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By Craig E. Saporito

INTRODUCTION Freeport-McMoRan Inc. has been very active recently with two major discoveries and its restructuring activities. This paper describes Freeport-McMoRan's businesses, the two major mineral discoveries, and exciting opportunities within the oil and gas operations. BUSINESS ACTIVITIES Freeport-McMoRan is the largest and one of the lowest cost fully integrated U.S. phosphate fertilizer producers. It is the second largest domestic Frasch sulphur producer. Freeport- McMoRan will become the largest domestic producer of Frasch sulphur when its Main Pass Block 299 sulphur deposit reaches full production in 1993. Furthermore, it is the largest transporter of sulphur produced by others. Its oil and gas activities rank among the largest U.S. independents in terms of production and proved reserves. The copper/gold operations in Indonesia are among the world's lowest cost. When expansion operations reach full capacity levels in 1992, the Indonesian copper/gold complex will be the fifth largest copper operation in the world. Operations are divided into three business segments that include: 1. Agricultural minerals, incorporating sulphur, phosphate rock and phosphate fertilizer activities; 2. Energy, including oil and gas activities; and 3. Metals, incorporating copper, gold and silver operations in Indonesia. In early 1989, Freeport-McMoRan announced the discovery of two world-class ore bodies; a sulphur deposit off the coast of Louisiana on Main Pass Block 299, and a copper/gold deposit -- the Grasberg in Indonesia -- approximately two miles away from the existing Ertsberg East operations. As a result of these major discoveries, Freeport- McMoRan decided to carry out a restructuring program. Its purpose was to sell $1.2 to $1.5 billion of non-strategic assets. Debt levels and associated interest expenses will be significantly reduced, and general and administrative expenses will be reduced, which will place Freeport- McMoRan in an excellent position to fund the development of the Main Pass Block 299 sulphur discovery, the Grasberg discovery, and oil and gas discoveries. This restructuring program also will allow Freeport-McMoRan to achieve the greatest future value for shareholders by focusing on its principal businesses (Figure 1). Strategic Restructuring • Sell $1.2 - $1.5 Billion Of Non-Strategic Assets • Significantly Reduce Debt • Significantly Reduce G&A • Fund Development Of Main Pass & Grasberg • Stronger Company; Positioned For Future Growth • Focus Is On Principal Businesses: - Sulphur/Phosphate Fertilizers - Indonesian Copper/Gold - Oil And Natural Gas Figure 1 - Strategic Restructuring AGRICULTURAL MINERALS Main Pass Block 299 Discovery The Main Pass Block 299 discovery has a proven reserve of 67 million long tons of recoverable sulphur. This is the largest known Frasch sulphur deposit in North America. The discovery increased Freeport-McMoRan's sulphur reserves more than five-fold, and is synergistic with the company's phosphate fertilizer assets. The

Jan 1, 1990

By Alistair Frame

INTRODUCTION In April 1988 discussions were about to start with BP on the possibility of buying their- mineral interests, and it took a long time to arrange a deal. I will talk about RTZ without BP Minerals, look at the new RTZ with BP Minerals, discuss the outlook for metal prices, and review the problems in South Africa and develop the case against sanctions on that country. RTZAT THE END OF 1988 Late in 1987, after completing a worldwide review of our strategic thrust, we decided: 1. That the business focus would be to remain a major diversified natural resource group with interests in related industries. 2. To divest non-core and low growth businesses. 3. To develop a logical acquisition plan. 4. To emphasise organic growth and, most importantly, to enhance shareholders' wealth by capital increase and a progressive dividend policy. Subsequently, we concluded that we should sell our oil and gas business and dispose of several assets for which we saw little growth potential. The disposal programme raised some U.S.$ 1,600 million, representing a significant capital gain on our various investments. All transactions were carried out by our small Head Office staff in London, without the help of merchant banks and lawyers, and we were able to safeguard the employment of our staff in all these operations. The most interesting disposal was of our oil and gas interests. Before the 1987 strategic review, we had ambitions to develop our oil and gas interests and to become the leader in the second division of European oil companies. Our interests, which were purely in exploration and production of oil and gas, consisted of the 100% owned RTZ Oil and Gas company, and 29% of LASMO, a publicly quoted U.K. oil and gas company with extensive worldwide interests. LASMO, in turn, owned 25% of Enterprise Oil, one of the more successful of the North Sea oil exploration and production companies. Prior to the end of 1987, our intention was to acquire control of both LASMO and Enterprise. However, when we evaluated the net asset value of these two companies based on our oil price assumptions, which were pessimistic for the next five years or so, we concluded that they were both trading in the market at significant premiums. This, taken with the additional premium required for acquisition and the high cost of exploration, led us to conclude that, since funds could undoubtedly be used to better effect, we should sell our interests. Turning to the other major achievements in 1988, we commissioned, and built up to design levels in a very short period of time, the Morro do Ouro gold mine in Brazil. This mine reached its design output of 100,000 ounces of gold per year within three months of start-up, which was on time and under budget. We are now considering a possible expansion of this property. In South America, Utah International, Mitsubishi and RTZ arranged non-recourse finance, with post completion guarantees, for the giant Escondida Project in Northern Chile. Financing came from a group of banks in Japan, Germany and Finland -- the countries to which most of the concentrates will be sold -- and from the LEC. The average output of the mine for the

Jan 1, 1990

By Robert F. Calman

OUTLINE FIVE EXAMPLES OF GOLD-LINKED FINANCINGS 1. Financing the Lupin Mine • Sale of Cdn $40.0 million of 12% preferred shares and Cdn $40.0 million of Gold Purchase Warrants @ $595 per ounce. 2. Financing the Copper Range acquisition • Borrowing 100,000 ounces from a Canadian chartered bank @ US$307 for five years. 3. Financing the Round Mountain expansion • Borrowing up to US $80.0 million in dollars, convertible into gold, repayable over five years from a group of North American banks. 4. Financing the Tenneco Precious Metals Division acquisition •Sale of SFr 110.0 million of ten year 3-718% bonds with warrants to buy 132,000 ounces of gold at US $560. 5. On Forward Sales, Puts and Calls • Gold, Silver, Canadian Dollars, Swiss Francs THE FINANCIAL RULES AT ECHO BAY 1. Never bet the company 2. Equity is the primary form of capital for a gold mining company 3. On debt 4. The Yardsticks for Corporate Decisions 5. Financial Community Relationships 6. Dividend Policy No Text Available Tables Follow

