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The work of the Committee on Industrial Preparedness* is well summed up in the following letter written by Thomas A. Edison, Chair-man of the Naval Consulting Board, after President Wilson and signed the army appropriation and army reorganization bills: "The Committee on Industrial Preparedness of the Naval Consulting Board, of which committee Howard E. Coffin is chairman, after a five months' campaign in many ways unique in vigor and vision has played a very definite part in the measures for the national defense which have just become law. It is responsible for having laid the foundation for a true industrial preparedness in this nation. "Five months ago the committee, wholly non-partisan in make-up, acting with the civil, mechanical, mining and electrical engineers and the chemists of the country, members of five great scientific bodies, began its work in' every nook and cranny of the land. The purpose was to prepare American industry efficiently to support the armed forces of America in the event of war. "The public, the business men and the legislators at Washington knew little regarding the demands on industry in connection with modern war. No department at Washington was charged with the duty of coordinating the needs of the army and navy with transportation, industry, and kindred functions. The purchasing, quartermaster's and ordnance departments of the army and navy were unable to buy military supplies except by competitive offering in the open market. No one had considered the need, and no legislative machinery was in existence, for preventing the presence of skilled workers on the fighting front when they would in time of war be needed in the factories, mills and mines of the country. Neither at Washington or elsewhere was there even a list of the industrial resources of the nation in such shape as could be used for practical purposes in case war should come. "The three things, then, that the committee headed by Mr. Coffin set out to do and that now have been brought about were as follows: First, to mobilize concretely the business men of America and their output against a day of need. This meant chiefly to discover in fullest detail just what equipment our manufacturers possessed that might be swung over to supply the army and navy swiftly and bountifully from the hour the colors were raised. In a few weeks this initial task, which has been a truly colossal one, will be at an end. A complete report of the equipment of practically every concern of substantial size in the country is now in the hands of the - committee. Directly in charge of the great inventory has been W. S. Gifford, Supervising Director of the Committee. The second step was to procure legislation making possible the placing by the war and navy departments of annual orders for munitions in small quantities to American manufacturers now not producing such things, so that quietly, efficiently and thoroughly they could learn in time of peace how to supply the government in time of war. The new laws make all this possible. It should be said here that this practice will bring about a geographical diffusion of munition plants all over our country, instead of affording us only a few such concerns for the most part near the exposed seaboards, as at present. It is obvious that this system will also throttle all talk of a munitions trust.

Jan 10, 1916

By John K. Hammes

INTRODUCTION This introductory paper presents a description and definition of what the finance function is and what it specifically means for the mining industry. In its simplest terms, finance is, "management of money matters". As an area within the discipline of business administration it draws heavily on the related fields of economics and accounting, and to a lesser extent on marketing and production. MINING FINANCE DEFINED In preparing to write about what finance means to the mining industry, I asked a number of mining people the question, "What does mining finance mean to you?" Most responded that mining finance was "How a company borrowed money for mine development", and perhaps half those questioned included "raising equity" in the definition. It is not surprising that the mining industry concept of finance is the providing of funds needed for the objectives of the business, for that was once a view shared by authorities in the field of business administration. Further, it is certainly the area where much of the emphasis has been placed in the past ten to fifteen years as the industry struggled with the development of more remote and more refractory or lower-grade orebodies while profitability and internal cash flow were below expectations. No wonder project finance became such a popular topic. Twenty years ago it is probable that the emphasis would have been on mine valuation, for that subject was the area of finance then most often examined in industry publications. Papers concerning the pros and cons of payback, internal rate of return, and discounted cash flow appeared regularly. Let's examine the following situations, each the result of a financial decision: - Funding the exploration program in a developing country was accomplished by buying the next six-months budget needs in local currency. One week later the currency devalued 30 percent. If the purchase had been delayed or the local currency borrowed short term, a substantial saving would have been made in funding the program. - A major mining company borrows heavily to finance both expansion of its primary mining business and its entry into several new industry segments. When markets for all of the commodities it produces turn down for a prolonged period, there is concern over the adequacy of cashflow to cover debt service in addition to other company needs. The company's financial officers, however, had arranged very large committed credit facilities from numerous financial institutions which assured the availability of funds for several years. This enabled the company to implement a strategy to conserve cash, sell assets and survive until conditions improved. Further, short term suppliers of credit also were comfortable with the assurance that longer term credit was there to support them. -A medium size mining company financed several mines independently with limited obligations on the part of the parent company. The company decided to refinance the operations under one agreement. More flexible terms, lower interest cost and a longer tenor financing were achieved in return for assuming the risk as a direct obligor. - The exploration and development group of a large mining company proposes to develop a new mine in a country in which the company does not presently operate. When the investment is rejected they are advised that one reason was that the reinvestment assumption inherent in the discounted

