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By Rudolf E. Greuer, Linneas W. Laage, Xinton Chang

MFIRE is useful for the analysis of ventilation networks under thermal and mechanical influence MFIRE simu¬lates a mine&apos;s ventilation system and its response to altered ventilation parameters, external influences, and internal influences Extensive output enables detailed quantitative analysis of the effects of the proposed alteration on the ventilation system MFIRE was written in FORTRAN 77 and compiled with Microsoft° FORTRAN for the Intel 8086-8088 central processing units The source code is listed in appendix A for users who wish to modify the source code for operation on other computers MFIRE MODIFICATIONS OF MTU-BOM CODE The program described in Bureau of Mines Informa¬tion Circular 8901 has become known as the MTU-BOM codes MFIRE is an evolutionary product of the MTU¬BOM code with major improvements and enhancements 6 For users previously familiar with the MTU-BOM code, the following is a listing of the major improvements and enhancements incorporated by MFIRE 1 The length of an airway is an input value, LA The elevation difference of the airway is calculated from the elevation input, Z, in both programs It is possible for a data file to describe an airway that is shorter than its el¬evation difference The MTU-BOM code does not check for this error and uses the values of LA and Z This does not cause a computational problem, only a simulation problem MFIRE issues a warning message for this case, and the airway length is made equal to the elevation dif¬ference if LA is less than Z 2 To evaluate rock temperatures (average wall surface temperature of airway before a fire), it is assumed that the air temperature at an airway entrance is equal to the air temperature at the airway starting junction, and that the air temperature at the airway exit is equal to the air tem¬perature at the exit junction. The MTU-BOM code follows this assumption in all cases When a rock temperature of less than 0° F is calculated, an average temperature is used to represent the rock temperature of the airway MFIRE uses the same principle, except the consideration of unlikely rock temperatures When the exit junction of an airway is the atmosphere (a fixed condition junction), the air tempera¬ture at the exit is made equal to the air temperature at the airway beginning If an unlikely value of wall temperature (<0° F or > 150° F) results from calculations, a message is issued and the rock temperature is set equal to the air temperature at the airway exit The program user can always input rock temperature (TROCK) for an airway to override the calculated value. 3 MFIRE allows use of an optional reference airflow rate to define and limit the heat generation of a fire source This allows the simulation model to more closely resemble a real fire and to improve simulation conver¬gence Heat generation corresponds, but is not linearly related to airflow rates reaching the fire In the simula¬tion, heat generation is calculated from oxygen consump¬tion and is directly related to the variable incoming airflow Use of this optional reference airflow rate allows the heat generation to vary, but in a damped, user defined manner When the airflow rate passing through a fire source is equal to its reference airflow rate, the data items describ¬ing the fire source are not modified If the airflow rate is lower or higher than its reference airflow rate, the data items used to define the fire source are modified according to the following equations