Jan 1, 1990

By John J. McCabe

INTRODUCTION Over the years, Congress has written into the Internal Revenue Code various provisions aimed at lessening at least one financial burden faced by taxpayers in the mining industry - the federal income tax burden. These provisions include the election to deduct exploration expenses, the election to defer deduction of development expenses, and the percentage depletion deduction. Careful tax planning from the very beginning of a mining venture is essential in taking maximum advantage of these tax benefits. A major decision to be made is the choice of organizational structure. (For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see McCabe, John J., "Developing Structures for Investments in Mineral Property," New York University Institute on Federal Taxation, 42 NYU 24, 1984). One such structure is the use of multiple corporations, with mining activities conducted by one corporation and nonmining activities, such as manufacturing, financing and administration, conducted by the other corporation. This technique, which will be discussed in detail below, can be particularly advantageous in delaying recapture of previously deducted exploration expenses and in maximizing depletion deductions. TAX BENEFITS IN MINING Exploration Subject to certain restrictions discussed below, exploration expenditures (i.e., expenditures paid or incurred during the taxable year for the purpose of ascertaining the existence, location, extent, or quality of any deposit of ore or other mineral, and paid or incurred before the beginning of the development state of the mine are deductible at the election of the taxpayer (Section 617(a)).* Were it not for this option, exploration expenditures would be required to be capitalized and recovered through depletion, after production begins. Exploration of a mineral deposit can be very costly and may not result in commercial production for some time. If the taxpayer has income to he offset by the deductions, a mining venture can usually be structured in such a way as to allow the offset of mining losses against the other income. With today's high interest rates, this election can be quite valuable in present value terms. Corporate and noncorporate taxpayers are subject to different restrictions on this tax benefit. Corporations may elect to deduct only 85 percent of eligible exploration expenditures (Section 291(b)). (The Tax Reform Act of 1984 reduced this to 80 percent effective for expenditures after December 31, 1984, in taxable years ending after such date). The remaining 15 percent (20 percent after December 31, 1984) is capitalized and recovered at the same rate as five-year ACRS property (Section 291(b)). Individual taxpayers are not subject to this 85 percent rule; however, any amount deducted in excess of ten-year straightline amortization is a tax preference item for individuals (Section 57(a)(5)). Individuals may avoid the tax preference by electing to capitalize exploration expenditures and amortize them over ten years (Section 58(i)). In order to prevent the taxpayer from, in effect, converting ordinary income into capital gain by selling property that has given rise to exploration expense deductions, the Code requires recapture of such deductions upon the occurrence of certain events (Section 617): 1. Upon disposition of the property, adjusted exploration expenditures are recaptured to the extent of gain realized on the disposition (Section 617(d)). 2. If the property is leased, the lessor is disallowed any depletion deduction until his adjusted exploration expenditures have been recaptured in the form of foregone depletion deductions (Section 617(c)).

Jan 1, 1985

By William J. Potter, Roger N. Pyle

Introduction The primary ingredient for survival of mining companies during a recessionary period is to be innovative and resourceful in the structuring and financing of operations. Over the past decade, many mining companies have had to retrench and restructure their operations and to redeploy their assets just to survive. During the same period, traditional sources of financing for mining companies -- commercial banks, subsidized export credit loans and long term straight debt financing in the public markets -- became less available and more expensive. Meanwhile, new markets and new financing instruments provided new alternatives for mining companies. Those companies which exploited these alternatives greatly enhanced their capacity for survival and even for profitability. This article considers the strategies adopted by some companies to adapt to changes in this recessionary environment; the inadequacy of traditional sources of financing; certain of the new financing instruments, structures and markets which have become available; and how several mining companies have utilized these new instruments, structures and financial markets to improve their competitive positions. THE IMPACT OF RECESSION ON MINING COMPANIES AND TRADITIONAL FINANCING SOURCES In its 1983 year-end article "The New Economic Order" Mining Journal characterized many of the large private sector mining companies with operations in the industrialized countries as being "gripped between the jaws of high working costs and stagnating metal commodity prices." The article went on to characterize the Canadian mining industry in particular as being "in the difficult position of having to seek to sell the bulk of its output in a world market characterized by over-capacity, where production costs were determined by internal political and economic factors while prices were set by external competitive forces of supply and demand." Miners of a wide range of commodities in the industrialized countries have come to realize that their domestic mineral resources are in many cases no longer competitive with global sources of supply. To compete and survive they would have to rely on their technical and financial expertise in mineral exploration and development and in mining and processing. Strategies For Survival Global competition has compelled management in the extractive industries to improve their worldwide cost position. This is the only means whereby a mining company can differentiate its product and attain a substantial competitive advantage. During the past decade, for example, ASARCO Inc. and Inco Ltd. chopped their payrolls, postponed expansion plans and otherwise retrenched. ASARCO reduced its capital expenditures and cash requirements for operations in 1984 to a level almost equal to its internally generated cash. The company's finances were also strengthened by increasing total lines of credit from outside sources, by selling common stock, and by reducing annual pension funding through a change in actuarial assumptions. Other companies returned to their traditional organizational structure where they had a demonstrated competitive strength. Consolidated Gold Fields, for instance, resumed its operation as a mining finance house. Its capital investment programs are now devoted solely to resource development. In mid-1984, at a time of firming zinc prices, Union Miniere S.A. used the opportunity to integrate its smelting capacity and to direct investment to certain subsidiaries at the expense of less viable operations. Smaller corporations realized that it was not enough just to be the low-cost producer. For example, Drummond Coal Company in Alabama, which dominates its regional market due to its low-costs, has also developed a world-wide trading capability and has placed incremental tonnage from its own mines as well as brokered coal produced by others, thereby minimizing capital risk. In Canada, Campbell Resources has exploited difficult times by acquiring assets cheaply. In the process it improved its capacity to withstand cyclical economic swings by diversifying from solely a copper and gold producer to a company based upon asbestos, coal, copper, gold and natural gas.

Jan 1, 1985

By Thomas P. Bispham

INTRODUCTION From the lender's point of view, the greatest period of risk in a project financing occurs during the construction phase. Therefore, most projects are supported during this phase by completion guarantees supplied by some credit-worthy entity; for example, the project sponsors in the case of a joint venture, such as that of W.R. Grace, Hanna Mining, and Liberty Capital; or by a strong contract with a utility or foreign importer/investor, such as the way North American Coal Corporation has structured many of its transactions. THE PROJECT LOAN REQUEST A project financing is a more complex form of term loan than one using an ongoing corporation's balance sheet as a credit base and, therefore, a potential lender will subject the loan request to a more rigorous analysis. To support this effort, the financial institution will require a more detailed information memorandum to evaluate the credit and technical risks of a project - especially since much of the necessary information is not otherwise available. (See also Gibbs and Sroka paper above in this Chapter) A well-prepared information memorandum will impress prospective lenders with the planning ability and general competence of management. Also, the process of preparing the memorandum will help management understand the true extent of the opportunities and limitations of its venture. Appendix A outlines the topics which comprise a complete information memorandum for a loan request. Of some interest to those seeking to sell a currently-operating mining venture, a similar information memorandum should be prepared i.e., covering the same topics discussed here, for the investment banker to use with potential purchasers. For that purpose, though, one might not want to prepare quite as much detail as for a lender. Appendix B outlines the elements of a reserve evaluation and feasibility study, often called the "Bankable Document." Usually, these studies are prepared by independent engineering consultants for use by potential borrowers and sellers. (Potential purchasers will often contract for a similar study for their use in evaluating an acquisition.) ELEMENTS OF A LOAN INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 1. Outline: The information memorandum should begin with a one-page outline covering such topics as: a. The borrower's name, address, and phone number. b. Principal contact at the borrower. c. Amount of the proposed financing. d. Desired pricing and structure of the proposed financing. This should include a description of the amount and source of equity in the proposed financing. e. Use of the proceeds and timing. 2. Summary: The most important information contained in the memorandum should be summarized in two pages. Note - If the borrower is a recently-formed single-purpose company, then elements 3, 4, and 5 will apply to the guarantors of completion and to the project sponsors. 3. The Borrower: This section is a brief biography of the borrower including such topics as date and state of incorporation, founder(s), lines of business, etc. 4. Capitalization: The borrower's current debt and equity position, including leases and trade debt, with amounts, terms, names, and addresses enumerated. Equity owners, and percentage ownership, should be identified. 5. Historical Financial Statements: If available, a minimum of five year's worth of complete historical financial statements