Jan 1, 1985

By Alistair Frame

INTRODUCTION In April 1988 discussions were about to start with BP on the possibility of buying their- mineral interests, and it took a long time to arrange a deal. I will talk about RTZ without BP Minerals, look at the new RTZ with BP Minerals, discuss the outlook for metal prices, and review the problems in South Africa and develop the case against sanctions on that country. RTZAT THE END OF 1988 Late in 1987, after completing a worldwide review of our strategic thrust, we decided: 1. That the business focus would be to remain a major diversified natural resource group with interests in related industries. 2. To divest non-core and low growth businesses. 3. To develop a logical acquisition plan. 4. To emphasise organic growth and, most importantly, to enhance shareholders' wealth by capital increase and a progressive dividend policy. Subsequently, we concluded that we should sell our oil and gas business and dispose of several assets for which we saw little growth potential. The disposal programme raised some U.S.$ 1,600 million, representing a significant capital gain on our various investments. All transactions were carried out by our small Head Office staff in London, without the help of merchant banks and lawyers, and we were able to safeguard the employment of our staff in all these operations. The most interesting disposal was of our oil and gas interests. Before the 1987 strategic review, we had ambitions to develop our oil and gas interests and to become the leader in the second division of European oil companies. Our interests, which were purely in exploration and production of oil and gas, consisted of the 100% owned RTZ Oil and Gas company, and 29% of LASMO, a publicly quoted U.K. oil and gas company with extensive worldwide interests. LASMO, in turn, owned 25% of Enterprise Oil, one of the more successful of the North Sea oil exploration and production companies. Prior to the end of 1987, our intention was to acquire control of both LASMO and Enterprise. However, when we evaluated the net asset value of these two companies based on our oil price assumptions, which were pessimistic for the next five years or so, we concluded that they were both trading in the market at significant premiums. This, taken with the additional premium required for acquisition and the high cost of exploration, led us to conclude that, since funds could undoubtedly be used to better effect, we should sell our interests. Turning to the other major achievements in 1988, we commissioned, and built up to design levels in a very short period of time, the Morro do Ouro gold mine in Brazil. This mine reached its design output of 100,000 ounces of gold per year within three months of start-up, which was on time and under budget. We are now considering a possible expansion of this property. In South America, Utah International, Mitsubishi and RTZ arranged non-recourse finance, with post completion guarantees, for the giant Escondida Project in Northern Chile. Financing came from a group of banks in Japan, Germany and Finland -- the countries to which most of the concentrates will be sold -- and from the LEC. The average output of the mine for the

Jan 1, 1990

By D. L. Rainey, E. R. Goter, W. R. Hudspeth

THE area in which spodumene-bearing pegmatites occur extends from Gaffney, S. C., in a northerly direction to Lincolnton, N. C., a distance of about 16 miles. The zone averages 2 miles in width. Interest in this area was first aroused by the discovery of small amounts of cassiterite in the peg-matites and in greissen which occurs on the walls of some of the pegmatites. Attempts were made from 1880 into the 1920's to mine and concentrate cas-siterite, but there were no successful operations. In 1935 L. M. Williams became interested in the area and began prospecting by trenching and sinking several small shafts. He gradually gained control of a considerable acreage south of the city of Kings Mountain, N. C. Mr. Williams states that he produced some ore from a shaft which he shipped to the Maywood Chemical Co. in the late 1930's. In 1937 G. H. Chambers of the Foote Mineral Co. visited the area and examined several properties, but the lithium market was too small to support the necessary concentrating plant. Early in World War II the Solvay Process Co., encouraged by various federal agencies, acquired the Williams properties and leases and started a drilling program to develop reserves for spodumene mining. A study of this area was also made under T. L. Kesler by the U. S. Department of the Interior Geological Survey. Starting in 1942 a concentrating plant, water supply dams, and shops and other buildings were constructed. The Superior Stone Co., a neighboring crushed stone operator, was awarded a contract to mine and crush the pegmatite ore. Late in 1943 the plant started operations, which were continued until February 1946. A drop in demand for lithium chemicals forced it to close and remain closed for several years. In 1948 the Foote Mineral Co. became interested in assuring itself a source of lithium ore on the North American continent, to be used in the production of lithium ore chemicals, and inspected properties in Canada, South Dakota, and North Carolina. The North Carolina deposits were the most promising. In the fall of 1950 the company leased the Solvay interests with option to buy and acquired additional properties. Renovation of the mill and preparation of the quarry for mining was begun in earnest in January 1951. A new crushing plant was built and construction started in July 1951. The flotation process used was developed in the North Carolina State Minerals Research Laboratory located at Asheville, N. C. Foote is now in the process of expanding its production. The crushing plant is being revamped and much of the old milling equipment purchased from Solvay will be replaced by new. Mining equipment of suitable capacity has been received and is in use. The frontispiece is a general view of the mill. The orebodies consist of pegmatite dikes composed of fine-grained albite and quartz, with varying amounts of mica and spodumene. The latter may amount to as much as 50 pct of the rock, but the overall average is about 15 to 20 pct. Tin, columbite-tantalite, beryl, and other valuable minerals are present in varying small amounts. These dikes, which intruded into the Roan Gneiss underlying most of the Piedmont area, strike approximately N 30 E and dip about 85" to the west. The gneiss has the same strike but dips about 70" west. The dikes lie in a belt extending from Lin-colnton, N. C., to Gaffney, S. C., and passing through

