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Within the research project "Mine Development" funded by the "Austrian Fonds zur Forderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung (FWF) " (funds for scientific research) between 1991 and 1993 150 underground hardrock mines in Europe, Northern America, Australia and Japan have been visited to analyze their general design and layout. The main aim of the project was to develop strategies for accessing new underground hardrock mines and to establish a mine planning database. The investigation included mines in high developed countries only, with a comparable labor cost situation. This paper presents the results of one part of the project, which deals with investigations into the influence of different parameters on the design of the primary access for a mine.

Jan 1, 1995

By H. W. Hunt

Accessories are increasingly used to protect and extend H, pipe, precast concrete, timber, and sheet piles for any soils conditions. With point protection, piles can be driven through boulders, layered rock, garbage dumps, and waterfront debris to provide dependable support for all types of structures. Splicers for pipe piles can be tapered for a water-tight drive-fit that does not require welding. The pipe splicer can be made applicable to precast concrete piles. Splicers for H make the long pile as strong as an unspliced length with only simple welding. Transition splicers quickly connect different types or sizes into efficient composite piles.

Jan 1, 2010

By P. Venkatasubramanian

The aerospace and nuclear industries have been applying systematic techniques for assessing the safety of complex technical systems for many years. These techniques such as fault tree analysis, failure mode, and effect analysis, etc., and more recently "expert systems," were developed to formally evaluate systems safety and to determine how hazards can he reduced. The application of formal methods such as expert systems has the potential for further reduction in both frequency and the consequences of mine accidents. This paper presents a general expert system model of diagnostic reasoning and describes its use as an inference method for analysis and problem identification for accidents due to the presence of an open cycle diesel-powered mine cars in underground coal mines.

Jan 1, 1987

By J. F. Myers, S. E. Sharp

THE safety data presented in this paper are based upon replies to a Questionnaire sent out to representative mining companies. The authors feel that it is a fair cross section of the milling industry, in that the 17 companies, of the United States and Canada, reporting on 22 mills, are scattered from the Hudson Bay to the Mexican border and from coast to coast. These data concern the accident records of the. various plants from 1939 to 1944, inclusive and the six years are divided into two periods. The first period (1939, 1940 and 1941) represents something of a normal operating condition. The second period (1942, 1943 and 1944) represents the period of time that was most affected by war con¬ditions. During the second period there was a high labor turnover, inexperienced workers were numerous, women replaced men in many kinds of work, a labor shortage existed more or less throughout the industry, and supervision was pushed for peak production. All of the companies reporting compiled their accident experiences for these six years in accordance with the standards set up by the American Standards Association (Engineering Societies Building, New York, N. Y.), consequently the tabulated data presented herein are comparable. The authors of this paper feel that the industry as a whole is greatly indebted to the personnel of the companies that furnished these data, which make this study possible for presentation. This survey covers a total exposure of 74,528,880 man-hours, with 105,471 man-days of lost time from 870 accidents. SAFETY RECORDS In Table I, the safety record is shown of the various mills reporting. The severity rate is usually conceded to be the most vital statistical figure in safety parlance, therefore the participating companies are listed in order of their severity rate for the combined six-year period, under size of organization. The table also shows the frequency rate as well as the frequency-severity ratio (F/S). As noted in Table 1, most of the companies suffered an increase in both severity and frequency rates during the second period; only six of the 22 enjoyed an improvement. From correspondence with the various plants, it seems that a few had very little labor shortage or turnover, and these were not greatly affected. A few plants, anticipating the situation, strengthened their training facilities and actually were able to show a better experience during the second period. This gives great credence to the value of organized training in any safety program. The frequency-severity ratio (F/S) shown in the last column of Table I offers