Jan 1, 1990

By E. J. Gleim

"When permissible equipment is first placed in a gassy mine, those in charge may not realize the amount of attention and care they must give it if they intend to secure its full value as safety equipment. If permissible machines are installed as a safety measure, then they must receive regular, intelligent inspection and upkeep to forestall the development of unsafe features.Certain fundamentals have been followed in the design of this type of equipment in order to minimize the possibility of its igniting gas and dust. Hence, some knowledge of these fundamentals is essential to the inspector or official charged with the duty of ascertaining the condition of permissible machines with respect to safety. Familiarity with the constructional details of a machine is of first importance in making a thorough inspection of it. A knowledge of Schedule 2C3 which gives the requirements for practically all types of motor operated equipment receiving the United States Bureau of Mines' approval is also a requisite.There are certain special features in the construction followed by different manufacturers that can not be made clear for the purposes of inspection except by a lengthy description which would be inappropriate in this paper. There are, however, some general points that are applicable to the inspection of any machine employing trailing cable for connection to the power supply, also some that apply to any permissible storage-battery locomotive.The following list, based on the writer's experience in making field inspections, gives these general points in the form of questions which may he used as a guide by the inspector. A brief explanation is given after each question so that the reason for checking up on each point will be understood.1. Is a U. S. Bureau of Mines' approval plate attached to the machine? (Such a plate is necessary in order to establish identification as a permissible machine.)2. Is approval plate clean?(The plate should be clean so that the precautions enumerated on it are readable.)3. Is trailing cable protected by a fuse or other automatic circuit-interrupting device?(Trailing cable must have a fused trolley tap or other suitable means for short-circuit protection in case the cable is run over or splices fail. Proper fusing will minimize the possibility of fire in the cable reel.)4. If a trolley tap is used, does it contain a fuse of the proper capacity? (A piece of trolley wire or, too large a fuse may entirely defeat the purpose of fusing.)5. If a fused trolley tap is not used, how is connection made to the power supply? (The end of the trailing cable must be fitted with an insulated arrangement to minimize shock hazard when connecting the cable to the power supply.)6. Are the main fuses (or overload relays) of the correct size (or setting) for protection of the machine against overload?(Too large a fuse or too high a setting of the overload relay will permit damage to the machine by abuse through sustained overloads.)7. If the machine has a headlight, does the headlight circuit have overload and short-circuit protection?(The wiring of the headlight circuit on a machine is usually of a smaller size than that for the main circuits and therefore requires fuse protection proportionate to the size of wire.) Note: This same question may be asked relative to coal drills sometimes mounted on a machine."

Apr 1, 1932

By D. Harrington

"Since its establishment in 1910 the Bureau of Mines has consistently recommended the rock-dusting of bituminous and lignitic coal mines as a preventive of widespread explosions. As with many other proposed innovations, the response to the bureau's recommendation has been slow; but during the past 10 years many coal mines have done some rock-dusting, even though probably fewer than 50 of the country's approximately 6,000 coal mines are thoroughly rock-dusted. Notwithstanding the inadequacy of the rock-dusting which has been done in most of the mines which have adopted the new system, numerous cases are at hand. indicating the well-founded basis of the bureau's claims regarding the effectiveness of rock-dust in stopping explosions. Very brief descriptions will be given of several cases in which explosions in coal mines of the United States are fairly definitely known to have been stopped by rock-dust during the past 5 or 6 years; in addition, several cases are cited in which explosions were stopped through the agency of rock-dust and moisture.A rock-dusted mine is one in which the floor, roof, and sides of every accessible working place, including haulage ways, airways, manways, and rooms and connections have an application of rock-dust - for instance, limestone - such that the incombustible content of the aggregate dust on those surfaces is over 60 per cent. The dust in these workings should be sampled at regular intervals to determine whether the incombustible matter in the coal-dust is less than the necessary minimum of 60 per cent; another application of rock-dust should be given when the incombustible percentage is less than 60. (As an example of thorough rock-dusting, see Bureau of Mines Information Circular 6578, 1932, which describes how rock-dusting is done in Alabama at a cost of 1.8 cents per ton of coal for a thorough application; Report of Investigations 3060, February, 1931, Rock-Dusting In A Pennsylvania Coal Mine; or Information Circular 6244, 1930, giving data, including costs, on rock-dusting in coal mines in New Mexico.)An explosion may be started by the ignition of gas, even when rock-dust is present; hence it is not correct to say that rock-dust will prevent an explosion of gas; however, if rock-dust has been applied to a working place which has present an explosive mixture of me-thane and air, and if an open light is used or a blown-out shot or an electric arc occurs, although there will very likely be an ignition and possibly an explosion, the rock-dust will certainly prevent ignition of the coal-dust nearby, and unless the general atmosphere has an explosive gas mixture, the rock-dust will stop propagation of the flame throughout the mine. In other words, if an explosion is started by gas or by coal-dust and the mine has been rock-dusted as defined, the rock-dust will prevent widespread extension of the explosion, unless the general atmosphere contains methane and air in explosive proportions.With these definitions clearly in mind, instances are now given where rock-dust has played a prominent part in the stopping of several explosions. No cases have been included where there was any reasonable doubt that rock-dust had taken a definite part in the limiting of the explosions."