Jan 1, 1954

By Granville S. Borden

MANY complaints have been filed by mine prospectors, explorers and producers about inequities in mining taxation. They have insisted upon improvement, and in the past 35 years there has been some progress. Many of the best taxation provisions made to date are those contained in the Revenue Act of 1951. Mining economics presents special problems, a fact even recognized by many textbooks. Certain provisions have been made to take care of mining taxation rights, but these have been made by Congressional act and do not represent basic, constitutional, guarantees. Despite special provision, in the form of depletion allowances, there remain injustices. The industry faces the problem of gaining adequate income tax allowances for exploration and development expenditures, operating losses, and bonus and subsidy payments. Problems in mine taxation arose soon after the adoption of the 16th Amendment. This amendment gave Congress the power to impose income taxes. Supreme Court decisions against a number of mining companies held that Congress, under its power to tax income, could tax net operating revenue before depletion allowance was deducted. The court also ruled that the right to deduct depletion is a matter of Congressional permission. There is no statute provision permitting mining stockholders to recover their investment out of dividends while the mine is being operated. The Supreme Court did not recognize that part of mining proceeds are actually amortization of the cost of mineral rights. Both these omissions stem from failure to recognize that by its very nature mining consumes its mineral rights and therefore that a part of gross proceeds are not income but recovery of capital. Suppose a Congress unfriendly to mining interests repeals the provisions that allow deductions for depletion. Under such a situation assume that a corporation buys a mineral deposit for $300,000. They mine the deposit and earn an operating profit of $500,000. At the current rates they would pay a Federal Income tax of in excess of $250,000. This venture results in a loss of $50,000 as shown in the table below. For the example given the absence of depletion provisions in income tax law would turn ore into waste rock, because the word "ore" connotes commercially mineable rock. [ ] In retrospect the conclusion is clear: If the Supreme Court had recognized that a part of mining proceeds represent in reality sales proceeds of mineral rights, then profits derived from such sales would have been taxed at the favorable long-term capital rates, instead of being taxed at the high normal, surtax and excess profits rates. It is a question whether percentage depletion allowances offset this tax situation. History The history of depletion allowances has been one of general improvement. The original act did not include depletion, but an allowance at the rate of 5 pct of gross proceeds was provided in 1913. The Acts of 1916 and 1917 allowed depletion upon cost of property, and in 1918 the law was further changed to permit depletion upon cost, or market value as of date of discovery. In 1932 metal, coal and sulphur properties were permitted to elect depletion in percentages of gross income, limited to 50 pct of net income, in lieu of cost depletion. Shortly thereafter the rule was changed and percentage depletion is now allowable in any case where it is higher than cost depletion. Since 1942 percentage depletion allowances have been extended to cover many nonmetals, and in 1951 the rate for coal mines was increased from 5 to 10 pct of gross income. It is interesting to note that these allowances have been retained, and even

Jan 1, 1952

By George D. Graffin.

The first use of graphite is lost in the mists of time. It was used by primitive man to make drawings on the walls of caves and by the Egyptians to decorate pottery. As early as 1400 A.D. graphite crucibles were being made in the Haffnerzell district of Bavaria. Through the Middle Ages graphite was confused with other minerals, especially galena and molybdenite. Two common names that are still used for the mineral are "Plumbago," meaning leadlike, and "Black Lead." The latter name implied that graphite is either composed of lead or at least contains a large percentage of it. Gessner is credited with having recognized it as a separate mineral in 1565, but its composition was not determined until 1779, when Scheele demonstrated that graphite oxidized to carbon dioxide, thus proving its carbon constitution. In 1789, Werner named it "graphite" from the Greek word "graphein," meaning to write. The United States has long relied on foreign countries for its graphite supplies. This reliance has been due more to the lack of suitable domestic graphites than to any particular preference for buying minerals overseas. Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) graphites were imported as early as 1820, and Madagascar graphites have been imported since the properties on that island were opened up about a hundred years later. Mexico has long supplied the United States with most of its requirements for amorphous graphite. Physical Properties and Classification Graphite is found in laminated, flaky aggregates disseminated in schistose rocks. It also occurs in veins and exhibits a foliated or fibrous structure. Graphite is a black lustrous mineral that crystallizes in the hexagonal system, with rhombohedral symmetry. The crystals have tabular form and are six-sided; the faces are commonly striated. The flakes have perfect basal cleavage and are opaque. When well crystallized, the flakes have a black metallic luster while the amorphous material is black and earthy, with a microcrystalline compactness. The flakes feel greasy. Graphite is an excellent conductor of heat and electricity. It melts at approximately 3550°C at a triple point under 1250 psi. It sublimes between 3300-3500°C at 14.7 psi. At 3726°C a second triple point occurs at approximately 100,000 atmospheres. Thermal oxidation in the presence of oxygen begins at 300°C and the rate increases with temperature. The three forms of carbon (charcoal, graphite, and diamond) are distinguished by chemical and physical tests. The specific gravity of charcoal is 1.3 to 1.9, of graphite 2.266 g/ cm3 (crystal density), and of diamond 3.5. Graphite has a hardness of 1 to 2 (Mohs' scale). Natural graphite can be divided into three classes: disseminated flake, crystalline vein (fibrous or columnar), and amorphous. Flake graphite is a lamellar form found in metamorphic rocks, such as marble, gneiss, and schist. Each flake is separate, having crystallized as such in the rock. Crystalline vein graphite is found in the form of well defined veins or as pocket accumulations along the intrusive contacts of pegmatites with limestones. The graphite of such deposits is of two types, foliated and columnar. The important Sri Lanka (Ceylon) deposits are vein type. Amorphous graphite is commonly found as minute microcrystalline particles more or less uniformly distributed in feebly metamorphic rocks, such as slates and shales, or in beds consisting practically entirely of graphite. The latter usually are metamorphosed coal seams and carry as much as 80-85% graphitic carbon, while the former, being altered carbonaceous sediments, commonly range from 25 to 60%

Jan 1, 1983

By S. F. Radtke

The properties and characteristics of lead and zinc have made these metals useful to man in many ways since the days of antiquity. Despite their long history of use, however, these metals have proved to be extremely resilient and responsive to modern needs. New alloys and compounds continue to be developed, adding to the growth of these metals. Consumption data is given for 1969 and compared with one and two decades ago. Trends in major markets also are cited and explained. Uses for lead and zinc which have come into prominence within the past few years are described and explained, with emphasis on the role played by the industry's cooperative research program. Current efforts in the research phase are discussed, with details given on major efforts for both metals, including new alloys, process developments, applications research, finishes, coating, paints and pigments, batteries and fundamental research. A forecast is given of promising new areas and a projection made on a longer term of new applications that may emerge from current research.