Jan 1, 1946

By Ralph H. Cleland

GENERALLY speaking, the Industry lost ground in 1941 in its accident experience. Though the frequency of compensation accidents was but slightly higher than in the previous year and well below past experience, our fatality rate shot up to that obtaining in 1938, and the average cost per man employed was the highest for some time. The number of fatalities was 56 in 1941 as against 33 in 1940. The average cost of compensation per man employed was $34.25 in 1941 as against $28.43. There was but a slight increase in the number of men employed. Accident prevention efforts were maintained, as shown by our frequency, but our accidents were of a more serious nature. In a period of considerable labour turnover, with many new men entering the Industry, especially the base-metal division, and much mental distraction, we might well have expected a high rate of accidents. That this did not occur is a tribute to managers, supervisors, and workmen alike. We all regret the high fatality rate and one must consider why this occurred. So far as it is possible to determine, there is no apparent explanation. There were no disasters. The accidents occurred to the same class of work-men, both in respect to jobs and age groups, and from the same age-old causes that we all know so well. Luck is a big factor in the seriousness of an accident; the solution lies in preventing accidents, even first-aid cases. Generally speaking, if minor accidents do not occur, major accidents do not occur.

Jan 1, 1942

By Kirk L. Prather

Why discuss techniques of accident prod lot on? Would it not be more useful to discuss means to reduce accidents? This discussion will answer these questions by suggesting ways in which effective accident prediction techniques improve the ability to foresee and prevent accidents. Accident Prediction Process The secret to accident prediction is to utilize the tendency for history to repeat itself. The same circumstances and the same human behavior that produced accidents in the past tend to produce accidents in the present and the future. The ability to predict accident occurence in the future by projecting from the past is a statistical process. In a bookmaker's jargon this means "playing the odds" or "the percentages". A horse or a sports team may be beaten on any given day, but by skillfully assessing the factors of past performance and assigning odds, many clever bettors make money in the long run.

Jan 1, 1973

By Harold L. Bare, Frank R. Barnako

Coal mining historically has been a hazardous occupation but, in recent years, tremendous progress has been made in reducing accidental coal mine deaths and injuries. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the basic principles of accident prevention as they are related to coal mining. Accident prevention fundamentals are no different for coal mining than for any other type of work. The fundamentals apply to all industries. Construction workers may be struck by falling tools and materials, and miners may be struck by falling slate and coal. Sailors may be trapped by shipboard fires, and miners may be trapped by mine fires. Railroad brakemen may lose hands and fingers positioning couplers, and miners may lose hands and fingers positioning couplers. Many other examples could be cited, but the point is that accidents that happen in coal mines are basically similar to accidents that happen in other industries. Thus, the basic principles for preventing accidents apply in coal mining as they do in any other type of work. COAL MINE ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE The US Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) is the main source for accident experience data in coal mines. Coal mine operators are required, by law, to forward to MSHA monthly the number of fatal and disabling injuries, man-hours worked, and tons of coal mined. This information is compiled and published quarterly, with annual summaries, by MSHA. Trends in the number of fatalities and fatal injury rates are shown in Fig. 1. Major coal mine disasters, with number of miners killed, and dates of coal mine safety legislation are shown in Table 1. The fatal and disabling injury frequency rates for the coal industry are shown in Fig. 2.

Jan 1, 1981

By Walter E. Montgomery

ACCIDENT-PREVENTION work in years gone by has been carried on by many mine managers as a philanthropic movement, but in recent years they have come to realise that Safety is good business and pays tangible dividends. Let us begin with the word itself. We are told that an accident is "any-thing occurring unexpectedly, undesignedly, or without known or assign-able cause'. It is further explained that it is any 'unpleasant or unfortunate occurrence involving injury, loss, suffering, or death", and, finally, "any unintentional or non-essential circumstance". We admit that accidents are unfortunate, unpleasant, unintentional, and they generally happen undesignedly and to a great degree unexpectedly, but to say that they happen "without known or assignable cause" leads us to believe that the word 'accident' is often misused. Would it not be more correct to say that a man suffered a "personal injury"? The word 'accident' in its proper sense implies something over which no one has any control, but when the majority of all so-called accidents are analysed we arrive at the incontestible fact that some act or action, previous or present, was the underlying cause. As long ago as the year 1556 this fact was mentioned by Georgius Agricola, who, in writing a paper on metallurgy, aptly stated, "It remains for me to speak on the ailments and accidents of mines, and of the methods by which they can guard against these, for we should always devote more care to maintaining our health, that we may freely perform the functions of our body, than to making profits". Farther on, Agricola relates in more detail, "Sometimes workmen slipping from ladders into the shafts break their arms, legs, or necks, or fall into the sumps and are drowned; often, indeed, the negligence of the foreman is to blame, for it is his special work both to fix the ladder so firmly to the timbers that they cannot break away, and to cover so securely with planks the sumps at the bottom of the shafts, that the planks cannot be moved nor the men fall into the water; wherefore the foreman must carefully execute his own work. Moreover, he must not set the entrance of the shaft-house toward the north wind, lest in winter the ladders freeze with cold, for when this happens the man's hands become stiff and slipping with cold, and cannot perform their office of holding. The men, too, must be careful that, even if none of these things happen, they do not fall from their own carelessness'.