Jan 1, 1985

By Fernando A. Buttazzoni, Jorge C. Munita

INTRODUCTION To provide a background for discussing long-range financial and operational planning in the mining industry, we would like to begin by describing the role of planning in Codelco. Having taken part in Codelco's planning process since its inception in 1976, we believe that useful conclusions may be drawn for the experience we shall relate. Although Codelco is a state-owned copper producer with an important role in the Chilean economy, and is consequently very much at the core of national economic planning, the following discussion is not related to government planning but to planning in an operationally and commercially autonomous business concern with all the characteristics of a private enterprise. The only way in which Codelco differs from private business is that its financial successes or failures have a more direct impact on the countryls ability to participate in international trade, to meet its international financial commitments and to achieve economic and social growth. Thus, what follows is a presentation of the conceptual features of the planning process at Codelco and a description of the current state of planning in the company. It is understood that certain conceptual components are basic to any formal strategic planning process, and that the components of Codelco's planning process are therefore generally applicable in similar companies. First, the mission and scope of operation of the company must be defined, and goals must be set to achieve leadership in the business activities in which it engages. Having set this framework, the company must constantly scrutinize those internal elements and conditions that are essential to fulfill its mission and achieve leadership. In Codelco this means considering the actions which can best serve to define future capacities, taking into account declining ore grades and determining optimal production levels; watching over the productivity and skills of its labor force, and; keeping abreast of technological developments in non-ferrous mining and processing. If the company is proficient in these three areas, it will be cost efficient and there- fore competitive. Codelco must also watch over the business environment in which it operates. The company sells concentrate, blister and fire-refined copper, wirebar, cathodes and wire rod and must study the behavior of the market to attune its product mix to the demand existing for these various commodities in the international market and the copper consuming industries in general. By examining the internal and external environment in which the company conducts its production and commercial operations, it is able to diagnose its strengths and weaknesses, to identify the hazards it must overcome to stay ahead in the copper trade, and to take full advantage of business opportunities as they arise. CHARACTERISTICS OF CODELCO-CHILE Although our subject is Codelco, readers should keep in mind that there are many other copper producing operations in Chile, all in the private sector, and many valuable deposits that may be exploited in the future. Codelco is the only public sector copper producer, although there is one other state enterprise that operates smelting and refining facilities principally to serve a large number of very small producers of copper concentrate. In the mid-19801s, Codelco is the largest copper mining company of the world and the largest producer and exporter of copper with yearly sales totalling close to US$ 1.8 billion in 1983. Moreover, it is a highly profitable copper company at a time when the world copper industry as a whole has reported losses for several years. Codelco-Chile is a fairly new organization. The history of the four mining operations it manages is much longer: El Teniente was opened in 1912, Chuquicamata in 1915, Salavador in 1959 -- with installations of the old Potrerillos mine dating from 1927 -- and Andina in 1970. Having had separate owners, the management systems of the

Jan 1, 1985

By M. S. Azun

The authors' paper did not explain the facts and reasons why state companies are established and what their role is in international industrial mineral trading. Also. I do not agree with the conclusion implying that the main goal for state companies is to capitalize natural resources. Almost all state companies are founded by certain laws and their activities are arranged by state regulations. Their only aim is to operate mineral deposits for their people and to protect the rights of the people. Although some ore deposits, such as nonstrategic or small, may be exploited by privately owned companies, the state has the right to control the operation and production. Activities of state companies may or may not be widened because of the character of the deposits and the importance of the mineral market involved. For some countries, although governments may occasionally change hands, the policy of the mineral trading system is not affected by this change. There is no doubt that any government desires to make more earnings to increase GNP, when it is involved in operating and trading mines. It wants to produce and sell the finished products, instead of unprocessed ones, if possible. When it is known that some mineral deposits are relatively rare, such as Turkish boron deposits, the government can nationalize the mines to control production and affect the market. If there is an abundance of a certain mineral in the market, the government can cut production and set a floor price, such as Canadian potash. Also, when production of a specific mineral is unique, such as Turkish chromite, the price of such mineral may be set by correspondent government. One may add that if some governments with their state companies produce a certain mineral in a larger amount, they may decide to establish a cartel to protect their production and price. These are the facts followed by government-owned state companies and partially government-owned companies. The reason being charge of many deposits by the state companies is always the same: "protect" the mineral rights of the people.