Jan 1, 1970

By Elmer W. Pehrson

Minerals have played a prominent role in the affairs of man and nations since time immemorial but with the advent of the industrial revolution, expanding use of the products of the mineral kingdom became synonymous with the material progress of mankind. Individuals and business groups have recognized this fact so have been aggressive in searching for and utilizing mineral resources, with notable success. Indeed, their achievements are primarily responsible for the present Machine Age. On the other hand, until recently the body politic has failed to grasp fully the essentiality of minerals although, at times, access to mineral supplies has been an important factor in the political maneuvers of nations. This chapter is concerned primarily with the broader political and economic relationships of mineral resources to the world economy, and with the internal and external actions of nations in the field of minerals. Many factors that condition the mineral economy of regions and the world as a whole, influence the internal and external affairs of individual nations. The more important of these are: 1. The nature of man's dependence on minerals. 2. The problems resulting from the unique characteristics of mineral occurrence. 3. Geopolitical concepts. 4. Minerals and world power. Actions of individual nations affecting their mineral economy seek two basic objectives : 1. Attainment and maintenance of prosperity. 2. Military security. Other objectives may be cited but on careful analysis they become integral parts or extreme phases of the two points noted above. For example, the twentieth century aggressions of the USSR, Germany, Italy, and Japan might be considered as direct bids for world power but they also can be interpreted as exaggerated or mistaken efforts toward military security and peacetime prosperity. Similarly, trade barriers, nationalization of industries, foreign exchange manipulations, taxation, monopolistic prac-

Jan 1, 1959

By T. H. Oxnam

INTRODUCTION. THE predominating value of the ores now being treated by the Palmarejo and Mexican Gold Fields, Ltd., is silver, although some gold is also carried. The present method of treatment consists of wet-crushing and concentrating, followed by the cyanidation of the unroasted sands and slimes. The sands are treated by leaching and the so-called accumulated slimes by a system of agitation and decantation. It is only within very recent years that the cyanidation of unroasted silver-ores has been commercially successful. In fact, at the time operations were begun at the cyanide-plant at Chinipas, February, 1902, I knew of no other leaching-plant treating similar ores successfully. The cyanide treatment of the Palmarejo ores differs but little from the ordinary practice in cyaniding gold-ores; and perhaps but little, if any, new information concerning the metallurgy of silver is to be gleaned from it. PALMAREJO MINE. The Palmarejo mines are located in the southwestern part of the State of Chihuahua, Mexico, on the foothills of the Sierra Madre mountains, at an elevation of 3,200 feet. The mills, 12. miles distant, are situated on the Chinipas river, near the town of Chinipas, which is about 150 miles northeast of Agiabampo, on the Gulf of California. Supplies are shipped via this port as this route is the best and most direct to the property. The ore-bodies in the Palmarejo mines have been deposited. along a series of rock-fractures, caused by an intrusion of eruptive rock. The most important of these fractures or fissures, both in width and value, are the Prieta and Blanca veins, which.

Jul 1, 1905

Jan 1, 1967

By Elmer W. Pehrson

Minerals have played a prominent role in the affairs of man and nations since time immemorial but with the advent of the industrial revolution, expanding use of the products of the mineral kingdom became synonymous with the material progress of mankind. Individuals and business groups have recognized this fact so have been aggressive in searching for and utilizing mineral resources, with notable success. Indeed, their achievements are primarily responsible for the present Machine Age. On the other hand, until recently the body politic has failed to grasp fully the essentiality of minerals although, at times, access to mineral supplies has been an important factor in the political maneuvers of nations. This chapter is concerned primarily with the broader political and economic relationships of mineral resources to the world economy, and with the internal and external actions of nations in the field of minerals. Many factors that condition the mineral economy of regions and the world as a whole, influence the internal and external affairs of individual nations. The more important of these are: 1. The nature of man's dependence on minerals. 2. The problems resulting from the unique characteristics of mineral occurrence. 3. Geopolitical concepts. 4. Minerals and world power. Actions of individual nations affecting their mineral economy seek two basic objectives: 1. Attainment and maintenance of prosperity. 2. Military security. Other objectives may be cited but on careful analysis they become integral parts or extreme phases of the two points noted above. For example, the twentieth century aggressions of the USSR, Germany, Italy, and Japan might be considered as direct bids for world power but they also can be interpreted as exaggerated or mistaken efforts toward military security and peacetime prosperity. Similarly, trade barriers, nationalization of industries, foreign exchange manipulations, taxation, monopolistic prac-

Jan 1, 1964

Jan 1, 1967

By L. F. Bishop

THE ore bodies of the Butte district1 are found in many different vein systems having many different structural characteristics; some are narrow with self-supporting ore but with weak walls; some are wide with weak or strong ore and weak walls; some of the veins dip steeply and others do not; some have well defined walls, and others, in the "horsetail" area, are mined to sample limits. Consequently, many types of stoping methods are used in mining these ores. The stoping methods used in the Anaconda Copper Mining Company's properties are the square-set and cut-and-fill. The square-set method is the principal stoping method used because, generally speaking, the ore and walls are weak, the ore is high grade, and good extraction is required. These square-set stopes may be classified as conventional, vertical slice, slot, timber rill, and Mitchell slice types. The conventional type square-sets are those of various shapes and sizes, mined by horizontal slicing to the boundaries of the stopes. The rock is slid to the chute and the filling is moved by gravity. The ore and waste may be handled with a scraper when local conditions require it. The vertical-slice square-set system is the type used in narrow veins that are mined in vertical panels. The slot stopes are stopes in wide veins that employ a slot across the vein instead of a con- ventional chute to handle the ore. The timber rill fs a type of square set in which the ore is mined as in inclined cut and fill but the square-set timber is used. The Mitchell slice is the type used for some broken or heavy ore blocks, or for pillar extraction between two converging slot stopes. The cut-and-fill method is used where the ore will stand without much support although the walls may be weak. The principal type of this method is the horizontal cut-and-fill, with mechanical scraping. The inclined cut-and-fill, or rill, stopes are used in some veins too narrow for scraping. The production from the various meth: ods in use for the second six months of 1944 are shown in Table I. [ ] This paper deals mainly with the vertical slice and slot types of square-set stoping, because of their effect on production locally and their potential possibilities here and in other districts, with sufficient reference to conventional square-setting for comparison.

