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By Frederick Görannsen

McDuffie county, once a part of Columbia county, lies in the eastern part of central Georgia, about 20 miles west of the Savannah river, and bounded on the northtwest by Little river. Wrightsboro, now almost forgotten, was one of the principal towns of Georgia before the Revolutionary war, and much of the land hereafter described as belonging to one of the principal gold-bearing sections of the South had been taken up by the early agricultural settlers, and was already under cultivation. Indeed, some of the present mining companies can trace their chain of title back to the original grant of King George III., made in 1771. The first discovery of gold in Georgia, however, was not made until 1823, when two English miners, who had emigrated to this country and were traveling as peddlers through this section, discovered quartz, rich in gold, on what is now known as " the 40-acre lot," and owned by the Columbia Mining Go. These men had no money to buy the lands, and not being able to stake off a claim and begin work, as is the custom in other places, they were forced to seek the aid of the native farmers. In this we are told that they were for a long time unsuccessful; the farmers and land-owners not knowing or caring anything about gold mining. In 1826, Jeremiah Griffin, a wealthy farmer, became interested with them, and they did some prospecting and located several rich veins. Mr. Griffin soon became enthusiastic, and bought about three thousand acres of supposed gold-lands, lying along Little river.. This purchase was unfortunate for the mining industry, as it effectually shut out all other prospectors, and confined entirely to Mr. Griffin and his associates the mining development of the whole region. As a consequence, the ground was never covered, arid there are virgin lands in this section now, which offer to the prospector as

Jan 1, 1903

By Don C. Blackmar

The production of non-ferrous secondary metals has become a large and important industry in the United States, and deals with practically cvery type of manufacturing concern. Its business is unique in that it generally buys frorn its customers as well as sells to them, whether they are individuals, cities, corporations, or the United States government. Its operations are of vital importance to the success and prosperity of nlany of the nation's most important manufacturers; yet there are few industries about which less is generally known by those outside it, whether concerning the rliagnitude of its operations or the details of its actual technique. The industry itself is to blame for this meager publicity, because its technical men have made few attempts to openly exchange ideas, in spite of the excellent examples set by the iron and steel or the copper and brass industries. Whether this is due to the ancient shroud of secrecy generally supposed to cover smelting operations, or because its technical men actually felt that the industry was too puny to be interesting, is hard to say. This paper will consider its subject in a general way, attenlpting to show something of the size and importance of the industry, as well as its fitness to do its work well. Attention will be called to the sound economic reasons for the handling of non-ferrous wastes by specialists, and to the often unseen losses of metals and labor which occur when manufacturc~rs rcclairn thrir own metallic wastes. Magnitude of the Modern Industry No particular thought is given to the kitchen accident whereby a ruined saucepan is sorrowfully tossed into the ash can, yet it is a fairly safe guess that within a month this saucepan, together with hundreds of its follows, will again be in service, perhaps in an autonlobile crankcase, or in an electric vacuum sweeper. It is by this conversion of the useless into the useful, whether from home or large manufacturer, that the secondary tonnage is built up.

DAVE BARTLEY and Edwin F. Gray, miners, late of Shasta County, California, young, healthy, and "dead broke," arrived at Ely, Nevada, one evening in the summer of 1900. Before rustling jobs and going to work, they decided to look around the camp, and in pursuance of this plan they visited a number of claims owned by D. C. McDonald, Justice of the Peace and pioneer of the district. Among the claims he showed them were the Ruth (named after his daughter) and the Kearsarge. Both were regarded as possible gold or silver properties. For no very definite reason the two miners changed their plan and took a lease and option to buy the two claims for $3500. After the transaction was closed and the partners were alone, Gray asked Bartley what he thought of the ground. "If she's good for anything, it's copper" was the reply; and, so far as the records disclose, that was the first time that anyone ever thought of Ely or the Robinson mining district, as it was called, as a possible copper area. There were some slight surface indications of copper, but it is probable that the fact that Bartley had just come from a copper district had something to do with his predilection for a metal that was much despised around Ely. In any event, his hunch was good, and he spoke with the wisdom of an oracle. For thirty years prospectors had sought gold and silver around the camp. Several stamp mills and cyanide plants had been put up and a hundred shafts had been sunk, but fate had been indifferent in its rewards to the optimistic owners. Copper ore would have to be hauled by wagon, 150 miles down Steptoe Valley to the Southern Pacific Railroad, and there was scant hope of finding ore that would bear this cost. W. B. Graham, who ran the general store in Ely, grubstaked Bartley and Gray, furnishing them with food and mining

Jan 1, 1933

By J. E. Tobey, David R. Mitchell, J. H. Kerrick

DETAILED knowledge of purchase specifications established by coal consumers is essential to the successful design and operation of a coal preparation plant. ANTHRACITE Specifications should be considered by both the consumer and the producer as guide posts outlining a certain path for both to follow. Plants differ, therefore specifications must differ to meet the varied requirements. Specifications are not of themselves a "cureall" or an assurance of complete satisfaction in fuel utilization. Specifications should not be regarded as a license to engage in an orgy of buying any and all coals that may happen to fall within their limits. This would lead to the indiscriminate mixing of coals which may vary in their burning characteristics. Different coals of equal grade tend to be individualistic in their burning characteristics. Rather, specifications should be used to help simplify coal selection, to reduce the actual number of coals used over a given period; in other words, to have a stabilizing influence on coal or customer turnover. In the final analysis, the use of too many coals per year in a plant is costly to both the consumer and the producer. Too many sources usually result in higher operating and maintenance costs for the consumer and higher sales costs for the producer. Finally, the statement included in the report accompanying the comprehensive Coal Selection Charts prepared by the Coal Committee of the National Association of Purchasing Agents, and released in 1938, is significant. This Committee worked diligently for a period of 15 years seeking to find a scientific and reliable method for selecting coals. The two following paragraphs are quoted from its report: More important is the fact that no ready-made classification or set of specifications can possibly replace the judgment and resourcefulness of an experienced combustion engineer or fuel technologist, nor the usual need for full scale plant tests under the exact conditions of use before a final decision is made.

Jan 1, 1950

By J. E. Tobey, David R. Mitchell, J. H. Kerrick

DETAILED knowledge of purchase specifications established by coal consumers is essential to the successful design and operation of a coal-preparation plant. ANTHRACITE Specifications should be considered by both the consumer and the producer as guide posts outlining a certain path for both to follow. Plants differ, therefore specifications must differ to meet the varied requirements. Specifications are not of themselves a "cure all" or an assurance of complete satisfaction in fuel utilization. Specifications should not be regarded as a license to engage in an orgy of buying any and all coals that may happen to fall within their limits. This would lead to the-indiscriminate mixing of coals which may vary in their burning characteristics. Different coals of equal grade tend to be individualistic in their burning characteristics. Rather, specifications should be used to help simplify coal selection, to reduce the actual number of coals used over a given period; in other words, to have a stabilizing influence on coal or customer turnover. In the final analysis, the use of too many coals per year in a plant is costly to both the consumer and the producer. Too many sources usually result in higher operating and maintenance costs for the consumer and higher sales costs for the producer. