregulation has also provided 24-hour markets; securitization can now liquify assets that before were rusting on balance sheets; information processing and communication tools give facts that are instantaneously available, creating the need for products to cover risk and exposures unknown before the start of the information and technology explosion. Thus we now have swaps, options, futures, options on futures, caps, as well as program trading, portfolio insurance, index funds, etc. Globalization will be unstoppable. Today's environment demands it. Corporations are now global competitors, even though they may have never shipped a product off-shore. Boundaries are disappearing and impediments have been removed. Stocks can be issued in a global offering with distribution in all major financial centers of the world. The high leverage of Japanese companies has made common stocks very scarce, which with the high savings rate, makes equity capital inexpensive in Japan. If markets were perfect everyone would issue stock in Tokyo and buy it back in New York. This would certainly stop the bleeding on the balance of payments. With the deficit balance of payments in America, it is no surprise that the cost of money is expensive here. The risk-return relationship on U.S. equity is not favorable enough to appeal to Japanese equity investors. The Tokyo-market, helped by a stronger yen, surpassed New York as the most important equity market in the world. The question is, will the Tokyo market hold up when Japanese domestic consumption increases at the expense of savings? In the U.S. debt markets, the plain vanilla debenture is making a comeback after a period of absence. Commercial paper has replaced short term bank borrowings for working capital funding by larger corporations. The banks have made an interesting comeback with loan sale programs that will continue to attract borrowers. There will be a continuing

Jan 1, 1990

By Alistair Frame

INTRODUCTION In April 1988 discussions were about to start with BP on the possibility of buying their- mineral interests, and it took a long time to arrange a deal. I will talk about RTZ without BP Minerals, look at the new RTZ with BP Minerals, discuss the outlook for metal prices, and review the problems in South Africa and develop the case against sanctions on that country. RTZAT THE END OF 1988 Late in 1987, after completing a worldwide review of our strategic thrust, we decided: 1. That the business focus would be to remain a major diversified natural resource group with interests in related industries. 2. To divest non-core and low growth businesses. 3. To develop a logical acquisition plan. 4. To emphasise organic growth and, most importantly, to enhance shareholders' wealth by capital increase and a progressive dividend policy. Subsequently, we concluded that we should sell our oil and gas business and dispose of several assets for which we saw little growth potential. The disposal programme raised some U.S.$ 1,600 million, representing a significant capital gain on our various investments. All transactions were carried out by our small Head Office staff in London, without the help of merchant banks and lawyers, and we were able to safeguard the employment of our staff in all these operations. The most interesting disposal was of our oil and gas interests. Before the 1987 strategic review, we had ambitions to develop our oil and gas interests and to become the leader in the second division of European oil companies. Our interests, which were purely in exploration and production of oil and gas, consisted of the 100% owned RTZ Oil and Gas company, and 29% of LASMO, a publicly quoted U.K. oil and gas company with extensive worldwide interests. LASMO, in turn, owned 25% of Enterprise Oil, one of the more successful of the North Sea oil exploration and production companies. Prior to the end of 1987, our intention was to acquire control of both LASMO and Enterprise. However, when we evaluated the net asset value of these two companies based on our oil price assumptions, which were pessimistic for the next five years or so, we concluded that they were both trading in the market at significant premiums. This, taken with the additional premium required for acquisition and the high cost of exploration, led us to conclude that, since funds could undoubtedly be used to better effect, we should sell our interests. Turning to the other major achievements in 1988, we commissioned, and built up to design levels in a very short period of time, the Morro do Ouro gold mine in Brazil. This mine reached its design output of 100,000 ounces of gold per year within three months of start-up, which was on time and under budget. We are now considering a possible expansion of this property. In South America, Utah International, Mitsubishi and RTZ arranged non-recourse finance, with post completion guarantees, for the giant Escondida Project in Northern Chile. Financing came from a group of banks in Japan, Germany and Finland -- the countries to which most of the concentrates will be sold -- and from the LEC. The average output of the mine for the

Jan 1, 1990

By Sven A. Wehrwein

Leveraged buyouts are a fixture in today's market place. This paper will include comments on how LBO's are analyzed, structured and sold, as well as an overview on the present environment of LBO's.