Apr 1, 1932

By R. H. Kudlich

In order to assist the various Federal and State agencies using large quantities of coal to select coal best suited technically and economically to their use, the United States Bureau of Mines has placed at their disposal a fuel inspection service. As part of this service, inspections are made at the mines which propose to furnish coal to these agencies on contracts. Such inspections cover both the mine itself to ascertain its capacity to fur- nish the desired tonnage and quality of the coal, the preparation of the coal in the tipple, and the obtaining of samples for analysis to determine the quality of coal as shipped. To insure that the sample sent to the laboratory for analysis is representative of the average quality of the coal, increments are taken at intervals until a gross sample of about 1,000 pounds of coal has been collected from each of the sizes of coal shipped by the mine, while coal has been coming from all parts of the mine. In reducing this gross sample to the small sample which is sent to the laboratory for analysis it is necessary to crush and quarter the coal by a certain standardized method until only 5 or 6 pounds of coal small enough to pass through a 3/16-inch square-mesh screen remains. The ordinary method which the bureau has followed was to crush the coal by hand with a tamper, such as is used for tamping concrete, on some hare smooth surface and to reduce the volume by quartering and riffling. During the past few years the demands from various Federal and State agencies for this service have been increasing rapidly in respect to bituminous coals. In addition to this, which might be called the normal increase, numerous requests have been received for similar service in respect to anthracite. It was obvious that if this increased demand was to be met it would be necessary either to increase the force allotted to this work or to provide the present force with some means by which their work could be made more effective. A care- ful survey of the situation showed that the greatest amount of time was consumed in trans- porting the men and their equipment from mine to mine in the same district, and in reducing the gross sample to the small finely crushed sample which is to be sent to the laboratory. Both of these phases of the work could be greatly accelerated by providing a motor truck of suitable speed and capacity, carrying a power-operated crusher, and the proper auxiliary equipment to store the gross sample as collected and to reduce it in volume efficiently after it has been crushed. Such a truck has been provided and placed in service. In the eight months it has been in operation the desired results have been fully attained. About twice as many samples as usual have been taken during that time by the same 2-pan crew assigned to this work. Many of the mines in the eastern part of the United States are in hilly or mountainous regions and can be reached only over rough, practically unimproved roads. Hence the speci- fications for the truck were drawn to cover high-quality, long-life trucks, in order that

Nov 1, 1931

By E. J. Gleim

"Information gathered during recent months by field men of the U. S. Bureau of Mines shows that in one State alone there have been 71 fatalities from electrical causes during the last 51/2 years, of which 55 were from contact with mine trolley wires operated at 250 volts or less, direct current. The 1928 law relating to the guarding of trolley wires in the-mines of this particular State reads: ""All trolley wires carrying a voltage of class 2 must be properly shielded except where the same are at least 61/2 feet above top of rail."" Class 2 voltage is defined as being ""between 300 volts and 600 volts direct current, or 240 volts and 480 volts alternating current."" From this it may be inferred that no guards are required, for 250-volt trolley wires, and the natural conclusion to be drawn is that the lack of guards or shields must be held responsible for these fatalities. To prevent fatalities from this source, it has been advocated that every foot of trolley wire in mines should be guarded. While some such drastic step may appear to be amply justified, a closer examination of the records shows that lack of guards is not entirely responsible but rather that carelessness and neglect in the observance of certain well-established simple rules concerning installation and location of trolley wires must also bear a share in the responsibility. In -other words, if trolley wire is installed carelessly and its maintenance neglected, failure may be expected of any guards that have been put up.There are a-number of factors affecting safety as related to trolley wires in mines, among which the following may be enumerated.1. Installation relative to track and passageways.2. Guarding.3. Maintenance.4. Discipline.Acknowledgment is made to D. Harrington and K. L. Marshall of the safety division of the bureau for assistance given in securing data on cost of installing guards for trolley wires.The statement that fatalities should not be charged in every case to lack of guards is supported by the following example: A man operating a locomotive was electrocuted when the trolley wheel jumped the 250-volt trolley wire and allowed it to sag against his shoulder. He was sitting in the regular place provided in the locomotive, but the wire was 11 inches inside of the rail and only 39 inches above it where the wire touched him, or 11 inches from the roof at a distance of 12 feet from the nearest hanger. The accident occurred between two hangers 44 feet apart, and the trolley wire was inside the rail over the entire distance, being 2 inches inside at one hanger and 10 inches inside at the other hanger. A bolt in the roof indicated that there had been a hanger at one time between the two on the 44-foot span.This example is a violation of good practice in the installation and maintenance of trolley wire. In the first place the wire should have been outside instead of inside the rail. In the second place there should have been at least one intermediate hanger so that the span would not be so great and the sag would be reduced. Furthermore, it is possible that the wire was not taut enough even when the intermediate hanger was in place.To provide a degree of safety for men in the mines certain coal-mining States, recognizing the need, have enacted laws to regulate the installation of trolley wires. These limit the distance that the wire must be kept outside and above the rail. Thus, the 1927 mining laws of Ohio specify that:"