Jan 1, 1985

By Edgar F. Cruft

INTRODUCTION It is sometimes said that "mines are made, and not found." I rather doubt that the exploration geologist would be overly sympathetic to that statement, and, of course, like most one-liners it is only partly true. Access to different financial markets are important at the mineral prospect stage. The modern mine financier has a much more complex, and interesting, job than the financiers of an earlier era, for example, the Canadian financiers of the 40's and 50's who had one simple set of options; i.e. float a company, promote it, and sell an equity stock issue, and then promote it some more. QUALITIES OF A FINANCIER Because technical people are seldom taught financing in their basic training, and because they are usually not involved in it until at quite a senior level in their careers, the whole field often acquires a certain mystique. The engineering professions have too often believed financing is the province of the accountant or financial executive and just as we in the technical world are often too quick to bristle if the latter try to tread on our domain, the opposite can just as easily be true. Unfortunately, this is another example of a compartmentalized individual, and that is one thing the successful financier cannot be. However, to be a successful financier one does not need extensive training or experience in accounting or finance. In fact it can sometimes be a disadvantage to get too buried in working only from the standpoint of discounted cash-flow analyses, ROI's, etc. It must be stressed, however, that one had better know how these analyses are made, and be knowledgeable in understanding a balance sheet, and have a good understanding of financial terminology. The difference between a simple project-type debt financing with a commercial bank and a more inventive and creative financial package comes from an intuition and an experience relating to risk-reward factors. The most important element is "common-sense", based on knowledge and experience. The goal is structure a financial package that fits the project, and in so doing it is important to recognize that it must fit within the limitations of the group supplying the money. I find insensitivity to recognize these constraints the most common mistake made in the field. Put yourself in the other person's place and understand his sources of funds and financing limitations. The engineer has an advantage in financing, as he or she has (or should have) a better idea than anyone of the value of the product, be it the mine, prospect, or company i.e. the intangible or potential worth which cannot be put on a pro-forma. He also knows, or should know, the risks involved. Two projects might look the same on paper, but a good financier must have a sense of when to take whatever deal he can get, and when to hold out based on his evaluation of future developments. It is essential to have a good sense of commodity values and trends, trends affecting the general economy (money supply, interest rates, effects of energy costs, etc.), and political considerations. He must also have a good understanding of the science and art of taxation as deals can often be financed using the government as a silent and unwitting partner by proper use of the tax laws. WHEN TO SEEK FINANCE The first critical decision to make in financing a mineral prospect is "when". At the exploration level, when it is only a dream in the geologist's eye, the alternatives are more limited than when it is a fully-engineered project. The "when" decision depends on how much in internal funds the company has to play with, and how desirable it is to invite financial participation to spread the risk. Assuming that decision is not taken out of lack of money, no one can categorically say when to do it. There is

Jan 1, 1985

By Michael A. Gustafson, Fernando B. Sotelino

INTRODUCTION The degree of success of any new project will ultimately depend on two factors: (i) the underlying economic strength of the project; and (ii) how successfully the parties involved can coordinate their interests to establish a financing structure which indeed capitalizes on the project's inherent economic attractiveness. A project's underlying economic attractiveness is determined by its inherent comparative advantage in accessing the factors of production, combining these factors of production to create a product and marketing this product. Initially, the decision regarding whether to go ahead with the project - the go/no go decision - has to be based on its total ability to generate cash flow returns to project participants to compensate them for resources committed and risks undertaken. The extent to which project sponsors will actually benefit from the project's inherent economic attractiveness is fundamentally dependent on their ability to establish the long-term financing arrangement which best meets the objectives and constraints of each project participant and sources the most advantageous funding. The decision regarding the financing of the project, the "how-to-go" decision, is then an attempt to find the capital structure, consistent with market terms and conditions and sound financial management policies which will best: (i) match planned outflows with cash inflows; and (ii) maximize the return for project sponsors. This article makes use of a case study to illustrate the analytical process involved in dealing with the go/no go and the how-to-go decisions on a project. Though most commonly applied to project finance situations, the guideline described herein is equally applicable to other financing situations, such as leveraged buyouts and debt restructurings, where timely repayment of debt depends largely on the future cash flows to be generated by the entity being financed. Our case study is of a hypothetical expansion of an existing copper mining operation in Latin America. The company, Latin American Copper (LAC) currently has 147 million metric tons of proven sulphide ore reserves. The existing mine complex consists of an open pit mining operation and a conventional flotation plant with a processing capacity of 20,000 metric tons of ore per day. LAC sells copper concentrates primarily to Japanese custom smelters. The mine has been in operation for 5 years, fine copper production last year was 108,240 metric tons, and LAC currently has assets of $175 million and net worth of $135 million. Due to a recent increase in proven reserves, LAC is considering doubling the treatment capacity of its flotation plant to 40,000 tons per day, and expanding its mining capacity to meet the additional concentrator capacity (the "Project"). Project capital expenditures and incremental working capital have been estimated at approximately $210 million. The construction period is expected to cover one year, including a three-month start-up phase. The Project is to be funded by a combination of equity, senior debt, including both supplier credits and/or commercial bank term loans, and subordinated debt. LAC's shareholders are willing to commit a maximum of $50 million to the Project. A government development agency, which is also a minority shareholder, might be willing to lend approximately $40 million to LAC in the form of subordinated notes, depending on the ability of the Project to generate foreign exchange reserves. Commercial banks cannot be expected to offer loans with maturities longer than ten years. The Project is expected to increase the value of the firm because: (i) It will solidify the Company's position as a low-cost copper producer by taking advantage of economies of scale. As a result of the expansion, cash production costs are expected to decrease 7.0[c]/lb. and all-in costs 11.0[c]/lb; (ii) The potential earnings stream from the sulphide ore reserves will be realized

Jan 1, 1985

By John K. Hammes

INTRODUCTION This introductory paper presents a description and definition of what the finance function is and what it specifically means for the mining industry. In its simplest terms, finance is, "management of money matters". As an area within the discipline of business administration it draws heavily on the related fields of economics and accounting, and to a lesser extent on marketing and production. MINING FINANCE DEFINED In preparing to write about what finance means to the mining industry, I asked a number of mining people the question, "What does mining finance mean to you?" Most responded that mining finance was "How a company borrowed money for mine development", and perhaps half those questioned included "raising equity" in the definition. It is not surprising that the mining industry concept of finance is the providing of funds needed for the objectives of the business, for that was once a view shared by authorities in the field of business administration. Further, it is certainly the area where much of the emphasis has been placed in the past ten to fifteen years as the industry struggled with the development of more remote and more refractory or lower-grade orebodies while profitability and internal cash flow were below expectations. No wonder project finance became such a popular topic. Twenty years ago it is probable that the emphasis would have been on mine valuation, for that subject was the area of finance then most often examined in industry publications. Papers concerning the pros and cons of payback, internal rate of return, and discounted cash flow appeared regularly. Let's examine the following situations, each the result of a financial decision: - Funding the exploration program in a developing country was accomplished by buying the next six-months budget needs in local currency. One week later the currency devalued 30 percent. If the purchase had been delayed or the local currency borrowed short term, a substantial saving would have been made in funding the program. - A major mining company borrows heavily to finance both expansion of its primary mining business and its entry into several new industry segments. When markets for all of the commodities it produces turn down for a prolonged period, there is concern over the adequacy of cashflow to cover debt service in addition to other company needs. The company's financial officers, however, had arranged very large committed credit facilities from numerous financial institutions which assured the availability of funds for several years. This enabled the company to implement a strategy to conserve cash, sell assets and survive until conditions improved. Further, short term suppliers of credit also were comfortable with the assurance that longer term credit was there to support them. -A medium size mining company financed several mines independently with limited obligations on the part of the parent company. The company decided to refinance the operations under one agreement. More flexible terms, lower interest cost and a longer tenor financing were achieved in return for assuming the risk as a direct obligor. - The exploration and development group of a large mining company proposes to develop a new mine in a country in which the company does not presently operate. When the investment is rejected they are advised that one reason was that the reinvestment assumption inherent in the discounted