Jan 1, 1990

By Robert F. Calman

OUTLINE FIVE EXAMPLES OF GOLD-LINKED FINANCINGS 1. Financing the Lupin Mine • Sale of Cdn $40.0 million of 12% preferred shares and Cdn $40.0 million of Gold Purchase Warrants @ $595 per ounce. 2. Financing the Copper Range acquisition • Borrowing 100,000 ounces from a Canadian chartered bank @ US$307 for five years. 3. Financing the Round Mountain expansion • Borrowing up to US $80.0 million in dollars, convertible into gold, repayable over five years from a group of North American banks. 4. Financing the Tenneco Precious Metals Division acquisition •Sale of SFr 110.0 million of ten year 3-718% bonds with warrants to buy 132,000 ounces of gold at US $560. 5. On Forward Sales, Puts and Calls • Gold, Silver, Canadian Dollars, Swiss Francs THE FINANCIAL RULES AT ECHO BAY 1. Never bet the company 2. Equity is the primary form of capital for a gold mining company 3. On debt 4. The Yardsticks for Corporate Decisions 5. Financial Community Relationships 6. Dividend Policy No Text Available Tables Follow

Jan 1, 1990

By W. V. Bluck, W. L. McMorris

Higher coal quality is being recognized in potentially lowering the cost of power as measured at the bus bar. Assessment of potential coal supplies for most power plants is now going beyond buying at the lowest delivered fuel cost. It is now taking into consideration other factors, such as handling, storage, pulverization cost, boiler fouling, post combustion cleanup, and waste disposal costs. New measurements of quality are being considered now by those producing and those consuming the fuel by assessing numerous variables in the total fuel cycle to achieve the lowest possible power costs.

Jan 1, 1986

By R. E. Ray, J. W. Stevenson, J. A. Berry

Conventional concrete block plastered with a cementitious coating is the most common material used in the construction of permanent stoppings to direct airflow in underground mines in the US. All mines experience various degrees of strata convergence depending on depth of overburden, geological conditions, and type of roof support employed. Strata convergence will cause cracks and joint openings in masonry stoppings, resulting insignificant air leakage losses. Where strata convergence is severe, complete structural failure of the stopping can ultimately occur. Reconstruction of damaged or destroyed stoppings adds expensive overhead to mining operations, and even greater expenses are incurred from the additional fan horsepower required to overcome leakage losses. Ideally, a stopping should maintain high resistance to airflow while yielding to strata convergence. By properly incorporating a polyisocyanurate rigid foam material within the masonry block structure, stopping service life can be increased in mines experiencing strata convergence problems such as floor heave, roof loading, and lateral rib movement.