Apr 1, 1932

By J. W. Paul

"The economic features of coal mining must take into account the drain on the man power. Study over a recent 5-year period reveals an average yearly loss of 2,125 underground men, of whom 1,182 are killed by falls of roof and coal, and according to recent data compiled by the Bureau of Mines it is estimated that 54,000 men sustain lost—time disabling injuries from the same cause.Under normal activity of the mines approximately 50 lives are taken by falls of roof during every 10 days the mines are operated, or 5 persons are killed per day, which, at a compensation charge of $5,000 each, amounts to $25,000 per day. Add to this the similar number killed by causes other than by falls of roof and we have $50,000 as an approximate daily fatality charge for each day the mines operate. On the basis of 200 working days per year, this amounts to the alarming figure of $10,000,000 annually. An investment at 5 per cent to yield this amount would require $200,000,000, which is equivalent to a capital investment of $0.40 per ton of coal, produced annually, on the basis of 500 million tons. These figures apply only to fatalities for which a fixed or stated amount is paid for compensation and do not include the compensation and hospitalization paid for the approximately 103,000 upon whom idleness is enforced by a lost-time disability injury. In one State having an annual production equal to approximately 30 per cent of the total bituminous production of the United States, the most recent data shows that for each fatality there are eight serious injuries causing 60 days or more lost time. The frequency rate of accidents for that State is less than the average for the United States, and so a conservative comparison may be made by using the figures of that State in estimating the total serious injuries, which gives 16,000 as losing 60 days or more. The average number of underground employees in the coal mines of the United States for the past 10 years has been approximately 570,000; the annual underground fatalities amount to approximately 2,000 and non-fatalities to 108,000, or a total of 110,000, which means that one out of every 5.17 employees ,or 19.3 per cent, receives an injury which results in either a fatality or a lost-time disability; this figure in a little over five years will reach a number equivalent to 100 per cent of all underground workmen. Against this is the record of many miners who have worked 25 years or more without a lost—time disability injury, indicating that coal mining is not necessarily productive of injury or death to workers.In the matter of falls of roof, it is found that 85 to 87 per cent of all fatalities occur at the working face, face of a room or entry, or in pillar work. It is at the working face that the greatest roof hazards are encountered, and when about 75 per cent of the underground employees spend approximately 90 per cent of their working hours at the face, it is logical that there is where injury is most likely to occur.Although the roof hazards may vary in different beds of coal, experience has proved that roof hazards can be successfully controlled in all coal mines, essentially regardless of the character of the roof if constant care and attention are given by the management and employees in applying the principle of safety. In almost every mining district some companies maintain an extremely low frequency rate of injury, whereas in the same district with essentially the same roof conditions the opposite is true.A study has recently been made of a number of reports upon fatalities in one district of one of the principal coal—producing States and it showed that 50 lives had been lost at 23 mines as the result of falls of roof or sides. These reports were made by the mine officials, safety engineers, and safety committees and an attempt was made to give both the cause and the person or factor responsible for the fatality. A summary of the items of responsibility is as follows:"