Jan 1, 1985

By G. E. Pralle

INTRODUCTION The decade from 1969 to 1979 saw the crest of a wave of investments by companies and investors, primarily from the major industrial nations, in the metals and minerals industries of the so-called lesser developed countries. This was brought about by two major considerations: 1). The higher ore grades and therefore the higher profit potential of the mineral deposits in the third world countries, and 2). The desire, particularly by the European countries and by Japan, to ensure a safe supply of raw materials not available in their own countries. The decade began with the start of the Toquepala mine in Peru and the major investments in the Bougainville mine in Papua New Guinea and the Ertsberg mine in Indonesia. It ended with the start-up of Southern Peru Copper Company (SPCC) Cuajone mine in Peru and Inco's Soroako mine in Indonesia and the investments in several major alumina or aluminum projects in Australia and Brazil. Concurrent with this huge flow of funds into the mineral resources industry of the developing world was the build-up of a psychological fear in the host countries of exploitation/domination by the foreign investors. This resulted in an increasing trend towards: 1). Nationalization of existing mineral ventures, and 2). Tougher legal/fiscal frameworks for new ones. NATIONALIZATION Nationalization appeared in its earliest form as "Mexicanization" of the petroleum industry in Mexico in the 1930's, followed later by Mexicanization of the mining industry in general. This was enacted with the Mexican Mining Law of 1961 which required that 51% of the equity be owned by Mexican nationals. Later in the decade the equity share for foreign investors was reduced to 33 1/3% for the developers of the Frasch sulphur operations in the Isthumus of Tehuantepec. However, the law was not fully implemented in the copper industry until late 1970 with the purchase of 51% of the ownership in the Cananea Mining Company. The trend toward nationalization of the copper industry progressed to Chile where in 1967 under the Government of Eduardo Frei the major North American copper companies were induced to sell a one-half interest in their Chilean mines to the State. Likewise, in 1970, "Zambianization" took place, when the two major operating companies Roan Selection Trust (Amax) and Zamanglo (Anglo American) were restructured into Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM) and Nchanga Consolidated Mines (NCCM) providing the government with 51% of the equity ownership. Whilst the earlier forms of nationalization in general constituted a fairly priced buy-out (El Teniente, Chile for US$80 million, RCM for US$117.8 million, NCCM for US$178.7 million), the total nationalization of the Chilean mining companies in 1970 under Salvador Allende did not. Later, "Western" countries joined this trend and on October 29, 1973, Mr. Gough Whitlam proclaimed that "overseas capital must continue... in partnership with Australian capital" and "in some special energy cases we have an objective of 100% Australian ownership". In 1974 Mr. Pierre Trudeau stated: "The Liberal Party of Canada sets as an objective that new resources projects in the natural resource field should have at least 50% and preferably 60% Canadian equity ownership". FOREIGN INVESTMENT The situation for the foreign investor in the worldwide resource industry rapidly deteriorated from then on. New features appeared in mineral exploitation and operating agreements, centering not only on local government/local companies ownership but also on increased taxation. The new tax rate (mineral tax, royalty, and income tax) for the semi-government companies NCCM and RCM in Zambia became an effective 73%. Likewise the much publicized and discussed renegotiated Bougainville agreement brought dramatic increases in the total "take" by the PNG Government. More innovative forms of indirect taxation made their appearance and were added to the normal tax burdens of the mineral industry which already

Jan 1, 1985

By Douglas A. Karvonen

INTRODUCTION Although the economy in the Province of Saskatchewan has historically been agriculturally oriented, a major source of wealth has been realized through natural resources such as petroleum and natural gas, coal and uranium and since the 1960's - potash. Potash or potassium chloride, in the form in which it is presently produced in Saskatchewan, is used primarily as fertilizer, a source of potassium, one of three essential elements required for healthy plant growth, with about 5% of production sold to the chemical industry for use in such products as soap and liquid detergent, glass and ceramics, textiles and some pharmaceuticals. Saskatchewan is estimated to have approximately 40% of known world potash reserves and its ten active mines account for some 25% of annual world production. POTASH CORPORATION OF SASKATCHEWAN In an effort to guarantee a fair and lasting economic benefit to the Province of Saskatchewan, the Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan (PCS) was created on February 4, 1975 through an Order-in-Council under the Crown Corporation's Act and later on April 1, 1976, the Potash Corporation Act provided for its continuation. PCS was given the mandate to acquire ownership of a significant portion of the potash mining capacity in Saskatchewan and to establish an organization capable of operating the facilities, marketing the product, and conducting all of the other activities necessary for a successful corporation competing in the world potash industry. The corporation is the largest potash producing and selling organization in the Western World - or third largest in the world. (See also Figure 1). PCS through its wholly-owned subsidiary, PCS Mining, has acquired a whole or partial interest in five geographically distinct producing properties or divisions, representing today more than 40% of Saskatchewan's potash producing capacity. The acquisition of each division was followed by a program designed to exploit and maximize the particular opportunities at each minesite for increased production. To that end, PCS Mining has taken an active lead in expanding to meet future demand and has implemented expansion programs at all properties except for its Esterhazy Division where it has a long-term processing agreement with International Minerals & Chemical Corporation (Canada) Limited. Through its wholly-owned subsidiaries, PCS Mining, PCS Sales and PCS Transport, this provincial crown corporation has the ability to operate as a producer and marketer of Saskatchewan's potash. In certain instances PCS, the parent company, assists in the financing of various projects undertaken by the subsidiaries and in other cases the subsidiary involved arranges its own financing. POTASH RESERVES As a background to the specific issue of financing, it is helpful to describe briefly the nature of the deposit which supports the industry - our collateral, if you like. The potash beds underlying Saskatchewan are sedimentary rock deposits formed by the gradual evaporation of an inland sea during the Middle Devonian period roughly 400 million years ago. Now known as the Prairie Evaporite, this formation stretches from North Dakota and Northeast Montana through Southern Saskatchewan into North-Central Alberta. These beds lie at mining depths ranging from 950 - 1000m (3,000 ft) below the surface, where conventional mining methods can be used, and to 1,650m (5,000 ft), where solution mining must be

