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By Ramie H. Thompson

1.1 BACKGROUND In many underground coal mining operations the use of electromagnetic field equipment, particularly communication systems, not only increases the overall efficiency of the mining operation but can be directly linked with mine safety considerations. The use of electromagnetic field producing equipment in underground coal mining operations can only be expected to grow. Several new communication systems have already been proposed. In addition, high-frequency producing equipments for many diverse uses in mining operations are under study. The use of these equipment in underground mining operations is hampered by the possibility of their electromagnetic fields interacting with the electric blasting cap operations commonly carried out in the mines. Such interactions can have at least two results bearing directly on mine safety: o premature initiation of the cap, either in its normal shot location or during hookup or transportation; o dudding of the cap so that normal firing operations do not cause irritation; thereby leaving unexploded high explosives after normal firing. Since the consequences of a premature initiation could, particularly in coal mines operations, result in catastrophe involving human life, the overall approach to prediction of possible hazard must be, as far as possible, of a "worst case" nature. The general problem of predicting possible RF hazards for any electroexplosive device (EED) is best treated by reference to Appendix A of

Jan 9, 1983

Permit quicker, safer clearance of hang-ups in the ore passes and chutes of underground mines. Approach Develop a device that can be operated from a safe distance to explosively propel a projectile into the hang-up. How It Works The Hang-Up Clearance Module, consisting of a stand, steel disk, explosive charge, and aiming device, is placed at a location convenient for line of sight aiming at the hang-up. This placement can be more than 100 feet from the target. Once aimed, the charge is remotely detonated, and the disk is converted by explosive force into a slug and propelled to the hang-up, bringing it down. The steel disk and an explosive charge are contained by a plastic casing. A small booster which is placed at the rear center of the explosive makes up the last component of the charge. Initiation is accomplished by standard means such as detonating cord or a number 8 blasting cap. When Initiated, a detonation wave travels through the explosive, inverting and consolidating the steel disk into a large slug. This slug is propelled at high velocity to the hang-up, delivering more than 5 million foot-pounds of energy on impact.

Jan 1, 1981

Reduce injury to people or damage to equipment when a scheduled production blast is detonated. Approach The essential elements of an effective blast area security system were identified through case studies of five mining operations where the blast area guarding practices were considered to be superior to those generally found in the industry. These elements were used in making recommendations for improved blast area safeguarding practices. Background The blast area security system is a means by which the mine operator prevents injury to people or damage to equipment when blasting is performed. Analysis of blasting accidents showed that most blasting accidents occur during scheduled blasting and are due to inadequate blast-site security. Factors contributing to the system's breakdown are failure to clear the blast zone, inadequate guarding. and failure of personnel to follow instructions, retreat to a safe location, and/or take adequate cover. Mine personnel, visitors and even trespassers can inadvertently wander into a blasting zone unless proper procedures exist to ensure that all personnel are cleared from the blast zone and kept safely away until after blasting IS completed. Statistics show that the blaster is the miner most frequently injured In these accidents.

Jan 1, 1986

Provide an accurate, reliable means for determining when a sealed mine or mine section can be safely reopened after a fire. Approach The Bureau of Mines performed a research investigation that resulted in the development of a mathematical formula for deriving a quantity, called RATIO, which can be used to define when a sealed mine or mine section has returned to safe recovery conditions after a fire. Research Results There were two major results from this Bureau research. Over a period of several years, the Bureau of Mines conducted six experiments at its Bruceton Experimental Mine in Pennsylvania. The experiments involved sealing the mine after several tons of piled coal had been allowed to burn continuously for 2 to 3 days. Although gas data obtained during the experiments revealed nothing significant, measured smoke particle levels were found to correlate with the stages of combustion and temperatures of the smoldering coal pile. Moreover, it was found that no smoke particles are produced when high-temperature smoldering exists deep within the mass of the coal pile since the smoke particles are filtered by the coal surrounding the hot region. Smoke is emitted into the mine atmosphere only if combustion is occurring near exposed surfaces. As suggested by these findings, any decision to recover a sealed mine area based primarily upon the absence of smoke particles is not a wise derision.