Feb 1, 1932

Background Carbon monoxide (CO) is an odorless, colorless gas that can cause illness and death by asphyxiation. Although the toxicity of CO is understood, CO exposure can occur from unrecognized sources. On April 2, 2000, a couple and their newborn infant were poisoned by CO migrating through the ground from blasting at a nearby coal strip mine into their home near Kittanning, Armstrong County, PA. They were treated at the hospital and diagnosed with CO poisoning. The infant had a carboxyhemoglobin level of 31%, the father 28%, and the mother 17%. Carboxyhemoglobin is the compound formed in the blood when CO is breathed. Persons not exposed to CO have carboxyhemoglobin levels of 0.3%-0.7%, and cigarette smokers have levels of up to 9%. Following release from the hospital, the family installed a CO detector in the basement of their home with the help of the local fire department. This Technology News briefly describes this incident to help increase awareness of the problem. It is discussed in more detail by Eltschlager et al. [2001]. Figure 1 shows the coal strip mine believed to have generated the CO. The initial suspect for the source of the CO was the furnace in the house. Only later did it become apparent that blasting at the nearby strip mine might be the culprit. A State investigation concluded that CO had migrated approximately 500ft from the blast, through the ground, and into the home. Figure 2 shows the locations and order of blasts at the mine. Initially, the mine did not plan to blast. Overburden generally consisted of weathered shale that could be dug without blasting. However, the mine decided to blast when hard sandstone that could not be dug out was encountered within 3 ft of the coal top. The blasting was intended to break up the sandstone. Blasting was done using bulk ammonium nitrate-fuel oil (ANFO) in 6.25-in holes 25-30 ft deep on a 16-ft by 16-ft pattern, with charge weights ranging from 17 to 170 lb. The closest blast to the home was 430 ft on April 17, 2000. The distance from the home to the blast area on the day when CO was first reported (March 31, 2000) was 500 ft. Twenty blasts were detonated at the mine between March 7, 2000, and April 20,2000. The blaster was careful to prevent fly rock since another home was only 150 ft away and a garage was 50 ft away. The quantity of explosive used in the blasts was sufficient to break the sandstone, but was less than would normally be used to blast overburden. The holes were typically one-third explosive and two-thirds stemming, with powder factors averaging 0.43 lb/yd3. Additionally, the muck was not immediately excavated after each blast. The heavy confinement on the explosive acted to prevent the typical release of blasting fumes into the atmosphere. Instances of CO migrating from blasts into homes have occurred before, but generally the distances involved were under 150 ft. It is believed that the blast design contributed to the confinement of CO in the ground, and discontinuities in the ground strata facilitated migration toward the residence. Upon inspection of the blast pitwall, a regular system of joints was observed. These joints are oriented roughly from the blast pit toward the house (figures 3-4).Blast-generated CO appears to have been driven into the joint system, displacing the air. When the joint system was saturated, the next succeeding blast pushed the CO into an uncased well next to the house (a high level of CO has been measured in the well shortly after a blast). From there, the CO entered the French drain system and then the basement of the house. The joints are vertical cracks through rock layers that occur on a regular spacing (figure 3). They are most common near valley slopes and are caused when valley walls converge as the stream cuts down through the rock layers. Often called hill seams, they roughly parallel the valley walls, but can curve and split, creating a pathway for gas movement (figure 5). These fractures are often encountered when underground mining proceeds close to outcrop. The system of fractures at the Kittanning blast pit was well developed and provided a path for transmission of CO both through the sandstone and up and through the overlying shales. Blasting engineers should be able to distinguish naturally occurring fractures from blast fractures and note the frequency, development, and orientation of the hill seams and their proximity to occupied houses. The limits of transmission of

May 1, 2001

By J. R. Thoenen

This circular is part IV of the third paper (entitled "Sand and Gravel Excavation") of a series summarizing the technical problems involved in the production and preparation of sand and gravel. Part I discussed the use of power shovels, draglines, and excavator cranes; part II discussed the use of power scrapers, slackline cableway excavators and hydraulic monitors; and part III discussed the use of hydraulic, clamshell, ladder, and dipper dredges. This circular discusses haulage equipment in general, particularly the use of industrial cars with locomotives or hoists as the motive power. Part V, to follow, will discuss the use of other types of haulage equipment.