Jan 1, 1985

By Peter A. Allen

INTRODUCTION Lac Minerals Ltd., a significant North American producer of gold and other metals for over three decades, recently completed the financing for its third discovery in an eight year period. From 1975 to 1982, three important gold deposits in Quebec and Ontario: namely Bousquet, Doyon and Hemlo, were located and tested by company geologists. When current development plans are complete, Lac will have injected $400 million into these deposits. A discussion of these projects and their financing reveals some extraordinary challenges faced by top mining management. Responses to these challenges developed by Lac management may interest executives planning to proceed with new North American gold or base metal mines. MINE DE BOUSQUET In 1976, we explored a property containing a large low grade surface gold deposit. The geologial setting was exciting and we tested recent rethinking about the volcanigenic genesis of gold and base metal occurrences. These ideas helped pus to persist in drilling a nearby conductor and 600,000 ton, 0.22 ounce/ton orebody was outlined. With gold at $Cdn.150 per ounce the feasibility was approved and work started February 1978. Availability of a company custom mill 35 miles away reduced our immediate capital needs to $8.5 million. First of all, understanding the geological significance of results at Bousquet was critical. Mine and surface exploration geologists at Lac are continually and closely working together to better understand the nature of gold deposits in the Shield. This management emphasis on both pure and mine geology meant that a much larger ore reserve could confidently be predicted. (A proposal to quickly develop and ship the ore to a nearby company mine was discarded.) Instead of designing just for the initial plan of 500 tons per day we therefore included headframe, shaft and hoisting capacity for 1,700 tons and provided a compartment for future shaft deepening. These prebuilt additions were welcomed within two years. The type of collaboration whereby surface and mine geologists make study and field projects of each other's problems sets the foundation for this predictive ability. At Lac, the traditional responsibility for and supervision of the mine geologist by the mine manager is modified by this collaboration. This adds interest and scope to the geologist's work and lets him think beyond production requirements. Besides such management considerations, dedicated, professional geologists with integrity and lots of practical experience are needed to plan successful developments like Bousquet. Second, projecting future bullion revenue was critical and our experience selling production for future delivery gave us a way to ensure that loan repayment at term would not be jeopardized by falling metal prices. Output from a single mine is often reduced or curtailed for numerous reasons, so "selling forward" is done best and with least risk by companies like Lac with more than one or two producing locations for that metal. At first, a forward marketing program was considered unwise, speculative and unorthodox by analysts and other producers. Declining markets in the early 1980s prolonged gold project capital recoveries however, and critics were better able to appreciate the usefulness of such a tool. The notion that gold miners shouldn't sell forward is rooted in the belief that long-run gold prices will rise as modern social theory implementation in democracies inevitably erodes currency values. Selling against this trend goes against this industry belief or "ethic" and is at odds with the company shareholder who expects the gold price to rise not fall. Nonetheless, an efficient tool is available to the gold producer (not to most other metal producers) to quickly disengage from adverse price trends or to lock in spot prices instantaneously for two years or more of profits. Gold had recently retreated from U.S.$200 to $104 and now had reversed to $150. Lac had been forced to close several of its producers during the late 1960s because central bank-controlled

Jan 1, 1985

By James L. Poole

INTRODUCTION Companies in the mining industry are subjected at times to currency exchange rate risks and interest rate risks. The former occurs any time a firm deals in more than one currency. The latter occurs anytime a firm is financing itself with borrowings that have a floating interest rate (although a fixed rate can be a problem at times). FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISKS There are two general reasons why exchange rate risks (FX risk) can occur: First, a firm may be building a mine or plant in another country where financing for the plan is denominated in funds other than the country hosting the plant. For example, if a Canadian firm is building a smelter in another country which is being financed with Canadian dollars, the C$100 million for labor, which must be paid in the local currency, has subjected the firm to a C$100 million FX exposure risk. If after the cost estimates were made the local currency appreciates 30% against the Canadian dollar, the cost of labor has increased to C$130 million. (Of course, the local currency could also devalue during this period making the labor cost component less than estimated.) The other reason exchange rate risk arises is due to the fact that the costs of production in one country producing minerals may be incurred in one currency while the production is sold in another currency, such as coal being exported from Canada to Japan under contracts denominated in Yen. In this example, the Canadian firm is exporting coal to Japan and being paid in yen in 30 days at a contract price of 100 Y per ton. Furthermore, assume that the mining firm anticipates a depreciation of the yen against the Canadian dollar of 5% in the next 30 days. Therefore, the mining firm stands to lose 5% of the value of its shipment in a month's time not including carrying costs. In both cases, the mining company risks an adverse change in the exchange rate, that is, the currency the company holds may decrease in value relative to the other currency. There are a number of ways to mitigate the exposure to foreign exchange which can be utilized by the mining company. Optimally, a company should try to match all their inflows and all their outflows in the same currency. For example, if a Canadian firm has mining costs and debt service costs both denominated in Canadian dollars then 100% of their receipts would need to be in Canadian dollars. If a Canadian firm has 70% of its cash outflows in Canadian dollars and 30% of its cash outflow in American dollars in the form of a loan amortization then their receipts would need to be 70% in Canadian dollars and 30% in U.S. dollars. This general principle of matching cash receipts and cash costs in the same currency works fine in a perfect world but what of the real world when these cannot be matched? In actual practice, however, the financial markets have developed a number of ways in which foreign exchange risks can he managed or reduced. FORWARD MARKETS One method is to use the forward markets which are made on a world-wide basis by the commerical banks for foreign exchange. If a firm wanted to lock in the current exchange rate for the receipt of a foreign currency at some point in the future, they could do so by contracting on the forward market with a bank selling that foreign currency at the current rate at the future date. For example, assume that a Canadian firm is exporting coal to Japan which would pay yen in 90 days. If a firm wanted to lock in today's exchange rate they could contract with a bank to sell on the forward market yen in 90 days. When the yen was received the contract would be executed by selling the yen to the bank and receiving the previously agreed upon number of Canadian dollars. Generally speaking, the forward market can be used to sell forward about 12 months. The costs of selling (or buying) forward

Jan 1, 1985

By Anthony Tuke

Members of the Society of Mining Engineers may well regard it as rather unusual that a paper on this subject is being presented by someone whose first taste of mining came at the age of 60 or so - someone who last heard of cathodes and anodes in 1938. On the other hand, the title does refer to the financing of a mine and at least I can claim to have spent all my business life since the war until 1981 in the world of banking, though this inevitably means that I have been used to looking at these and other problems through what you might regard as the wrong end of the telescope. The lending of money, and more particularly the provision of finance for commerce and industry, is the central job of a banker and I have been involved in this in various ways over many years, but regrettably only very marginally in the world of mining. As you will see from what follows, the rather specialised form of finance which RTZ required was, to my regret, not provided by the British banking community since the great majority of the finance came from American banks and, to a lesser extent, from German banks. I am most indebted to Mr. Roy Wright for a great deal of the nuts and bolts in this paper. He was one of the three central figures in the growth and expansion of RTZ during the 1950's and 1960's and was right at the centre of the negotiations with bankers, with governments and with many others. The going, as you will see, was far from easy. The essential basis for the financing of each of the RTZ group's mining projects was a firm long-term sales contract for sufficient of the output of the particular mine to produce the cash flow necessary to service the loans. Wherever possible, loans were raised in the same currency as the sales contracts were made. Each sales contract was designed to give the customer the product he wanted with a long-term assurance of supply and at the same time to give the bankers the protection they required. Thus the marketing concept and the financing concept for a particular mine formed one overall plan, and talks with the customers and the bankers were conducted in parallel until a satisfactory marketing/financial package was agreed in principle. Preliminary talks were begun soon after the discovery of a potentially viable orebody. As confidence about a discovery increased, customers were persuaded to enter into contingent sales contracts before the very detailed and costly business of the economic and technical feasibility study of the mine was launched; such a study might cost 10% or more of the estimated total capital cost. At the same time provisional understandings were reached with the bankers. The contingent sales contracts usually gave a period of grace of eighteen months to two years, during which time the decision whether or not to continue with the mine had to be made. This decision rested mainly on the result of the feasibility study and also on coming to a firm agreement with the bankers. If all went well and the mine went ahead, then the contingent sales contracts became firm, but they fell away if the decision was negative. The Company was fortunate that during the whole period when its major mines were being developed, world trade was increasing rapidly and Japan was becoming a dominant industrial power. The Japanese supported many of the mines, including Hamersley Iron Ore, Lornex Copper, Bougainville Copper to name a few, with the basic long-term sales contracts that enabled their development. The Germans supported Palabora and to a lesser extent Bougainville. The mines were financed as individual projects generally with a loan/equity ratio of about 65/35, without legal recourse to RTZ for the loans. RTZ was, however, responsible for providing any capital overruns required to bring the mines into commercial operations. Nevertheless, the RTZ management regarded itself as morally responsible to the lenders because, Palabora aside, the sales contracts had either a fixed selling price (like Hamersley), an indexed price (like the Elliot Lake Uranium Mines and Mary Kathleen), or a floor price (as in Lornex, Bougainville and Rossing). Thus the Company believed that any financial failure would have been due to poor management or technical