Jan 1, 1986

By W. S. Cavender

The Round Mountain mining district, Nye County, Ne- vada, was discovered in 1906 on claims owned by Lewis D. Gordon. Initial mining operations uncovered gold veins of spectacular richness, and within a few days of discovery, Gordon sold his controlling interest for some $87,000. From this sale emerged the Round Mountain Mining Co., predecessor of Nevada Porphyry Gold Mines, Inc., the latter destined to become the major property owner in the area. Vein mining in the district continued sporadically into the early 1930s, yielding 9.3 Mg (330,000 oz) of gold plus substantial silver credits from approximately 626 kt (690,000 st) of ore. In addition to the lode deposits, the early miners recognized the placer potential in the alluvial fan material accumulated around the west and north sides of Round Mountain itself. Intermittent placer operations were carried out for a number of years, and in the 1940s and 1950s, Round Mountain Gold Dredging Co. worked the placers under a lease from Nevada Porphyry Gold Mines. The last placer operation terminated in 1959 when it, like some of its predecessors, proved uneconomic. Total placer production for the district is estimated at 3657 km (4 million yd) of gravel containing 59 Mg (210,000 oz) of gold and possibly 2.0 to 2.3 Mg (70,000 to 80,000 oz) of silver. Round Mountain is a small hill situated on the east flank of the Toquima Range in central Nevada. The hill is com- posed of relatively flat-lying Tertiary rhyolitic ash flow tuffs, which overlie Paleozoic metasediments and Cretaceous granites. Throughout the surrounding Round Mountain mining district, most of the known gold ores occur in the tuffs, although the metasediments and granites are also mineralized. Mineralization is structurally controlled, principally by a series of northwest-trending shears and shattered zones. Vein, stockwork, and disseminated ores occur, usually containing simple quartz-pyrite-gold mineral assemblages. The gold itself is electrum, having a silver content of 30% to 40%. In September, 1967, Elwood Dietrich, a prospector and mine promoter, obtained a purchase option on the 4452 ha (1 1,000 acres) of mineral rights held at Round Mountain by Nevada Porphyry Gold Mines. The original option had a buy-out price of $1 million and was established through Dietrich's friendship with officers of Nevada Porphyry. In April, 1968, Dietrich conveyed his option to Ordrich Gold Reserves Co., a partnership created by a group of west coast investors, mostly employees of the airline industry. There- after, Ordrich invested considerable funds in trying to test and develop the property, but soon recognized the need to seek financial and technical support from the mining industry. In December, 1968, Dietrich contacted Wayne Cavender, then Regional Geologist, Southwest, for Copper Range Exploration Company (CRX) in Tucson, Arizona, and made a data presentation. Shortly thereafter, Cavender was appointed Manager of Exploration and Chief Geologist for Copper Range Co. (parent company of CRX), New York City, and he asked C. Phillips Purdy, CRX Regional Geologist, Northwest, to make an initial property examination. Purdy's one-week field study took place in March, 1969, and resulted in a recommendation that CRX pursue its investigation of the property. The presence of low-grade gold mineralization in both the alluvial gravels and in the bedrock was verifiable, but the placer was deemed to have the greater immediate economic mining potential. At that time, gold was in the $1.41/g ($40 per oz) price range. Working from Purdy's information, Cavender decided to attempt acquisition of the property, and the first in a long series of negotiations was initiated with Ordrich. Basically, CRX felt that the placer had a promising potential for several reasons, including (I) past operators had recovered free gold but not the gold contained in the pebble fraction of the gravels; (2) past operations appeared to have been ineffectively designed or managed and not costefficient; and (3) the price of gold appeared to be poised for an upward move. Negotiations with Ordrich were prolonged and difficult, with CRX competing against several ma* mining companies, but finally an agreement was reached, effective June I, 1970. Gold was then back to $35. It is believed that, in

Jan 1, 1985

By E. L. Affleck, W. G. Stevenson

In both Canada and the United States, a company making a public offering of securities must comply with regulations which have been passed by Federal, State and/or Provincial Legislatures. These regulations usually require the distribution of an acceptable prospectus which provides essential background information about the issuer, the project and the share offering. when the public offering has been accepted, the unlisted company may then seek a listing of its shares for trading on a Stock Exchange. Once listed, the company will be subject to rules of the Stock Exchange. This paper will deal with the specific information required for inclusion into a prospectus being submitted for a resource company and particularly those parts of concern to mining engineers and geologists.

Jan 1, 1985

By John R. Caldon

INTRODUCTION Leasing has become a major industry in many countries because of the advantages it affords. Whilst the accounting, legal and tax treatment of leasing varies from country to country, there is far more similarity than difference. The general approach to the subject is largely the same. This paper looks to the basic financial considerations in the decision to lease or buy. TYPES OF LEASES Before embarking upon the subject, it would seem appropriate to define a "lease". A lease may be defined as: "an agreement granting one party the right to use, for a specified period of time, property owned by another party in return for a series of payments of rental by the user to the owner''. Ownership, of course, generally entitles the owner to unrestricted use of the asset over its useful life in contrast to a lease which gives the lessee use over a limited period. The distinction between the status of owner and a lessee often is fairly small. In this case we are dealing with what is generally termed a "finance lease". A finance lease is one which substantially transfers the risks and benefits of ownership from the legal owner to the lessee. For example, a finance lease would exist where the lessee enters into a lease of an asset for most of its useful life and has an option to buy the asset at the end of the lease for a price which takes cognisance of the rentals already paid. Where a lease does not substantially transfer the benefits and risks of ownership to the lessee, i.e. those benefits and risks remain with the owner and lessor, the lease is termed an "operating lease" and is an agreement for the renting and usage by the lessee of an asset owned by the lessor for a limited period. An example of an operating lease might be where a tenant leases a building for a defined period say 6 years with the rent and occupancy subject to renegotiation at the end of the lease term. The economic consequences of the distinction between a finance and an operating lease is very important. With a finance lease, the lessee has a de facto economic interest in the asset and the alternative to a finance lease is some form of purchase; with an operating lease, the lessee does not have a basic economic interest in the asset and consequently a comparison with a purchase option involves far more than simply a funding comparison. Some of the principal differences between finance and operating leases can be summarised as follows: (a) finance leases: -the risks and benefits of ownership are substantially transferred to the lessee; -the lessor normally recovers his investment during the term of the lease; -the lessor in entering into the transaction is relying more on the creditworthiness of the lessee than the underlying value of the asset; - the lease is either non-cancellable or a large penalty will apply for unilateral cancellation by the lessee; (b) operating leases -the risks and benefits of ownership remain essentially with the lessor; -the lease rental income would not normally cover the recovery of the lessor's investment; -the lessor evaluates his risk in terms of the underlying value of the assets;