Jan 1, 1945

By Christian F. Baiz

INTRODUCTION Industrial minerals can have similar financing requirements to those needs of metaliferrous and coal mining projects. One of the outstanding differences is the understanding of the many different markets that these industrial minerals represent. There are in excess of 30 principal industrial minerals ranging in terms of annual production from the largest quantity such as sand and gravel, to possibly the smallest quantity of production of a legitimate industrial mineral which may be defined as industrial and rough gem diamond. (See Tables 1 and 2) Project finance techniques, analytical methods, and information requirements are covered elsewhere in this Chapter and Chapter 10. Some comments on equity finance aspects follow. EQUITY AMOUNT The amount of equity in a financing transaction provides a cushion to the lender in case the project runs into trouble. Generally speaking, the greater the amount of risk in a project, the more equity a lender will require. The amount of cash equity in a project financing transaction is between 25 and 40 percent. The amount of leverage (debt/equity) is negotiable based on such factors as the strength and extent of the sponsor's undertakings, of the project's economics, and the term of a strong sales contract. Naturally, a borrower seeks to obtain d loan with as little equity required as can be negotiated. Zero percent equity is usually associated with a take-or-pay contract (a hell-or-high- water unconditional commitment under which the purchaser must pay for the commodity as though it were shipped regardless of whether it is actually mined or shipped) with a financially strong corporate entity i.e., the parent company or an end user. As a take-or-pay contract is tantamount to a guarantee of payment, the banker views the credit basis of the loan as being other than the borrower's mining operation and therefore will analyze the creditworthiness of the institution purchasing the commodity on the basis of its corporate balance sheet. Do not confuse a take-or-pay contract with a take-if- tendered or take-and-pay contract. Another means in the United States of obtaining zero percent equity is the carved out production payment financing, typical of coal mine financing. This involves the sale, or conveyance, by the owner of the mineral property of a production payment to a nominally capitalized company. The nominally capitalized company is formed solely to buy the production payment and usually borrows 100 percent of the purchase price from a lender. Equity amounts of 10 to 20 percent generally are found in transactions which employ techniques such as an advance sale or a subordinated lease/loan. These agreements are viewed as quasi equity by most banks for several reasons. First, the proceeds represent a cash infusion early in the project's life - usually prior to the bank lending any funds. Thus, the repayment schedule is "behind" that of the bank debt. In the case of an advance sale, repayment is in the form of a long-term supply contract with favorable terms, usually priced close to the mining operation's costs. There is also usually a requirement that all costs of the project be paid for by the loan or equity, often making the sponsors financially responsible for any cost overruns. Cost overruns are a major risk in any project, large or small, and are often due to unforeseen factors such as wildcat strikes, a piece of faulty equipment, or any event which delays completion, e.g., remote location, weather, etc.. . The question of how overruns are covered can be negotiated. For example, in addition to the original debt/equity ratio of the project, there can also be a cost overrun ratio that will

Jan 1, 1985

By L. Hartsell Cash

INTRODUCTION Created in 1944 to help rebuild those economies, principally in Europe, which were seriously damaged or destroyed during the Second World War, the World Bank--or to use its correct name, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development-began its operational phase by making a loan to the Government of France to accomplish two tasks: (i) to import coal for space heating purposes; and (ii) to buy new machinery and equipment to help rehabilitate its coal mines. Once the thrust of reconstruction in postwar Europe was largely accomplished, the World Bank Group (for today the World Bank has three separate lending windows) turned to mobilizing funds to improve living standards in developing countries, which remains its primary goal today. Over this period of time, the World Bank Group has continued to assist the world mining industry in various ways and, since 1955 the World Bank Group has financed mining or mineral processing projects with loans/credits totalling $1.5 billion. The World Bank Group consists of two institutions--the World Bank itself and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which was founded as a separate institution in 1956 and three separate lending windows--the World Bank, the International Development Association (IDA), and IFC. The World Bank loans are provided at commercially-related interest rates but have grace periods usually of up to 3 to 5 years and repayment periods ranging from around 15 to 20 years. Since the World Bank raises its operating funds on the international capital markets in varying currencies and in varying interest rates, it relends a basket of currencies at floating interest rates which are fixed every six months to reflect the Bank's own borrowing cost. At the present time, the interest rate is just below 10% per year and in addition, a one-time front-end fee of 1/4 of 1% is charged. Also, a commitment fee of 3/4% per year is charged on the undisbursed amount of the loan itself. For loans to industrial and mining projects, it is normal to charge an additional guarantee fee of 1 to 1.5% in addition to the annual interest rate. This guarantee fee is payable to the government of the country in which the project is carried out since, by its charter, the World Bank is required to have the guarantee of the host government for each loan made in a specific country. By far the greatest source of lending funds within the World Bank Group is that of the World Bank itself and for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1984, the World Bank approved loans totalling $12 billion. The second lending window within the World Bank Group is IDA which performs the same functions as the Bank itself and has the same staff. Nevertheless, its loans (called credits) are made on much softer terms and are made to the poorest nations only. IDA funds are subscribed by the wealthier countries, usually as grants, and these are relent as credits to those countries with the lowest per capita income. IDA credits are made for 50 year periods, including 10 years of grace, to the government itself. The credits are interest free, but there is a service charge of 3/4% per year on the amount withdrawn and outstanding to defray the administrative costs of IDA. Credits approved during fiscal 1984 totalled $3.5 billion. The third lending window is IFC. While IFC is a separate corporation and operates quite separately from the World Bank and has its own staff and regulations, it works very closely with the World Bank on its overall approach to the mining sector and to a particular country. IFC's mission is essentially to supply venture capital and to stimulate development of the local private sector in capital markets as well as to promote the international flow of private capital to developing countries. Unlike the World Bank and IDA, the IFC does not lend directly to governments

Jan 1, 1985

By G. E. Pralle

INTRODUCTION The decade from 1969 to 1979 saw the crest of a wave of investments by companies and investors, primarily from the major industrial nations, in the metals and minerals industries of the so-called lesser developed countries. This was brought about by two major considerations: 1). The higher ore grades and therefore the higher profit potential of the mineral deposits in the third world countries, and 2). The desire, particularly by the European countries and by Japan, to ensure a safe supply of raw materials not available in their own countries. The decade began with the start of the Toquepala mine in Peru and the major investments in the Bougainville mine in Papua New Guinea and the Ertsberg mine in Indonesia. It ended with the start-up of Southern Peru Copper Company (SPCC) Cuajone mine in Peru and Inco's Soroako mine in Indonesia and the investments in several major alumina or aluminum projects in Australia and Brazil. Concurrent with this huge flow of funds into the mineral resources industry of the developing world was the build-up of a psychological fear in the host countries of exploitation/domination by the foreign investors. This resulted in an increasing trend towards: 1). Nationalization of existing mineral ventures, and 2). Tougher legal/fiscal frameworks for new ones. NATIONALIZATION Nationalization appeared in its earliest form as "Mexicanization" of the petroleum industry in Mexico in the 1930's, followed later by Mexicanization of the mining industry in general. This was enacted with the Mexican Mining Law of 1961 which required that 51% of the equity be owned by Mexican nationals. Later in the decade the equity share for foreign investors was reduced to 33 1/3% for the developers of the Frasch sulphur operations in the Isthumus of Tehuantepec. However, the law was not fully implemented in the copper industry until late 1970 with the purchase of 51% of the ownership in the Cananea Mining Company. The trend toward nationalization of the copper industry progressed to Chile where in 1967 under the Government of Eduardo Frei the major North American copper companies were induced to sell a one-half interest in their Chilean mines to the State. Likewise, in 1970, "Zambianization" took place, when the two major operating companies Roan Selection Trust (Amax) and Zamanglo (Anglo American) were restructured into Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM) and Nchanga Consolidated Mines (NCCM) providing the government with 51% of the equity ownership. Whilst the earlier forms of nationalization in general constituted a fairly priced buy-out (El Teniente, Chile for US$80 million, RCM for US$117.8 million, NCCM for US$178.7 million), the total nationalization of the Chilean mining companies in 1970 under Salvador Allende did not. Later, "Western" countries joined this trend and on October 29, 1973, Mr. Gough Whitlam proclaimed that "overseas capital must continue... in partnership with Australian capital" and "in some special energy cases we have an objective of 100% Australian ownership". In 1974 Mr. Pierre Trudeau stated: "The Liberal Party of Canada sets as an objective that new resources projects in the natural resource field should have at least 50% and preferably 60% Canadian equity ownership". FOREIGN INVESTMENT The situation for the foreign investor in the worldwide resource industry rapidly deteriorated from then on. New features appeared in mineral exploitation and operating agreements, centering not only on local government/local companies ownership but also on increased taxation. The new tax rate (mineral tax, royalty, and income tax) for the semi-government companies NCCM and RCM in Zambia became an effective 73%. Likewise the much publicized and discussed renegotiated Bougainville agreement brought dramatic increases in the total "take" by the PNG Government. More innovative forms of indirect taxation made their appearance and were added to the normal tax burdens of the mineral industry which already