Jan 1, 1985

By Robert L. Davidoff

INTRODUCTION The impact of taxation differs substantially from state to state in a complex fashion that depends on both the physical characteristics of a mineral deposit and on the price of the mineral commodity relative to its costs of production. A comparative analysis of the tax structures of eight states (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wisconsin) showed wide variations in rates of return for any given type of mineral property, with no state having either the most burdensome or least burdensome tax structure under all circumstances. Three hypothetical mineral operations were analyzed: a producing open-pit copper property, a non-producing underground platinum operation, and a non-producing underground gold operation. None of them corresponds exactly to an existing property. Each of these property types is further defined to have ore feed grades at three different levels, leading to three potential profitability levels, referred to in this paper as "economic", "marginal" and "subeconomic". Thus the differential impact of state tax structures is measured for mineral properties of different types, as well as for different profitability levels. Montana is used as the base case. This study does not address the topic of corporate structures or tax consolidation. There are no costs assumed external to the operation of the deposit (e.g. exploration to locate additional deposits). Two types of analyses were performed for this study. The first calculates the total cumulative tax payments in each state using all applicable taxes (including U.S. federal income taxes and examines the resultant differences in discounted cash-flows rate of returns DCFROR's amoung the eight states. The second is a sensitivity analysis that examines each type of state tax separately (i.e. state income, property, and severance taxes) in order to isolate and examine the differences in tax payments that are due to the difference in rates and methods of computing specific types of taxes in each state. The results of this study serve to illustrate the complex nature of interactions among various taxes. For example, property tax is a deduction in calculating severance tax in some state. Changes in property-tax and severance-tax payments both enter into the calculation of state and federal income-tax liability. This, in turn, could change the timing and usage of tax-loss carry forward amounts and investment tax credits. Additionally, the physical characteristics of a property, the method and costs at which the mineral will be extracted, and the profitability level at which each property operates will affect tax treatment. Each mineral operation was evaluated at three different predetermined profitability levels, referred to using the terms economic, marginal and sub-economic. These three profitability levels are defined by the ore feed grades of the primary commodity that yield in constant terms, approximately an "economic" 18% DCFROR, "a marginal." 10% DCFROR, and a "sub-economic" 5% DCFROR, respectively, under the Montana tax structure. In the analyses, the mining and processing parameters for each of the three types of properties were assumed to be identical for each of the eight states. It was assumed that each operation produces at full operating capacity throughout its life. This implies the level of mineral commodity demand will support the inferred commodity price, such that each operation will be able to sell all its output. The analyses performed for this study were done using a comprehensive economic evaluation simulator that is used in the Bureau of Mines, Division of Minerals Availability MAS program to perform DCFROR analyses. All economic evaluations performed upon these data (see appendix 2) were in constant January 1981 dollars. By-product prices used for the analyses were: [Gold $425.00/troy ounce Palladium$200.00/troy ounce Silver $ 10.00/troy ounce] Typical cash-flow calculation layout is given in Appendix 3. The initial step for each evaluation is to define an "economic" profitability level scenario. An 18% DCFROR rate in Montana was considered the

Jan 1, 1985

By N. R. MacMillan

INTRODUCTION The Bullmoose Coal Project is part of a major development in northeastern British Columbia which comprises a new rail line, a new townsite, powerline, highway, the upgrading of the Canadian National Railway's main line, a new coal port at Prince Rupert and two new coal mines, the Bullmoose mine and the Quintette mine. The total investment by all parties is estimated to be in excess of $2.6 billion and made up approximately as follows : [Table No. 1 $ Millions - Quintette Coal Limited 950 Teck-Bullmoose Coal Inc. 275 Canadian National Railway Company 800 6 British Columbia Railway Company Port at Prince Rupert 280 Townsite, Roads 6- Power ] The new infrastructure is intended to serve not only the Bullmoose and Quintette coal projects but also eventually a number of other coal properties in northeastern British Columbia. The Bullmoose project is structured on a joint venture basis as follows : [Table No. 2 Teck Corporation 51% Lornex Mining Corporation Ltd. 39% Nissho Iwai Coal Development 1 0% (Canada) Ltd. -- 100% ] The mine has a capacity of 2.3 million tonnes of clean coal per year. In the initial years 1.7 million tonnes will be metallurgical coal and 0.6 million tonnes thermal coal. After the first three years of operations the annual production of metallurgical coal will increase to an average of approximately 2.1 million tonnes and the production of thermal coal will decrease to an average of approximately 0.2 million tonnes. At this level of 2.3 million tonnes annual production, the Bullmoose mine has sufficient reserves for at least 26 years of production. History Brameda Resources Ltd. commenced coal exploration in the Bullmoose-Sukunka area in 1969. Teck obtained an option on the Bullmoose coal licences in 1970 and started surface exploration and diamond drilling in 1971. Teck earned a 50% interest in the property, and thereafter expenses were jointly financed by Teck and Brameda. In 1981 Brameda merged with Teck making Teck the sole owner. The initial phase of the exploration program, which was completed in 1975, included 7,200 meters of diamond drilling in 35 holes. During 1976 and 1977, detailed exploration and test work were carried out on the South Fork and West Fork areas where multiple seams close to surfaces indicated the potential for large tonnages of strippable coal. In those two years, work included road construction, detailed mapping and trenching to outline the coal seam traces at the surface, 6,300 meters of diamond drilling in 80 holes, and 300 meters of underground bulk sampling from seven adits. Washability tests and analysis work were carried out on the drill cores and adit samples, and pilot plant washability studies were undertaken. In 1978 and 1979 Teck engineers prepared open pit mining plans and production schedules and Kaiser Engineering was retained to prepare a layout of the plant preparation facility. A feasibility study prepared by Teck's engineering group in January 1982 was the base document used by the Lenders in assessing the technical and economic viability of the project. Property Location The property lies some 650 kilometers northeast of Vancouver, and 87 kilometers south by road from the village of Chetwynd. The Sukunka property (British Petroleum) adjoins to the north, the Mount Spieker property (Ranger Oil Option) adjoins to the east, and the Quintette property is located to the southeast.