Jan 1, 1988

By Michael J. Beus, Stephen Iverson

BACKGROUND A mine shaft is the lifeline to underground mines. Mine operators depend on safe, uninterrupted, and efficient movement of workers and materials. The shaft and hoisting system provides access to the network of openings used to recover the underground resource, provides vertical transport of miners and materials, and serves as an escapeway in case of an emergency. Accidents involving hoisting can be catastrophic. Such was the case in 1973 at the Markham Colliery in Derbyshire, UK when the conveyance overwound and fell to the shaft bottom, resulting in 17 deaths. Hoist and elevator machinery must meet the requirements specified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Parts 57 and 75. According to the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) data, many shaft-related accidents in the United States are associated with the hoisting cycle. MSHA statistics show that there were about 1500 shaft- related accidents in the 5-year period between 1992-1996. Most of these accidents resulted from the action, motion, or failure of the hoisting equipment or mechanism and involved movement of the conveyance which includes cages, skips, ore buckets, and elevators. A hoisting hazard may be characterized as an "unsafe hoist operating condition caused by insufficient or inaccurate information available to the hoist operator" (authors' quote). Earlier investigators have defined safety features and operating and maintenance standards for hoists, and reported on monitoring and control systems and sensors for hoists and conveyances [Farley, 1983; Ward, 19931. However, despite the considerable technological progress and hoisting control improvements in recent years, safety- related issues that require further investigation still remain. The hoist operator must constantly be aware of two important hoist-operating conditions: the position of the conveyance and the tension in the hoist rope. If this information is not available or is inaccurate, the hoist becomes unsafe. Current technology provides this information indirectly from sensors and indicators in the hoist room. However, unlike a building elevator hoistway, mine shaft hoistway problems often include: 1. poor ground conditions and excessive shaft wall and guide displacement; 2. rock bursts in deep mines (resulting in large rock movements and fragments blocking the hoist way); 3. water, ice, and salt buildup (impeding the smooth flow of the conveyance); 4. severe vibration from hoisting (resulting in loose guide support brackets, broken welds, or other alignment and conveyance mechanism malfunctions). The second issue relates to dynamic rope loads applied during normal winding, particularly during loading, acceleration, and stopping. Safety factors on wire rope are based on static load. They are artificially high to account for all cases of dynamic loads, even though the total load history on the rope (static and dynamic) during service is unknown. Therefore the tension, and thus the compliance with wire rope load safety factors, is unknown to the hoistman.

Reduce the hazards to which mine personnel are exposed by providing safer procedures for removing dragline wire rope terminations. Background The termination points of wire ropes used on draglines consist of a wedge and socket that lock the rope in place through friction. These components must be separated when the wire rope is changed. At present, the cannon method is the most common procedure used to accomplish this. However this method, using a small cannon and primer (detonator) cord to propel a steel projectile that will knock the wedge out of the socket, has the potential of causing injuries to mine personnel and damage to equipment. The Bureau of Mines, has devised safer, and equally efficient methods of removing wire rope terminations. The Bureau began by studying the cannon method, its merits and draw-backs. Safety guidelines were then developed for the cannon method, and two alternative methods-the pendulum ram and hydraulic pusher-were devised and tested. The Cannon Method The steel projectile used to separate the wedge and socket in the cannon method was found to be very effective. However, the method poses the inherent hazards of any explosive de-vice-hazards that could be increased by lax work procedures. There is no strict uniformity in the manufacture of the cannon or in the work procedures used in the mines employing it. Hazards could be reduced, or even eliminated, with adaption of certain manufacturing and work-procedure guidelines, such as 1) making the cannon and projectile de-signs, as well the work procedures used, uniform, 2) ensuring separate loading of the charge and detonator with insertion of the detonator through a separate port, 3) connecting electrical firing circuits only after the charge and projectile are loaded and the cannon is placed in its final firing position, 4) using approved detonating devices, 5) anchoring the cannon before firing and, 6) placing armor netting over the cannon before detonation.