Jan 1, 1985

By James L. Poole

INTRODUCTION Companies in the mining industry are subjected at times to currency exchange rate risks and interest rate risks. The former occurs any time a firm deals in more than one currency. The latter occurs anytime a firm is financing itself with borrowings that have a floating interest rate (although a fixed rate can be a problem at times). FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISKS There are two general reasons why exchange rate risks (FX risk) can occur: First, a firm may be building a mine or plant in another country where financing for the plan is denominated in funds other than the country hosting the plant. For example, if a Canadian firm is building a smelter in another country which is being financed with Canadian dollars, the C$100 million for labor, which must be paid in the local currency, has subjected the firm to a C$100 million FX exposure risk. If after the cost estimates were made the local currency appreciates 30% against the Canadian dollar, the cost of labor has increased to C$130 million. (Of course, the local currency could also devalue during this period making the labor cost component less than estimated.) The other reason exchange rate risk arises is due to the fact that the costs of production in one country producing minerals may be incurred in one currency while the production is sold in another currency, such as coal being exported from Canada to Japan under contracts denominated in Yen. In this example, the Canadian firm is exporting coal to Japan and being paid in yen in 30 days at a contract price of 100 Y per ton. Furthermore, assume that the mining firm anticipates a depreciation of the yen against the Canadian dollar of 5% in the next 30 days. Therefore, the mining firm stands to lose 5% of the value of its shipment in a month's time not including carrying costs. In both cases, the mining company risks an adverse change in the exchange rate, that is, the currency the company holds may decrease in value relative to the other currency. There are a number of ways to mitigate the exposure to foreign exchange which can be utilized by the mining company. Optimally, a company should try to match all their inflows and all their outflows in the same currency. For example, if a Canadian firm has mining costs and debt service costs both denominated in Canadian dollars then 100% of their receipts would need to be in Canadian dollars. If a Canadian firm has 70% of its cash outflows in Canadian dollars and 30% of its cash outflow in American dollars in the form of a loan amortization then their receipts would need to be 70% in Canadian dollars and 30% in U.S. dollars. This general principle of matching cash receipts and cash costs in the same currency works fine in a perfect world but what of the real world when these cannot be matched? In actual practice, however, the financial markets have developed a number of ways in which foreign exchange risks can he managed or reduced. FORWARD MARKETS One method is to use the forward markets which are made on a world-wide basis by the commerical banks for foreign exchange. If a firm wanted to lock in the current exchange rate for the receipt of a foreign currency at some point in the future, they could do so by contracting on the forward market with a bank selling that foreign currency at the current rate at the future date. For example, assume that a Canadian firm is exporting coal to Japan which would pay yen in 90 days. If a firm wanted to lock in today's exchange rate they could contract with a bank to sell on the forward market yen in 90 days. When the yen was received the contract would be executed by selling the yen to the bank and receiving the previously agreed upon number of Canadian dollars. Generally speaking, the forward market can be used to sell forward about 12 months. The costs of selling (or buying) forward

Jan 1, 1985

By Lyman H. Hart

Some of the significant facts that will affect the supply and demand for metals during the next few decades are given in this presentation. This is important because the only hope for intelligent guidance of the national destiny depends upon presenting a consistent and accurate picture of basic problems. The metals problems now fomenting are only slightly less important than those precipitating the energy crisis. Admittedly, it is difficult to generate serious thinking on this subject when the world is enjoying easy access to all metals at modest prices. This is possible because of the current world capacity to over-produce, and United States credit standing, at least up to now, has permitted buying freely on world markets. Although both these vital conditions are subject to change, there is little doubt that if the U.S. financial house is kept in order, we can muddle along for a while on a generally expanding, metal-based economy. But should our credit standing be permitted to collapse, or should there be a tightening of world supplies of metals, the nation would immediately find itself in trouble. Unfortunately, clear signals indicate that both of these conditions are threatening. The metal age started many centuries ago, and with the exception of the noble metals, barely a dent was made in world reserves until the present century. Then, as a result of the pioneering ideas of D. C. Jackling and Paul Gemmel, and the willingness of the McNeals, Penroses and Guggenheims to back ideas with money, a virtual explosion of metal production was propagated throughout the world. It is important to examine the causes of this expansion to determine whether it is a trend that may be sustained or whether it is anomalous and therefore attributable to circumstances not likely to be repeated or continued. This period of plenty is a once only phenomenon. Vast metal resources have been sitting around here for eons, while the world was unaware of or unconcerned with their existence. But when population began to grow exponentially, and ways were discovered to use metals to develop machines to do the work of men and animals, the exploitation of raw materials increased at a staggering rate. And now the realization is dawning that minerals are a wasting asset and are beginning to present supply problems that should begin to be of concern. Two main factors have caused this condition; One is the population growth, and the other is the expanding demand for irreplaceable raw materials as nations become more developed. A group of systems analysts, at Massachusetts Institute of Technology in a book Limits of Growth, has warned that at present rates of population growth and resource consumption together with environmental constraints, a point will be reached within 100 years when the world population will become totally incapable of supporting itself. The authors conclude that this end result could be avoided if a planned equilibrium could be established at a lower rate of population growth and resource consumption. Fortunately, there is evidence that the population problem is moderating. The growth rate in the U.S. has decreased from 2.3% per year in 1900 to 1.1% in 1970. But, even at the lower rate, population will double in 70 years. The world rate is greater, and if it continues, world population will rise from 3.5 billion to nearly 10 billion in 50 years. All of these projections are questionable because the dangers of growing population are now being recognized. A marked decrease in growth rate has been noted in the more developed countries-in fact, it was zero in the U.S. in 1972. The other factor affecting consumption of raw materials is the increase in per capita use of most items as individuals become more affluent. Many economists believe that developing countries such as China and India represent a vast future potential market; but there are others, with whom the author agrees, who believe over-population tends to stagnate development. Nevertheless, it is a fact that vigorously developing societies increase consumption at a rate far above their population growth rate.

Jan 1, 1974

By Reaves. M. J.