Oct 1, 1935

By R. D. Currie

The practicability and dependability of two permissible methane-indicat- in detectors recently developed were proved conclusively by extensive tests in the return airways of all mines operating in the anthracite region in most of which samples and readings were taken with one or the other of the two in- dicating detectors. These detectors roved dependable and accurate within practical limits, and their general use should be encouraged as an aid to bet ter ventilation, more accurate control of air currents, and greater safety in mines.

Feb 1, 1936

By R. V. Ramani, A. S. C. Owili-eger

? THIS PROGRAM SIMULATES METHANE FLOWRATES THROUGH THE GOAL ? SEAM BY THE GAUSS-SEIDEL ITERATIVE TECHNIQUE. THE MODEL IS A TWO ? DIMENSIONAL SYSTEM. THE ITERATIVE FORM OF THE GAUSS-SEIDEL IS ? OBTAINED FROM A PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL EQUATION OF FLOW BY CENTRAL ? FINITE-DIFFERENCING APPROXIMATION SCHEME ? NPRESS IS THE NUMBER OF SPECIFIED PRESSURES EXCLUDING ? RESERVOIR AND FACE PRESSURES ? NQUAN IS THE NUMBER OF SPECIFIED FLOW QUANTITY.... EXCEPT FLOW ? OUT OF THE FACE. THIS- QUANTITY CAN BE POSITIVE(INJECTION) OR ? NEGATIVE ( PRODUCTION) ? XPERM(I,J) I S THE DIRECTIONAL PERMEABILITY IN THE X-DIRECTION AT THE POINT (I,J) ? YPERM(I,J) IS THE DIRECTIONAL PERMEABILITY IN THE Y-DIRECTION ? AT THE POINT (I,J) ? RESEP&apos; IS THE RESERVOIR PRESSURE ? FACEP IS THE FACE PRESSURE. THIS PRESSURE IS ASSUMED TO BE ? APPROXIMATELY ATMOSPHERIC ? LENGTH, WIDTH, AND THICK ARE THE ZONE OR MEDIUM DIMENSIONS * PUHL I S A DUMMY NAME FOR VISCOSITY ? DMAXI IS VARIABLE NAME FOR INITIAL MAXIMUM ERROR OF ITERATION ? DMAXF IS A VARIABLE NAME FOR FINAL MAXIMUM ERROR OF ITERATION ? NITER IS A VARIABLE NAME FOR STORAGE OF NUMBER OF ITERATIONS ? RAD IS A VARIABLE NAME FOR THE SPECTRAL RADIUS OF THE GAUSS¬ ? SEIDEL MATRI-X. THIS PARAMETER ALSO MEASURES THE RATE OF ? CONVERGENCE OF THE ITERATION ? KOUNT IS AN ITERATION COUNTER ? MAXIT IS THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ITERATION SPECIFIED BY THE USER # EPS IS THE MAXIMUM RESIDUAL ALLOWABLE ERROR-FOR CONVERGENCE

Jan 1, 1974

By J. B. Janus

This report, the 25th in a series, lists analytical data of coal samples collected by the Bureau of Mines in connection with the purchase of several million tons of coal for various Government agencies during fiscal year 1975. Tipple samples were collected by Bureau of Mines engineers at tipples as coal was being loaded into railroad cars or trucks. Ultimate analyses are given for these coalbeds only. The delivered coal was sampled at destination in accordance with instructions furnished by the Bureau of Mines, and all samples were analyzed in the Bureau laboratory at Pittsburgh.

Jan 1, 1976

By R. V. Ramani, R. Stefanko, G. W. Luxbacher

CALCULATION OF MINE HEAD LOSSES FROM ALTIMETER SURVEY DATA USBM PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY - MINERAL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT USBM USBM USBM THIS PROGRAM CALCULATES PRESSURE LOSSES USING THE USBM METHOD GIVEN USBM IN USBH IC 7809 BY MCELROY AND KINGERY.1957. THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE USBM BETWEEN THIS PROGRAM AND THE CITED REFERENCE IS THE TREATMENT OF AIR USBM