Jan 1, 1938

By James J. Holmes

ACCIDENT prevention as we know and understand it today is of comparatively recent origin. As a matter of fact, the Industrial Accident Prevention Association of Ontario, which is the oldest organization of its kind in the Dominion, celebrated its thirtieth anniversary only this year. On the other hand, one could say that the history of accident prevention is almost the history of mankind itself. In a general sense, every forward step that man has made throughout the centuries has been largely due to two things: (1) a desire for increased comfort, and (2) the need for safety; and, always, the need for safety has taken precedence over the desire for comfort. While it is true that hundreds of volumes have been published, dealing with the many aspects of accident prevention work, you cannot go to a library and pick out a book that has all the answers in it. Such a book has never been published-we are still looking for some of the answers. However, a good deal of real progress has been made.

Jan 1, 1945

By Harold L. Bare, Frank R. Barnako

Coal mining historically has been a. hazardous occupation but, in recent years, tremendous progress has been made in reducing accidental coal mine deaths and injuries. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the basic principles of accident prevention as they are related to coal mining. Accident prevention fundamentals are no different for coal mining than for any other type of work. The fundamentals apply to all industries. Construction workers may be struck by falling tools and materials, and miners may be struck by falling slate and coal. Sailors may be trapped by shipboard fires, and miners may be trapped by mine fires. Railroad brakemen may lose hands and fingers positioning couplers, and miners may lose hands and fingers positioning couplers. Many other examples could be cited, but the point is that accidents that happen in coal mines are basically similar to accidents that happen in other industries. Thus, the basic principles for preventing accidents apply in coal mining as they do in any other type of work. COAL MINE ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE The US Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) is the main source for accident experience data in coal mines. Coal mine operators are required, by law, to forward to MSHA monthly the number of fatal and disabling injuries, man-hours worked, and tons of coal mined. This information is compiled and published quarterly, with annual summaries, by MSHA. Trends in the number of fatalities and fatal injury rates are shown in Fig. 1. Major coal mine disasters, with number of miners killed, and dates of coal mine safety legislation are shown in Table 1. The fatal and disabling injury frequency rates for the coal industry are shown in Fig. 2.

Jan 1, 1981

By Frank R. (Original by) Barnako

Coal mining historically has been a hazardous occupation but, in recent years, tremendous progress has been made in reducing accidental coal mine deaths and injuries. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the basic principles of accident prevention as they are related to coal mining. Accident prevention fundamentals are no different for coal mining than for any other type of work. The fundamentals apply to all industries. Construction workers may be struck by falling tools and materials, and miners may be struck by falling slate and coal. Sailors may be trapped by shipboard fires, and miners may be trapped by mine fires. Railroad brakemen may lose hands and fingers positioning couplers, and miners may lose hands and fingers positioning couplers. Many other examples could be cited, but the point is that accidents that happen in coal mines are basically similar to accidents that happen in other industries. Thus, the basic principles for preventing accidents apply in coal mining as they do in any other type of work.