Jan 1, 1986

Avoid accidents that can occur when applying belt dressing from an aerosol can, particularly when can pressure has dropped or when spraying against wind. Approach Use a garde-type sprayer. How It Works Commercially available garden-type sprayers can be used for applying conveyor belt dressing from 12 feet away, or more. Pressure is easily raised and maintained at about 50 psi. Most sprayers have a hand pump, but a battery-powered cordless model is also available. Garden-type sprayers are available in various sizes from 11/2 to 18 gallons, with the larger models wheel mounted. The 3-gallon model evaluated by the Bureau has a shoulder carrying strap, which gives additional safety advantages. Use of the strap frees both hands for climbing ladders or holding onto catwalk rails. When spraying, one hand can remain on a handhold to lessen the chances of touching a moving belt.

Jan 1, 1980

By R. J. Matetic

Researchers associated with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Pittsburgh Research Laboratory (PRL), are investigating injuries (fatal and nonfatal) attributed to water well drillers during well drilling activities. Injury data, obtained from various sources, suggest that many water well drillers are experiencing unnecessarily high insurance premiums and very avoidable citations or violations from the direct result of accidents, injuries, and fatalities occurring throughout the water well drilling industry. Expensive insurance premiums and unnecessary citations are the direct result of poor health and safety practices. Visits to numerous water well drilling sites were conducted by NIOSH personnel to characterize and identify the injury data collected and to provide inexpensive strategies to prevent, minimize, and eliminate safety and health issues associated with water well drilling activities.

Jan 1, 2001

By Robert F. Randolph

Research on improving haulage truck safety, started by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, is being continued by its successors. This paper reports the orientation of the renewed research efforts, beginning with an update on accident data analysis, the role of multiple causes in these accidents, and the search for practical methods for addressing the most important causes. Fatal haulage accidents most often involve loss of control or collisions caused by a variety of factors. Lost-time injuries most often involve sprains or strains to the back or multiple body areas, which can often be attributed to rough roads and the shocks of loading and unloading. Research to reduce these accidents includes improved warning systems, shock isolation for drivers, encouraging seatbelt usage, and general improvements to system and task design.

Jan 1, 2000

By Robert F. Randolph

Research on improving haulage truck safety, started by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, is being continued by its successors. This two-part article reports the orientation of the renewed research efforts, beginning with an update on accident data analysis, the role of multiple causes in these accidents, and the search for practical methods for addressing the most important causes. Fatal haulage accidents most often involve loss of control or collisions caused by a variety of factors. Lost-time injuries most often involve sprains or strains to the back or multiple body areas, which can often be attributed to rough roads and the shocks of loading and unloading. Part II will describe research to reduce these accidents, including improved warning systems, shock isolation for drivers, encouraging seatbelt usage, and general improvements to system and task design.

Jan 1, 1997

By Robert F. Randolph

Research on improving haulage truck safety, started by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, is being continued by its successors. This two-part article reports the orientation of the renewed research efforts, beginning with an update on accident data analysis, the role of multiple causes in these accidents, and the search for practical methods for addressing the most important causes. Fatal haulage accidents most often involve loss of control or collisions caused by a variety of factors. Lost-time injuries most often involve sprains or strains to the back or multiple body areas, which can often be attributed to rough roads and the shocks of loading and unloading. Part II will describe research to reduce these accidents, including improved warning systems, shock isolation for drivers, encouraging seatbelt usage, and general improvements to system and task design.

Jun 1, 1997

By Launa G. Mallett, Charles Vaught, Dana C. Reinke, Lisa J. Steiner, Lynn L. Rethi, Kathleen M. Kowalski-Trakofler, Jr. Brnich, William J. Wiehagen

Safety and health professionals recognize that training is a critical element of any effective safety and health program. An extensive literature survey has led the authors to conclude that we are at the beginning of a revolution in training due to changes in the demographics of the workforce, the rapid growth of technology, and the universal ascendance of the information age. Of present major concern in the mining industry is how to provide appropriate training for an aging workforce and concurrently develop training for the expected influx of new and less experienced miners as older workers retire. This report explores the key issues in the changing safety and health training area as identified by the multidisciplinary team of NIOSH researchers who conducted the literature survey. Issues include generational differences between newer mine workers and the present workforce with respect to their physical, psychological, social, and cultural characteristics; their learning styles and work expectations; and the impact of technology. Some preliminary conclusions are offered for future training needs.