Jan 1, 1985

By John K. Hammes

INTRODUCTION This introductory paper presents a description and definition of what the finance function is and what it specifically means for the mining industry. In its simplest terms, finance is, "management of money matters". As an area within the discipline of business administration it draws heavily on the related fields of economics and accounting, and to a lesser extent on marketing and production. MINING FINANCE DEFINED In preparing to write about what finance means to the mining industry, I asked a number of mining people the question, "What does mining finance mean to you?" Most responded that mining finance was "How a company borrowed money for mine development", and perhaps half those questioned included "raising equity" in the definition. It is not surprising that the mining industry concept of finance is the providing of funds needed for the objectives of the business, for that was once a view shared by authorities in the field of business administration. Further, it is certainly the area where much of the emphasis has been placed in the past ten to fifteen years as the industry struggled with the development of more remote and more refractory or lower-grade orebodies while profitability and internal cash flow were below expectations. No wonder project finance became such a popular topic. Twenty years ago it is probable that the emphasis would have been on mine valuation, for that subject was the area of finance then most often examined in industry publications. Papers concerning the pros and cons of payback, internal rate of return, and discounted cash flow appeared regularly. Let's examine the following situations, each the result of a financial decision: - Funding the exploration program in a developing country was accomplished by buying the next six-months budget needs in local currency. One week later the currency devalued 30 percent. If the purchase had been delayed or the local currency borrowed short term, a substantial saving would have been made in funding the program. - A major mining company borrows heavily to finance both expansion of its primary mining business and its entry into several new industry segments. When markets for all of the commodities it produces turn down for a prolonged period, there is concern over the adequacy of cashflow to cover debt service in addition to other company needs. The company's financial officers, however, had arranged very large committed credit facilities from numerous financial institutions which assured the availability of funds for several years. This enabled the company to implement a strategy to conserve cash, sell assets and survive until conditions improved. Further, short term suppliers of credit also were comfortable with the assurance that longer term credit was there to support them. -A medium size mining company financed several mines independently with limited obligations on the part of the parent company. The company decided to refinance the operations under one agreement. More flexible terms, lower interest cost and a longer tenor financing were achieved in return for assuming the risk as a direct obligor. - The exploration and development group of a large mining company proposes to develop a new mine in a country in which the company does not presently operate. When the investment is rejected they are advised that one reason was that the reinvestment assumption inherent in the discounted