Jan 1, 1981

The published safety policy of Mount Isa Mines Limited, together with details of the organisation and control techniques adopted by management to pursue an active safety programme within the company, is presented. The importance of communication by management through the organisational hierarchy and procedures instituted to ensure rapid and concise feedback on safety concerns are detailed. The paper also describes the role of the occupational health department and safety committees in assisting management to monitor the safety effort of supervisors and employees. Current safety performance levels are tabled together with details of some aspects of the programme on which safety effort will be concentrated in the future.

Jan 1, 1975

By Michael G. Zabetakis

Effective accident prevention programs utilize a broad spectrum of activities, including meaningful training programs. In practice, such programs must be directed towards specific, defined needs. These needs are considered here for three categories of employees: new, re-assigned, and experienced.

Jan 1, 1983

By J. M. Wolverton

CONSIDERABLE interest has always been taken in Safety-First and First Aid at the Sullivan mine. Even during the early days of development, Safety-First committees periodically held meetings, while lectures in first aid were given to any employees interested in the work. In 1929, a Safety Department was organized, and all accident-prevention and first-aid work was put in charge of a full-time Safety Engineer. An extensive programme has gradually been developed, the value of which can best be indicated by the reduction of the accident rate from 18.4 shifts lost per 1,000 shifts worked for non-fatal accidents and two fatalities for 1927, to 3.24 shifts lost per 1,000 shifts worked and no fatalities for 1936. SUPERVISION All work connected with accident prevention or first aid is under the jurisdiction of a central committee, known as the Accident Prevention Committee, which meets regularly once a month. It consists of all superintendents, department heads, foremen, and shift bosses, and is presided over by the Safety Engineer. At these meetings, the accident records of the previous month are reviewed and all accidents carefully analyzed and discussed. All proposed changes in the safety rules or in the accident tprevention programme are taken up and passed upon. Complaints or suggestions from the Safety-First Committee and the Employees Co-operative Committee, dealing with safety, are discussed and passed upon or a subcommittee is appointed to investigate and take any action found advisable. The question of underground ventilation and dust control, which recently has become a very important problem, always receives considerable attention.

Jan 1, 1937

By Daniel Murray

"ACCIDENT PREVENTION in and around coal mines presents many problems of a type which are not encountered in any other industry. This is particularly true of the coal mines in Nova Scotia, where the underground workings are very extensive and the area of exposure to workmen is very great.Roof conditions at the coal faces and in the waste change very rapidly, almost from hour to hour, and it is at these places that the greatest dangers exist and where most mine accidents occur. It is only natural, therefore, that our attention, as far as accident prevention is concerned, should be concentrated •at the coal faces and in the waste, especially in mines where the longwall system is used in the operation •of the seam.It has been said that no hard and fast rules can be set down for timbering at the coal faces and in the waste in the coal mines in this area. We do not subscribe to this theory, however, for the following reasons:On the longwall faces in No. 18 Colliery of the Dominion Coal Company, Limited, where the 'Dosco Miner' has been in operation and where there is a very rigid system of timbering and roof supports, which is strictly followed, only one compensable accident has occurred on those faces from May 2ndJ 1950, to the time of writing this paper, February 3rd, 1953.The 'Dosco Miner' has worked on four different longwall faces in this mine and has mined and loaded some hundreds of thousands of tons of coal."

Jan 1, 1953

By L McCracken

Up until 1990 CoalCorp North Island's accident record was six times that considered acceptable in those NSW operations with good accident prevention programmes. This was an obvious avoidable burden on the company in both human and cost terms.   Late in 1989 an accident prevention programme was implemented with the objective of achieving a 50 per cent reduction in the lost time accident frequency rate within 12 months. The key to achieving this objective was recognised as being an attitude change in the total workforce from General Manager downward. Management commitment and action were seen to be critical to the success of the programme.   Through very basic and simple training programmes in accident investigation, analysis and reporting, communication, on-the-job coaching and in focusing on improving supervision skills, the original objective was achieved.   During 1991 the application of methods improvement and hazard recognition techniques are seen as the logical step to achieving a further 50 per cent reduction in the accident frequency rate.