The title of my talk, "What Happened to the Uranium Boom?" is old news. Certainly it is for this group. All of us that make our living in uranium know that the boom of the last half of the 1970's is over. U.S. production has been exceeding consumption by more than two to one. Mines and mills are closing and yellowcake prices have been dropping for over 20 months. The gloomy outlook for the industry in the near term has been well documented by soothsayers of various descriptions, your daily newspapers, and in the Nuexco Monthly Reports. I'd like to attempt to describe the next upturn in the market (speculate, really) based upon the clues we're seeing now. In order to do that, I'd first like to go over briefly, some of the market factors that contributed to the recent price drop and resultant production cutbacks, and then hypothesize on the way these factors are changing and will change. Market prices are greatly affected (maybe even entirely determined) by buyer perceptions. This is particularly true with uranium, because of the long lead times associated with nuclear plant construction and also with conventional mine/mill development. Before the price rise (say, 1975) utility uranium buyers believed that: 1) U.S. producers would have difficulty expanding to meet U.S. demand. 2) Australian and Canadian production was essential to avoid shortages in the early 1980's. 3) Uranlum prices would continue to rise as demand exceeded supply. 4) Enrichment capacity would become inadequate. It was thought necessary, therefore, to build enriched inventory in the early 1980's for use in the late 1980's. Artificially accelerated expansion of the uranium producer industry was necessary to accommodate anticipated enrichment demand. Current perceptions are largely the opposite. These are the beliefs that were held most of this year and late last year as prices dropped. 1) U.S. production is far in excess of domestic need. Contraction of the U.S. production lndustry is necessary. 2) Canadian and Australian supply is optional and not essential. Producers in those countries are expanding mainly by displacing higher cost production and not because they fill a void, 3) Prices may be essentially stable for some time. 4) Enriched uranium is in excess supply. That is 1981. 1982 is shaping up to look like this: 1) Prices will have bottomed out. (That is not Nuexco's opinion necessarily, by the way, but it is my opinion.) 2) There will still be substantial utility inventories, but fewer spot sales. 3) Canadian and perhaps Australian sellers will have made substantial sales in the U.S. and will be aggressively seeking more. 4) U.S. production will have been dramatically curtailed. U.S. utilities that wish to con- tract long term will have difficulty in finding domestic sellers. Concern will develop about the availability of U.S. production capability. Virtually all long term con- tracts signed will be with non-U.S. sellers. 5) An awareness will begin to develop among U.S. buyers that we are approaching a period of dependence upon foreign uranium (which will be true). The history of the uranium market has been one of dramatic changes and overreaction to those changes. The rapid price rise of a few years ago generated excess U.S. production capacity and the rapid price drop of the last two years will almost certainly result in too little capacity. It will soon be difficult for U.S. buyers to buy domestic material except on the spot market. The question is, "will they care?" The lack of demand, of course, is the underlying reason for the current poor health of the uranium industry. In 1972, 1973 and 1974 collectively, there were 105 nuclear reactors ordered in the U.S. That ordering rate was expected to continue and accelerate throughout this century. In 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980 altogether, there were 56 more reactors cancelled than ordered. The net growth of our only customer since 1974 has been a negative 56. TO put this in perspective, if these 56 reactors were operating now it would more than double present U.S. uranium consumption. Underlying lack of demand is something that is simply not going to change in this decade. Time is going to be required. The NRC indicates that the maximum feasible number of new reactors that can be licensed each year is six. That would increase uranium consumption by only 10% per year. New reactors, if ordered tomorrow, would not generate new uranium demand until after 1990. Even so, United States' consumption of uranium will rise from the 1980 level of 18 million pounds per year, to

Jan 1, 1982

By John A. Ames

Webster's dictionary nearly equates portland cement with its current primary definition of cement. While such equation may be a triumph of common usage, the confusion between the terms cement and concrete unfortunately is very widespread. Full definition of cement properly would extend to many substances, but for purposes of this chapter cement is restricted to "varieties" of portland cement including "portland-pozzolan" cement. Among the usually recited historical notes concerning cement is that it was developed by the Romans. Their use of cement in the great structures of Rome, and even in the far corners of their Empire, such as Hadrian's Wall in the north of England, testifies to the antiquity of a major cement industry. From English sources we know of John Smeaton's carefully proportioned hydraulic cement mixed in 1756 and of Joseph Aspdin's patented cement to which, in 1824, he gave the name portland cement. (He claimed that his cement mortar looked like the famous dimension limestone quarried from the Isle of Portland on England's south coast.) The year 1971 marked the centennial of portland cement manufacture in the United States. A fair historical account of the many real contributors to the cement industry between 1756 and 1972 unfortunately would be too extensive for this chapter. Development of rotary kiln practice and burning at higher temperatures clearly was the major move into today's technology. As part of the 4th edition of Industrial Minerals and Rocks, this chapter on utilization focuses on inferred interests of the anticipated readers. The main period for which statistics are cited generally is that since the 3rd edition (1960) of this same volume. Cement manufacture is the processing of selected and prepared mineral raw materials to produce the synthetic mineral mixture (clinker) that can be ground to a powder having the specified chemical composition and physical properties of cement. Cement making incorporates a number of distinct steps, but it is characterized by the key pyroprocessing (or "burning") step, which brings about the necessary changes in the raw materials. This pyro processing is a chemical process. Conversion of large volumes of mineral raw materials into specification-controlled cement at relatively low cost is the objective. Statistics on the cement industry are of uneven quality. The U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) is the principal collector of available data. These statistics can be only as good as the quality of information supplied by the reporting companies. The data perhaps most often questioned relate to productive capacity of the industry. The questions submitted by USBM are valid, nevertheless, and the information gained from them, as good as is available, is what is generally used. The Portland Cement Association also is a source of much quality information. The year 1972 witnessed a test of the adaptability of cement industry statistics. This was the year of conversion from barrels and sacks of cement as the units of measure to tons and hundredweights. The barrels and sacks related to volumetric measures in that a sack was judged to be 1 cu ft (weighing a "standard" 94 lb). A barrel was 4 sacks. Volumes of concrete are stated in cubic yards, and the number of cubic feet of cement in a cubic yard of concrete was a sensible approach to the mensuration involved. However, cements do not weigh the same amount from plant to plant or from type to type, and the buyer was more interested in getting an assured weight for his money than in "buying air." Thus, a sack, in accepted practice, became 94 lb instead of 1 cu ft, and a "barrel" became 376 lb, regard- less of whether it would fit into 4 cu ft of space. With the de facto dealing in weight rather than in volumes, the awkward numbers made little

Jan 1, 1975