Jan 1, 1985

By G. E. Pralle

INTRODUCTION The decade from 1969 to 1979 saw the crest of a wave of investments by companies and investors, primarily from the major industrial nations, in the metals and minerals industries of the so-called lesser developed countries. This was brought about by two major considerations: 1). The higher ore grades and therefore the higher profit potential of the mineral deposits in the third world countries, and 2). The desire, particularly by the European countries and by Japan, to ensure a safe supply of raw materials not available in their own countries. The decade began with the start of the Toquepala mine in Peru and the major investments in the Bougainville mine in Papua New Guinea and the Ertsberg mine in Indonesia. It ended with the start-up of Southern Peru Copper Company (SPCC) Cuajone mine in Peru and Inco's Soroako mine in Indonesia and the investments in several major alumina or aluminum projects in Australia and Brazil. Concurrent with this huge flow of funds into the mineral resources industry of the developing world was the build-up of a psychological fear in the host countries of exploitation/domination by the foreign investors. This resulted in an increasing trend towards: 1). Nationalization of existing mineral ventures, and 2). Tougher legal/fiscal frameworks for new ones. NATIONALIZATION Nationalization appeared in its earliest form as "Mexicanization" of the petroleum industry in Mexico in the 1930's, followed later by Mexicanization of the mining industry in general. This was enacted with the Mexican Mining Law of 1961 which required that 51% of the equity be owned by Mexican nationals. Later in the decade the equity share for foreign investors was reduced to 33 1/3% for the developers of the Frasch sulphur operations in the Isthumus of Tehuantepec. However, the law was not fully implemented in the copper industry until late 1970 with the purchase of 51% of the ownership in the Cananea Mining Company. The trend toward nationalization of the copper industry progressed to Chile where in 1967 under the Government of Eduardo Frei the major North American copper companies were induced to sell a one-half interest in their Chilean mines to the State. Likewise, in 1970, "Zambianization" took place, when the two major operating companies Roan Selection Trust (Amax) and Zamanglo (Anglo American) were restructured into Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM) and Nchanga Consolidated Mines (NCCM) providing the government with 51% of the equity ownership. Whilst the earlier forms of nationalization in general constituted a fairly priced buy-out (El Teniente, Chile for US$80 million, RCM for US$117.8 million, NCCM for US$178.7 million), the total nationalization of the Chilean mining companies in 1970 under Salvador Allende did not. Later, "Western" countries joined this trend and on October 29, 1973, Mr. Gough Whitlam proclaimed that "overseas capital must continue... in partnership with Australian capital" and "in some special energy cases we have an objective of 100% Australian ownership". In 1974 Mr. Pierre Trudeau stated: "The Liberal Party of Canada sets as an objective that new resources projects in the natural resource field should have at least 50% and preferably 60% Canadian equity ownership". FOREIGN INVESTMENT The situation for the foreign investor in the worldwide resource industry rapidly deteriorated from then on. New features appeared in mineral exploitation and operating agreements, centering not only on local government/local companies ownership but also on increased taxation. The new tax rate (mineral tax, royalty, and income tax) for the semi-government companies NCCM and RCM in Zambia became an effective 73%. Likewise the much publicized and discussed renegotiated Bougainville agreement brought dramatic increases in the total "take" by the PNG Government. More innovative forms of indirect taxation made their appearance and were added to the normal tax burdens of the mineral industry which already

Jan 1, 1985

By Christian F. Baiz

INTRODUCTION Industrial minerals can have similar financing requirements to those needs of metaliferrous and coal mining projects. One of the outstanding differences is the understanding of the many different markets that these industrial minerals represent. There are in excess of 30 principal industrial minerals ranging in terms of annual production from the largest quantity such as sand and gravel, to possibly the smallest quantity of production of a legitimate industrial mineral which may be defined as industrial and rough gem diamond. (See Tables 1 and 2) Project finance techniques, analytical methods, and information requirements are covered elsewhere in this Chapter and Chapter 10. Some comments on equity finance aspects follow. EQUITY AMOUNT The amount of equity in a financing transaction provides a cushion to the lender in case the project runs into trouble. Generally speaking, the greater the amount of risk in a project, the more equity a lender will require. The amount of cash equity in a project financing transaction is between 25 and 40 percent. The amount of leverage (debt/equity) is negotiable based on such factors as the strength and extent of the sponsor's undertakings, of the project's economics, and the term of a strong sales contract. Naturally, a borrower seeks to obtain d loan with as little equity required as can be negotiated. Zero percent equity is usually associated with a take-or-pay contract (a hell-or-high- water unconditional commitment under which the purchaser must pay for the commodity as though it were shipped regardless of whether it is actually mined or shipped) with a financially strong corporate entity i.e., the parent company or an end user. As a take-or-pay contract is tantamount to a guarantee of payment, the banker views the credit basis of the loan as being other than the borrower's mining operation and therefore will analyze the creditworthiness of the institution purchasing the commodity on the basis of its corporate balance sheet. Do not confuse a take-or-pay contract with a take-if- tendered or take-and-pay contract. Another means in the United States of obtaining zero percent equity is the carved out production payment financing, typical of coal mine financing. This involves the sale, or conveyance, by the owner of the mineral property of a production payment to a nominally capitalized company. The nominally capitalized company is formed solely to buy the production payment and usually borrows 100 percent of the purchase price from a lender. Equity amounts of 10 to 20 percent generally are found in transactions which employ techniques such as an advance sale or a subordinated lease/loan. These agreements are viewed as quasi equity by most banks for several reasons. First, the proceeds represent a cash infusion early in the project's life - usually prior to the bank lending any funds. Thus, the repayment schedule is "behind" that of the bank debt. In the case of an advance sale, repayment is in the form of a long-term supply contract with favorable terms, usually priced close to the mining operation's costs. There is also usually a requirement that all costs of the project be paid for by the loan or equity, often making the sponsors financially responsible for any cost overruns. Cost overruns are a major risk in any project, large or small, and are often due to unforeseen factors such as wildcat strikes, a piece of faulty equipment, or any event which delays completion, e.g., remote location, weather, etc.. . The question of how overruns are covered can be negotiated. For example, in addition to the original debt/equity ratio of the project, there can also be a cost overrun ratio that will