Jan 1, 1985

By Kyle Wightman

INTRODUCTION CRA Limited is the largest mining group in Australia by value of sales and the second largest company in Australia in terms of share market capitalisation. In the past 25 years, CRA, its predecessors and affiliates have been involved in a number of mining and further processing developments in Australia and elsewhere. Many of these have been financed using project financing techniques. These include Comalco's development of the Weipa bauxite deposits in Northern Queensland in the late 1950's, the Hamersley iron ore developments in the Pilbara region of Western Australia in the mid 1960's, the Queensland Alumina Limited alumina refinery in Gladstone, Queensland, at about the same time, and the Bougainville copper project in 1969/70. In the past three years CRA has again utilised project financing techniques to fund its Tarong steaming coal project in Queensland, the Blair Athol steaming coal project also in that State and CRA's interest in the Argyle diamond project in the Kimberley region of Western Austrlia. PROJECT FINANCE DEFINED Nevitt Definition Nevitt's is the most frequently quoted definition - "A financing of a particular economic unit in which a lender is satisfied to look initially to the cash flows and earnings of the economic unit as the source of funds from which a loan will be repaid and to the assets of the economic unit as collateral for the loan." Risk and Balance Sheet Treatment It is important to focus in more detail on two aspects of project financing, risk and balance sheet treatment. The assessment of the various elements of risk in a project and the sharing of that risk between sponsors and lenders is the most critical feature. At one end of the spectrum is full absorption of risk by the sponsor(s). This can be described as "on risk" or "on credit" or "full recourse" to the sponsor(s) and is effectively a corporate financing. At the other end of the spectrum the lenders absorb the whole risk in a non-recourse financing which is "off risk" or "off credit" for the sponsor. The other aspect is the sponsor's balance sheet treatment. If the balance sheet of the economic unit undertaking the project and the financing need not be consolidated into the balance sheet of the sponsor (because ownership does not exceed 50%) then the financing may be described as off-¬balance sheet. If consolidation is required then the financing is described as on-balance sheet. Most project financings involve some recourse to the sponsor, i.e. they are limited recourse. Very few are non-recourse or off credit to the sponsor. Limited recourse financings may be on-balance sheet although many may also be off-balance sheet insofar as consolidation is concerned. However, sponsor support may very well be a contingent liability to the sponsor and require disclosure by way of note to the balance sheet should consolidation not be required. CORPORATE FINANCE CONTRASTED A financing which is on credit or full recourse to the sponsor, whether it is directly borrowed or guaranteed by that sponsor, is a corporate financing. Lenders will tend to base their credit assessment on a historical assessment of the sponsor's activities and its financial results rather than an assessment of the project or a detailed assessment of the future activities and prospects of the sponsor. PROJECT FINANCE - A BORROWER'S PERCEPTION Although CRA could choose to arrange all finance on a corporate basis (except perhaps for the very largest projects or acquisitions), project financing techniques provide a number of specific advantages which CRA has noted and which should be carefully considered by a project sponsor. Advantages

Jan 1, 1985

By Robert T. DeGavre

INTRODUCTION The $645 million financing for Inco Ltd's Soroako nickel project in Indonesia not only represents a significant human achievement but also there are certain important lessons that can be derived from Inco's experience in financing the project. The paper will not present a technical assessment of the project since Inco Ltd. submitted a series of papers on this subject at the international Laterite Symposium as part of the 108th Annual Meeting of the AIME in February 1979. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOROAKO PROJECT Table 1 summarizes the milestones achieved in the Soroako project and its financing. Exploration Phase A contract of Work was signed on July 27, 1968 by the Republic of Indonesia and F.T. International Nickel Indonesia (P.T. Inco) covering an extensive area of over 25,000 square miles on the two southeastern arms of the island of Sulawesi. The Contract provides that P.T. Inco has the sole responsibility for financing the project and determining the terms on which the financing should be obtained, that P.T. Inco has the right to receive and hold outside of Indonesia foreign exchange revenues and to freely dispose of such revenues, and that Indonesians have the right to purchase up to 20% of the equity of P.T. Inco over a period following start of production. P.T. Inco began field investigations in the Contract Area in August 1968. Preliminary reconnaissance sampling with portable drills broadly outlined areas of favorable laterite terrain which were then systematically sampled on surveyed grids. By early 1971 sufficient exploration work had been completed to indicate that the laterite deposits near Soroako could sustain a major nickel-producing plant (figure 1). Pilot plant studies in 1970 and 1971 at Inco's research station in Port Colborne, Ontario, using two bulk samples of Soroako ore material, also confirmed that the ore could be upgraded and treated for the recovery of its metal values. Feasibility Phase Encouraged by the results of its exploration program and pilot-plant work, Inco Ltd. commissioned Toyo Engineering Company of Japan in August 1971 to prepare a capital cost estimate for a relatively small nickel project called "Stage I". Stage I was to be a single-line pyrometallurqical process plant with an annual capacity of approximately 15,000 metric tons of nickel contained in 75% nickel sulphide matte (see Figure 2). Electric power was to be supplied by a thermal power station. It is important to recognize that Inco's strategy was to develop the Soroako ore deposits in several stages: first, construct a small project to gain experience and to reduce the initial capital outlay and then later expand in one or more steps to a much larger project to achieve maximum economies. The strategy reflected both Inco's financial position in 1971 as its sales and earning dropped sharply and the difficulties previously experienced by Inco in trying to launch in the late 1960's very large "greenfield" nickel projects in New Caledonia and Guatemala. Toyo's Project Development Study was completed. in January 1972. Based upon Toyo's cost estimate for physical facilities, Inco estimated the total capital cost of Stage I to be $115 million. For the next several months, Inco ran numerous in-house financial feasibility studies, using as inputs Toyo's cost estimate and the results of its exploration and pilot plant programs. In September 1972, Inco completed a project feasibility study which was based upon a capital cost estimate of $135 million. The feasibility study was immediately made available to potential partners and lenders. Partner Negotiations The Japanese nickel market had from the outset been central to Inco's planning for the Soroako project. That market had been growing dramatically at rates in excess of 20% per annum during the 1950's and 1960's. Japan had established, for rational security and other reasons, a domestic

Jan 1, 1985