Jan 1, 1977

Because surface mining removes the original plant cover from the land and exposes the soil, special care is needed. Until the mined land is stabilized by revegetation, snowmelt and rainfall can pick up sediment and erode mined lands much faster than undisturbed areas. Sediment control is an important aspect of protecting the environment during mining and reclamation because without it, large amounts of sediment can clog streams, increase the risk of flooding, damage irrigation systems, harm aquatic habitat, and limit the use of water for other purposes. Stream quality can be affected many miles downstream from the mine. Before SMCRA was implemented many streams were degraded by uncontrolled sediment from mining. Sediment is controlled through careful planning and a design that incorporates a variety of measures that work together to reduce soil erosion at the mine. Disturbed areas are graded, and some areas terraced, to achieve stable slopes, reduce runoff water velocity, increase infiltration, and divert runoff into drainage channels so that it flows away from unvegetated, erodible areas. Grading along the slope contour and scarify in gun vegetated slopes with bulldozer track marks help prevent erosion by slowing down the flow of water. Runoff from haul roads is controlled by culverts and roadside ditches. Sedimentation ponds or other forms of sediment control are required at all mines to minimize the amount of sediment leaving the site.

Jan 1, 1992

By Robert L. Lagace

This final report documents the work done by Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL) on behalf of the U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh Mining and Safety Research Center (PMSRC) , on Contract H0122026 (which began in August of 1971) . Under this contract ADL provided technical assistance to the Bureau on a task basis on virtually all aspects of the Bureau&apos;s programs related to present and planned emergency and operational communications and miner location systems for underground coal mines. The work consisted of in- dependent investigations, analyses, experiments, breadboard and prototype hardware development, workshops and technology transfer seminars on mine communications, and on-going evaluations and guidance related to the Bureau&apos;s contracted programs on electromagnetic noise, mine communications systems, and trapped miner location. This final report documents the work in two volumes, Volume I, "Emergency and Operational Mine Communications," and Volume II, "seismic Detection and, Location of Isolated Miners." The Tables of Contents of both Volumes are included in each Volume.

Jan 1, 1974

By R. Van A. Mills

This preliminary paper is intended to answer briefly some of the inquiries coning to the Bureau of Mines regarding the so-called "paraffining", of oil wells and methods of preventing and remedying that trouble. The increased difficulties in operation and the losses of production caused by the deposition of gummy and waxy hydrocarbons, commonly called paraffin, in the wells, tubing, other pumping equipment, and in the pores of the productive sands, have long been recognized but the trouble has not been overcome. The nature and causes of the trouble, together with some of the possible methods by which it may be diminished or overcome, are outlined below. Character of the Peraffining Materials. The so-called paraffin that collects in oil wells end in the pores of the oil-producing sands immediately around the wells, is generally made up of amorphous wax or uncracked paraffin, asphalt, or other gummy hydrocarbons mixed with more or lees water, oil, and inorganic silt. Some of the samples of this "paraffin" collected from oil wells in different fields and examined by the Bureau of Mines contain as mach as 20 per cent by weight of water and inorganic silt, whereas other samples are composed entirely of waxy hydrocarbons and oil. The inorganic silt accompanying this "paraffin" is mostly fine sand, clayey materials, common salt and finely disseminated precipitates of calcium and magnesium carbonates. Sulphates of calcium, barium, and strontium are less common constituents of the "paraffin."

Jan 1, 1923

By Julian Vigil

Mountain bumps have been a problem in the coal-mining industry since the 1920&apos;s. The problem became severe in the late 40&apos;s and early 50&apos;s with the introduction of mechanized mining. Fatalities and serious injuries resulted from mountain bumps during this period. Mountain bumps again caused fatalities in the 80 &apos;s. Interviews were conducted mostly with retired coal miners having experience in bump conditions with five different coal companies. These men held positions as president, general manager, roof-control specialist, mining engineer, inspector, superintendent, mine foreman, shift foreman, section foreman, miner operator, electrician, and general laborer. Together, their comments give a good idea of the things tried to mitigate mountain bumps in the Appalachian Coal Fields.