Jan 1, 1985

By James L. Poole

INTRODUCTION Companies in the mining industry are subjected at times to currency exchange rate risks and interest rate risks. The former occurs any time a firm deals in more than one currency. The latter occurs anytime a firm is financing itself with borrowings that have a floating interest rate (although a fixed rate can be a problem at times). FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISKS There are two general reasons why exchange rate risks (FX risk) can occur: First, a firm may be building a mine or plant in another country where financing for the plan is denominated in funds other than the country hosting the plant. For example, if a Canadian firm is building a smelter in another country which is being financed with Canadian dollars, the C$100 million for labor, which must be paid in the local currency, has subjected the firm to a C$100 million FX exposure risk. If after the cost estimates were made the local currency appreciates 30% against the Canadian dollar, the cost of labor has increased to C$130 million. (Of course, the local currency could also devalue during this period making the labor cost component less than estimated.) The other reason exchange rate risk arises is due to the fact that the costs of production in one country producing minerals may be incurred in one currency while the production is sold in another currency, such as coal being exported from Canada to Japan under contracts denominated in Yen. In this example, the Canadian firm is exporting coal to Japan and being paid in yen in 30 days at a contract price of 100 Y per ton. Furthermore, assume that the mining firm anticipates a depreciation of the yen against the Canadian dollar of 5% in the next 30 days. Therefore, the mining firm stands to lose 5% of the value of its shipment in a month's time not including carrying costs. In both cases, the mining company risks an adverse change in the exchange rate, that is, the currency the company holds may decrease in value relative to the other currency. There are a number of ways to mitigate the exposure to foreign exchange which can be utilized by the mining company. Optimally, a company should try to match all their inflows and all their outflows in the same currency. For example, if a Canadian firm has mining costs and debt service costs both denominated in Canadian dollars then 100% of their receipts would need to be in Canadian dollars. If a Canadian firm has 70% of its cash outflows in Canadian dollars and 30% of its cash outflow in American dollars in the form of a loan amortization then their receipts would need to be 70% in Canadian dollars and 30% in U.S. dollars. This general principle of matching cash receipts and cash costs in the same currency works fine in a perfect world but what of the real world when these cannot be matched? In actual practice, however, the financial markets have developed a number of ways in which foreign exchange risks can he managed or reduced. FORWARD MARKETS One method is to use the forward markets which are made on a world-wide basis by the commerical banks for foreign exchange. If a firm wanted to lock in the current exchange rate for the receipt of a foreign currency at some point in the future, they could do so by contracting on the forward market with a bank selling that foreign currency at the current rate at the future date. For example, assume that a Canadian firm is exporting coal to Japan which would pay yen in 90 days. If a firm wanted to lock in today's exchange rate they could contract with a bank to sell on the forward market yen in 90 days. When the yen was received the contract would be executed by selling the yen to the bank and receiving the previously agreed upon number of Canadian dollars. Generally speaking, the forward market can be used to sell forward about 12 months. The costs of selling (or buying) forward