Jul 1, 2004

By W. E. Tournay

In accordance with a cooperative agreement between the Bureau of Mines, United States Department of the Interior, and the Linde Air Products Co., an investigation was made at the Bureau Explosives Testing Station, Bruceton, Pa., to develop suitable test methods for evaluating the performance and sensitivity characteristics of liquid-oxygen explosives. This report presents the results of the investigation. The unique nature of liquid-oxygen explosives necessitated both modification of standard techniques and development of entirely new test methods. The latter requirement was due to the fact that differences exist in the kind of information that must be developed for studying relative safety and performance properties of these explosives compared to that of fixed explosives.

Jan 1, 1949

By J. J. McClelland

The face area of a continuous mining section of an underground coal mine is the most dangerous area in the mine. Workers there are at nearly twice the risk of death or disabling injury than those in other parts of the mine. Despite extensive training of miners and improved equipment and mining methods, fatality and injury rates have remained constant during the past few years. It is clear that advanced research is necessary to apply new technologies or modify work procedures to solve the continuing problem of the loss of lives and the numerous injuries at the mine face. A U.S. Bureau of Mines research program is developing a Reduced-Exposure Mining System (REMS) that relocates personnel operating the mining machinery at the face away from the hazards to a nearby haven of relative safety. REMS uses proven technologies of computer automation and robotics to help control the operation of the mining machines at the face, while personnel are moved away to a nearby, safe control room. In this protected, well-ventilated environment, they can supervise or control the operation of the machines while viewing what the machine is doing using video and graphic display monitors.

Jan 1, 1994

[1.1. The provisions of this code are minimum provisions and are designed to minimize hazards to life and property in and about underground coal mines where electrical equipment and circuits installed used. They indicate the Steps necessary in the selection, installation, operation, inspection, and maintenance of electrical equipment and circuits to obtain proper safeguards in reducing electric shock, fire, explosion and other hazards. Surface as well as underground installations were considered in formulating the code and, unless otherwise stated, each provision applies equal to both underground and surface installations. This code does not apply to buildings and installations not directly connected with mining operations, nor does apply to strip-mining operations.]

Jan 1, 1952

By J. A. Zimrner, R. J. Tirnko

The roles of main mine fans in underground mines are to induce airflow and continuously re- move hazardous gases and dust. While most larger mines use multiple fans to accomplish these tasks, many smaller mines employ only a single fan. This paper concentrates on those mines having only one fan to provide ventilation needs. If this fan should cease to function, it is likely that methane concentrations will in- crease in some areas of the mine. As a safety precaution, Federal Regulations require that personnel must be- gin evacuating the mine within fifteen minutes after fan stoppage. Powered haulage can be used to transport workers to the mine portal as long as travel is through areas where hazardous levels of methane are not expected. To determine where methane will accumulate along haulageways during a fan stoppage, air samples must be taken at specific areas and analyzed for hazardous gases. During this study, procedures were developed for measuring methane levels along the haulegeways that are used to exit a mine following stoppage of the main mine fan. Methane levels were measured in four different mines at selected underground locations during four planned fan stoppages. In these mines the measurements taken only at the specified locations showed that, if workers had used electrically powered haulage to exit the mine following a fan stoppage, the methane accumulated along haulageways during fan stoppages would not have significantly increased the risk of an ignition.

By M. Beus, S. Inverson, B. Stewart

Abstract Recent ore pass failures have underlined the need for improved designs, standards, structural mon¬itoring methods and better hang-up prevention and removal tech¬niques. Researchers at the Spokane Research Laboratory of the Na¬tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) are investigating methods to improve safety during the transport of ore in ore passes. Design criteria and hang-up prevention and remedia¬tion strategies involve studies of the effects of static and dynamic ore and waste-rock loads on chutes, walls, gates and support structures. Particle flow analysis methods were used to simulate the response of various ore pass designs to a wide range of ore loading condi¬tions. A full-scale mockup of ac¬tual ore pass and chute assemblies was duplicated and tested for load response. Data from a particle flow code and the mock-ups were com¬pared Loads on an active ore pass chute were measured.

