The Bureau of Mines investigated coal-mine-type short-delay electric detonators marketed by three domestic manufacturers to determine the accuracy of delays and the probability of overlap between adjacent de- lay periods. The Winzer index was computed and compared with the probability of overlap. A close agreement between the Winzer criterion and overlap probability was demonstrated. A permissible blasting unit capable of delivering a maximum firing energy of 4.0 J and a digital oscilloscope were used to measure the delay time with an accuracy of 20.25 ms. Another oscilloscope and a pulse transformer were used to record firing current. Experimental data indicated negligible overlap probability in detonators of shorter delay periods: periods 1 to 4, which correspond to 25 to 250 ms. However, a significant probability of overlap was detected in some detonators of longer delay periods: periods 5 to 9, which cor- respond to 300 to 500 ms.
"The transportation of explosives, and especially their distribution from the supply magazines of the manufacturers or dealers to the mines, quarries, or other points where they are to be used, by means of horse-drawn vehicles is an old-time practice, and the records of accidents of the past show this to have been a hazardous undertaking requiring for safety the taking of many precautions not required in the transportation of other merchandise.Displacement of the horse-drawn vehicle by the motor vehicle for the transportation of explosives is increasing rapidly. A consideration of the facts that the vehicle is operated by an explosion engine, using easily vaporized liquid fuel; that the charges in the engine are fired and the vehicle lighted by electricity; and that the vehicle, being operated insulated from the ground, may accumulate static charges led to the conclusion that new hazards are being introduced into the transportation of explosives through the use of motor-operate& vehicles, and that therefore additional special precautions must be taken against these additional hazards.That accidents have already occurred in this use of motor-vehicle transportation is evidenced from the following examples:Recently in California a driver loaded a box of granular powder in the rear of an automobile truck and a box of electric detonators in the front. Suddenly, while traveling along a highway, the explosives detonated, demolished the truck, and blew the body of the driver into small pieces. No evidence was left to show the cause of the explosion, but it is assumed that a jar or other means caused the detonators to fire, and that they in turn detonated the explosive. It should be recognized that it is unsafe to transport detonators and explosives in the same compartment, and this rule should be strictly enforced. At present this rule appears to be either unknown or, at least, frequently ignored.There are usually so many possible causes of ignition or detonation of a truck load of explosives that it is often impossible to state definitely the exact cause in a given case. This is well illustrated in the following account of an accident: A trucking company was hired to haul a truck load of explosives about 200 miles. The driver had had experience in driving trucks of explosives, and it was stated that he inspected the truck carefully before leaving the garage. Eighty 50-pound boxes of explosive were placed in tiers on each side of the truck and 265 25-pound kegs of black blasting powder were placed in the center of the truck. The boxes were placed flat and the kegs were placed on end, arranged in tiers. While the truck was being driven along the highway there was a muffled explosion. When some men, who were about a quarter of a mile away, arrived at the scene the truck was in flames and they could get no nearer than 100 feet. The driver was sitting in his seat and had apparently been killed instantly either by shock or fumes. When the flames were finally quenched, the driver's body was recovered, badly charred. It was, found that several boxes of explosives had been thrown about 40 feet by the initial explosion but were uninjured. A total of half a ton of dynamite was recovered. The cover to the gasoline tank could not be found."
"The Generic Mineral Technology Center for Respirable Dust (GTCRD) was created at The Pennsylvania State University and West Virginia University by a congressional initiative in 1983 responding to recommendations in the 1980 National Academy of Sciences study on the Measurement and Control of Dust in Mines. Many of these recommendations dealt with the need to initiate focused fundamental research for further professional progress in dust control. Long-term, sustained support was emphasized to develop expertise in respirable dust research. In creating this Center, Penn State and West Virginia University were specifically recognized for their expertise in and facilities for research on coal mining and medicine. Today, the Center includes the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Minnesota, and the Michigan Technology University. The Respirable Dust Center is the only organization that coordinates and integrates the medical, scientific, and engineering aspects of respirable dust disease. The Center works with the U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM), Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), and the U.S. coal industry in defining the research priorities for the programs of the Center to enhance research synergism.The Center's mission is to enhance the health, safety and productivity of miners by advancing the fundamental understanding of all aspects of respirable dust associated with mining and milling and the interaction of dust and lungs to reduce the incidence and severity of respirable dust disease.All Dust Center activities are focused to be responsive to this mission, which is shared by the several federal agencies closely associated with the GTCRD. While significant progress has made mine atmospheres cleaner and healthier, respirable dust-related disease remains the nation's most pernicious industrial hazard.The goals of the GTCRD were formulated with recognition of the diverse scientific, engineering, and medical aspects of respirable dust, in addition to a need to enhance researcher interaction, as well as education and technology transfer efforts, in the respirable dust area. These goals reflect the needs of the mining industry as determined by the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Measurement and Control of Respirable Dust study done in 1980. The report of this committee encouraged the Bureau of Mines to redirect its research efforts ""...toward obtaining fundamental understanding of the origin, transport and characteristics of respirable coal mine dust."" The GTCRD's goals, detailed in chapter three of this document, were formulated to mesh with NAS recommendations."
RI 8888 - Overlap Probability for Short-Period-Delay Detonators Used in Underground Coal Mining