Jan 1, 1985

By L. Hartsell Cash

INTRODUCTION Created in 1944 to help rebuild those economies, principally in Europe, which were seriously damaged or destroyed during the Second World War, the World Bank--or to use its correct name, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development-began its operational phase by making a loan to the Government of France to accomplish two tasks: (i) to import coal for space heating purposes; and (ii) to buy new machinery and equipment to help rehabilitate its coal mines. Once the thrust of reconstruction in postwar Europe was largely accomplished, the World Bank Group (for today the World Bank has three separate lending windows) turned to mobilizing funds to improve living standards in developing countries, which remains its primary goal today. Over this period of time, the World Bank Group has continued to assist the world mining industry in various ways and, since 1955 the World Bank Group has financed mining or mineral processing projects with loans/credits totalling $1.5 billion. The World Bank Group consists of two institutions--the World Bank itself and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which was founded as a separate institution in 1956 and three separate lending windows--the World Bank, the International Development Association (IDA), and IFC. The World Bank loans are provided at commercially-related interest rates but have grace periods usually of up to 3 to 5 years and repayment periods ranging from around 15 to 20 years. Since the World Bank raises its operating funds on the international capital markets in varying currencies and in varying interest rates, it relends a basket of currencies at floating interest rates which are fixed every six months to reflect the Bank's own borrowing cost. At the present time, the interest rate is just below 10% per year and in addition, a one-time front-end fee of 1/4 of 1% is charged. Also, a commitment fee of 3/4% per year is charged on the undisbursed amount of the loan itself. For loans to industrial and mining projects, it is normal to charge an additional guarantee fee of 1 to 1.5% in addition to the annual interest rate. This guarantee fee is payable to the government of the country in which the project is carried out since, by its charter, the World Bank is required to have the guarantee of the host government for each loan made in a specific country. By far the greatest source of lending funds within the World Bank Group is that of the World Bank itself and for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1984, the World Bank approved loans totalling $12 billion. The second lending window within the World Bank Group is IDA which performs the same functions as the Bank itself and has the same staff. Nevertheless, its loans (called credits) are made on much softer terms and are made to the poorest nations only. IDA funds are subscribed by the wealthier countries, usually as grants, and these are relent as credits to those countries with the lowest per capita income. IDA credits are made for 50 year periods, including 10 years of grace, to the government itself. The credits are interest free, but there is a service charge of 3/4% per year on the amount withdrawn and outstanding to defray the administrative costs of IDA. Credits approved during fiscal 1984 totalled $3.5 billion. The third lending window is IFC. While IFC is a separate corporation and operates quite separately from the World Bank and has its own staff and regulations, it works very closely with the World Bank on its overall approach to the mining sector and to a particular country. IFC's mission is essentially to supply venture capital and to stimulate development of the local private sector in capital markets as well as to promote the international flow of private capital to developing countries. Unlike the World Bank and IDA, the IFC does not lend directly to governments

Jan 1, 1985

Andy H. Vassiliou – Introduction Ladies and gentlemen,.good evening and welcome to the Paul F. Kerr Memorial Symposium dinner. I believe we are all here to honor the memory of a great teacher and advisor, and a true friend -- Professor Kerr, or Dr. Kerr, or to most of us who were his students, "Pappy" Kerr. Most of us who attended the Paul F. Kerr Memorial Symposium earlier today at the New York Hilton had the opportunity to read, or listen to, or discuss scientific papers presented in honor of Dr. Kerr. In addition, all of the speakers had the opportunity to reminisce about their association with Dr. Kerr, who was credited as having contributed substantially to their graduate education and the development of their careers. Dr. Kerr's two daughters -- Ruth and Nancy -- who attended the Symposium at the Hilton are also here with us tonight. I think we should keep tonight's festivities on an informal basis since we are all old friends or former students of Dr. Kerr. Some of us may want to say a few words about our experiences at the time we were students at Columbia, and hopefully include some anecdotes relating to Professor Kerr. I would like to invite everyone to do so, but first we have arranged for two of us to be the lead speakers, whom I will introduce in a few moments.