Jan 1, 1991

By Earl R. Maize

This is the first of a series of reports dealing with development of a method of strengthening bituminous-coal-mine roof. Later reports will describe the progress made with injecting high cohesive and adhesive bonding agents into bedding planes and mine tests of roof strata strengthened by the bonds formed. The concept of strengthening roof strata in coal mines by inserting steel rods in the form of bolts has been widely accepted by the coal industry. The benefits of increased production and safety derived from this type of roof support has more than justified the increased cost of roof bolting. However, not all coal-mine roof structure is amenable to this type of support, and failures occur owing to the heterogeneity and variable character of mine-roof strata.3/

Jan 1, 1957

"Initiated as a part of the Bureau of Mines program for development of strategic minerals for national defense, various mines in the Poughkeepsie Gulch and Mineral Point mining districts were examined by C. R. Wilfley, W. R. Hamilton, .and N. E. Wvvlwy, Jr., Bureau Of 'Mines engineers, in July and August 1943, July 1944, and September 1945. In a subsequent report a proposal was made to evaluate this isolated area 'of some 15 square miles located in Ouray and San Juan Counties, Colo.Reconnaissance work in the area was begun in June 1946. Mapping and sampling were begun in July and was completed in Pougkeepsie Gulch and extended westward to include the Hendrick Gulch area of the east side of Ironton Park. Project work was recessed for the winter on October 15, 1946 after approximately 6 square miles of the Poughkeepsie Gulch,district been mapped and 801 samples had been taken.In this report the physical features, climate, and ore deposits districts are described, and a brief history of mining and production lead, zinc; and silver is given.The individual mines and prospects in, the area are described in detail.A list of patented claims and ownerships is given in appendix I, and analyses of samples are tabulated in appendix II.The San Juan preliminary project was directed by Paul T. Allsman, chief, Salt Lake City Branch, Mining Division and was supervised by William M. Traver, Jr., supervising engineer, Colorado Field. Office.Chemical analyses were made by the Salt Lake City laboratory under the direction of H.E. Peterson, chemist, and S. R. Zimmerley, chief, Salt Lake City Branch, Metallurgical Division.Harold A. Waddington, president, Great Divide Mining & Milling Corp., and Ernest Miller, owner, Como Consolidated Mines, were particularly cooperative in making available maps and data concerning their properties."

Sep 1, 1949

By J. N. Van Sant

Lignite mining in North Dakota was begun about 1884 to supply the domestic needs of settlers. Annual production has grown rather slowly but steadily, exceeding 3 million tons in 1950. The western part of the State has lignite reserves, amounting to 351 billion tons, underlying an area of 28,000 square miles. Contour strip mining has almost completely replaced underground mining as the method of production. Lignite is often found under rather shallow and easily removed overburden, and this is the primary reason for the change in mining practice. Current mining operations are conducted where the overburden is 30 to 70 feet thick. Contour strip mining results in high production rates, at present 27 to 56 tons per man-day. These high production rates result in relatively low production costs.

Jan 1, 1959

Water pollution has been an integral part of most mining operations in the past. Most mine planners had designed their mining operations with little or no regard for prevention of water pollution. The main planning element was always the economics of mineral recovery. Quite often the cheapest means of mineral recovery resulted in the largest water pollution problems. Recent water pollution laws have introduced a new economic element - water pollution control costs - to be considered in mine planning. Water pollution control costs can be extremely high. Foresighted planning can minimize these costs and provide better water pollution control. Effective pollution control preplanning can eliminate pollution from active mines and minimize pollution that may occur after completion of mining. Presently available technology can practically eliminate water pollution by treatment of the mine water. Use of water treatment during mining has no effect on the levels of water pollution after treatment ceases and the mine is abandoned. Therefore, this section of the report deals with preplanning to reduce water pollution, both present and future, by using at-source control techniques. Proper planning of mining and pollution control techniques should follow the concept of a complete, comprehensive reclamation plan. This plan should have control measures designed for all phases of mining from initiation through completion. Preplanning involves acquiring complete information concerning the future mine site, defining the reasons why mining could cause pollution from the site, and determination of available techniques to prevent or minimize formation or transportation of pollutants. Location of haulage and access roads and other mine related facilities should be included in preplanning for water pollution control. Mine site planning is the primary step in establishing any new mining area and is the key to a successful, non-polluting and economical

Jan 1, 1973