The Sago Mine Disaster, on January 2, 2006, placed renewed focus on several different aspects of safety in the underground coal mining industry. One area which received increased attention since Sago and other underground coal mining events is the concept of Safety Culture. This report describes the results of a pilot Safety Culture Assessment implemented at a small Appalachian underground coal mine, hereafter referred to as the Mine. The purposes of this pilot assessment were to (a) evaluate the feasibility and usefulness of a methodology for assessing safety culture that had previously been developed for use within other industries, (b) to initiate an investigation into the understanding and defining of the existing safety culture of the underground coal mining industry, and (c) provide meaningful and useful recommendations for the participating mine for their consideration in their ongoing quest to enhance their existing safety culture. This pilot assessment was conducted in July 2007. The report provides information regarding the presence or absence of safety culture characteristics within the Mine. Observations regarding the characteristics of the Mine?s safety culture that should be sustained are presented. Areas in need of attention and management focus to improve the Mine?s safety culture are presented as well as recommendations for moving forward. Safety culture characteristics that are important for the existence of a positive safety culture have been identified to include: - Safety is a clearly recognized value in the organization. - Accountability for safety in the organization is clear. - Safety is integrated into all activities in the organization. - A safety leadership process exists in the organization. - Safety culture is learning driven in the organization. - A process for establishing a strong and effective Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) is in place. Performance objectives are associated with each of the safety culture characteristics and particular behaviors and attitudes have been identified that can be measured to evaluate these objectives. Using a methodology originally developed with the support of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an assessment of selected organizational behaviors and attitudes was conducted to evaluate the Mine in terms of these safety culture characteristics and their associated performance objectives. The methodology involves obtaining a variety of quantitative and qualitative information, using multiple data-gathering methods. The information collected is largely based upon the perceptions of the individuals in the organization. The evaluation is a ?point in time? snapshot of the Mine, but cultural beliefs and assumptions do not change quickly. The feasibility and usefulness of the methodology was successfully demonstrated during this pilot assessment. All aspects of the methodology including functional analysis, structured interviews with accompanying behavioral scales, work observations, and the paper and pencil

Aug 1, 2007

By David Hoadley, Kenneth R. Maser, Ashok B. Boghani, James E. Billar, D. Randolph Berry, Mackenzie Burnett, Robert H. Trent

C.5 Safety Equipment and Control Devices Safety equipment and control devices serve two principal functions in mine escape hoists. First, they can be used to provide important safety features such as protection against overspeed, over¬travel and undertravel. Second they can be used to automate or partially automate the operation of the escape hoist. Typical equipment available is described in the following section. 1. Simplex and Lilly Hoist Controllers Manufacturers: Logan Actuator Co. 4956 No. Elston Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60630 312-736-7500 The Simplex and Lilly Controllers provide a means for electrically shutting off the power to the hoist and the energy to physically set the brakes in the event of overspeed, overtravel, undertravel and failure to begin deceleration within sufficient distance

Jan 1, 1976

By John J. Sammarco

Mining has one of the highest annual average fatality rates among major US industries. Health and safety dangers have been inherent to mining since the early days of picks and shovels. Even though miners' health and safety has improved over the years, mining is still one of the most dangerous occupations. Mining was traditionally a low tech industry. It is now driven by competitive pressures to go high-tech by using programmable electronics (PE) for machine control, atmospheric monitoring and material processing. The industry's experience with the functional safety of PE is limited compared with other industries. Thus, PE is an emerging technology for mining that can potentially create or worsen hazards. The US National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Pittsburgh Research Laboratory in Pittsburgh, PA is addressing the safety of this new technology. NIOSH has a proactive project to generate recommendations for addressing the functional safety of PE-based mining systems before the technology proliferates. The recommendations take the form of a safety framework encompassing the entire life cycle for a PE-based mining system.