Jan 1, 1991

By A S. Leitch

This paper is based on the accident prevention pro-gram carried out in the coal mines of Alberta. It defines the role of the Alberta Mines Branch and of The Work-men's Compensation Board, and relates how a safety pro-gram was initiated. The formation of the Alberta Class 1 Mining Safety Council is also described. The responsibilities of both management and the individual worker are then outlined, and the main features of a successful accident prevention program are delineated. T HE purpose of this paper is not to repeat generalities and platitudes about industrial safety, but rather to relate the experience of Alberta coal mines during the past number of years in their efforts to keep accidents to a minimum. It has been learned from experience that many basic principles are as sound today as they were 20 years ago. How-ever the complexities of modern mining methods and the modern man or miner have created problems that did not exist then.

Jan 1, 1964

SECRETARY SHUBART: This letter will not surprise you. (Reads) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Mines Washington Sept. 4, 192G. Benedict Shubart, Secy, Rocky Mountain Coal Mining Institute. Denver, Colo. Dear Sir: "Sorry not to be able to be with you but since my function in the Institute has been largely along the line of `stirrer up of trouble' (of course always with the aid of Dalrymple), I do not wish to fall from grace now so am sending you a pamphlet on the last page of which is a' tabulation as to accident indices of various coal mining states and it seems to indicate that the states comprising the Rocky Mountain Institute have the poorest accident record of all the states producing coal. "It seems to me that even allowing for possible deficiencies in connection with placing accidents upon basis of hours of exposure, our western states need to `tighten up' as to safety practices, hence I hope that the Safety Committee report will be both drastic and progressive and that western coal mines apply the drastic proposals in addition to approving them as the policy of the Institute. Why wouldn't it be advisable to have a committee appointed to ascertain why the safety record of the states comprising the Institute is so bad as to coal mines? Wishing the Institute all kinds of success." (Signed) D. HARRINGTON. SECRETARY SHUBART: He encloses this pamphlet issued by the Bureau of Mines. On the back of it is this table; and it is a fact that the Rocky Mountain States are down at the lowest in almost every case, at the lowest point, with the highest accident rate in almost every kind of accident. Maybe he is wrong; maybe he states this for reasons. That is a rotten looking table for us.

Jan 1, 1926

By D. Harrington

E. H. DENNY (United States Bureau of Mines, Denver, Colorado) In the absence of Mr. Harrington it is my privilege to read his paper, which is in his usual, forcible and sincere style, and it is within the province of this Institute, certainly, to go into it as it concerns safety and efficiency in mining. He brings out some points in his paper that, I think, are well worth the consideration of the Institute. The figures he uses were compiled by Mr. Adams, of the Bureau, and cover a five-year period. However, examination of similar Bureau figures for a ten-year period, or any other long period on other bases brings out similar results. The figures in this paper have been based on the million hours of exposure of accidents, and the figures based on three hundred working-man-day basis, or on tonnage, brings out similar results. This paper is entitled "Accident Record in Western Mines," and it is, in a way, an amplification of Mr. Harrington's letter which was read at the Glenwood Springs Meeting.

Jan 1, 1927

By Christodoulos Xiouris, Ali Reza, James Karnesky

A rocket parachute signal flare is often used to signal a maritime emergency. In the general operation of these devices, a solid rocket motor propels a metal body to an altitude of approximately 1000 ft(305m).At the end of the rocket motor, a propelling charge drives a signal flare and parachute out of the metal body and ignites the flare, which then burns for approximately 40 seconds as it falls to earth. In this paper, we describe an engineering investigation of an accidental ignition of a rocket parachute signal flare, which caused injury to the user. The components of the flare involved in the accident were inspected via x-ray and microscopic imaging techniques, and compared with those of unfired flares recovered from the same vessel. Chemical analysis of residue on recovered components from the accident flare was also performed. These comparisons were used to determine the likelihood that the actuation mechanism had been deliberately manipulated. In the subject model of the flare, ignition of the rocket motor is accomplished through a percussion cap which is struck by a firing pin. Prior to activation, the firing pin holds down a pre-compressed spring. We present a comparison of the ignition system of the incident flare with those of other rocket parachute flares, which do not incorporate any stored mechanical energy.