Jan 1, 1985

By L. G. Margolin

INTRODUCTION In this paper we derive an expression to predict the onset of growth of a crack in a quasibrittle material. We employ an energy criterion, which was first proposed by Griffith (1920), and is essentially equivalent to the first two laws of thermodynamics. The criterion is applied to the elastic-plastic crack of Olesiak and Wnuk (1968), which is a three-dimensional generalization of the Dugdale (1960) crack. Our expression for the onset of growth differs in several respects from a criterion based on a crack in a brittle material (i.e., using linear elastic fracture mechanics) . Furthermore, the new features are in qualitative agreement with the experimental data. Among these new features are 1) the dependence of the apparent surface energy, or critical strain energy release rate on crack size (the shape of the R-curve); 2) the effect of in-plane stresses (i.e., the stresses that do not lead to any traction on the crack faces) on crack growth; and 3) a brittle-ductile transition. The energy criterion, as a necessary condition for crack growth, rests on a firm theoretical basis. However, its role as a sufficient condition is less secure. Several alternate criteria have been proposed as necessary and sufficient conditions for the onset of crack growth. We will contrast several of these, including critical strain (Olesiak and Wnuk, 1968; Goodier and Field, 1963) and crack opening displacement ("COD", Burdekin and Stone, 1966) with the energy criterion. We will show that these alternate approaches are inconsistent with the energy criterion, in the sense of being necessary conditions, and so should be rejected as criteria for growth--at least for the elastic-plastic crack.

Jan 1, 1984

By G. Gabra

The kinetics of acidified thiourea leaching of pyrite concentrate was investigated at temperature ranging form 20 °C to a 60 °C. The effect of various parameters on the dissolution rates are discussed. The gold extraction was found to be zero and first orders with respect to Fe (111) and thiourea concentration, respectively. The order of the reaction with respect to sulfuric acid was found to be zero. The activation energy was determined from the Arrhenius plot as 2,039 kcal mole -1 (for a freshly prepared acidic solution containing Fe (111) as the oxidant and at 800 rpm stirring speed. This relatively low activation energy value suggests that the gold extraction is controlled by a-physical phenomenon. Under optimum conditions, more than 90% of gold has been dissolved in about 30 min. and 95% in 60 min. Attempt to recover gold from thiourea solution using active carbon is also discussed.

Jan 1, 1984

By Rodolfo V. de la Cruz

The accurate assessment of the in situ deformability of rock masses is very important in the de and construction of underground openings for mining and geotechnical engineering applications. This paper presents a method and device for determining the in situ deformability of rock masses by relating the borehole jack load to the diametral displacements at a number of orientations around the borehole wall. The method called mu1tiple measurement method include the steps in which: a) diametral displacement sensors are installed at different orientations around the borehole to measure the changes in length of various diameters of the borehole; b) a uniaxial load is applied on two opposed octants of the borehole wall, and; c) using elastic theory and assuming a reasonable value for the Poisson's Ratio of the rock mass, the in situ deformability of the surrounding rock materials is determined from the measured diametral displacements and applied unidirectional load. The multiple measurement method has a significant advantage over existing methods since it provides several independent data in a single test from which to calculate the in situ deformability of the rock mass. The multiple data provide a check and counter check on the reliability and accuracy of the various measurements. The multiple data would also provide a means of quantifying the degree of fissuring on the borehole wall. Information on the degree of fissuring is very important in numerical modeling of rock masses.

Jan 1, 1984

By Paul H. Lu

Methods and results of measuring three basic parameters for ground stability control, ground pressure, strata movement, and geomechanical properties of mine rock are presented in this paper. It is found that these parameters can be measured in situ by simple and practical techniques with nonsophisticated and inexpensive instruments. Specifically, a drillhole dilation technique employing a cylindrical hydraulic borehole pressure cell (CPC) was used to determine the modulus of rigidity. Premining ground pressures were determined by pressure convergence tests with a combination of one CPC and two pre-encapsulated flat hydraulic borehole pressure cells (BPC) installed in a single drillhole. Abutment pressures and pillar loading were monitored with BPC's. Differential strata movements and bed separations were measured with self-recording 10-anchor-point extensometers. Roof-to-floor convergence was measured with self-recording convergence meters. Some applications of these in-situ-determined parameters to mine design and ground stability control are also discussed.

Jan 1, 1984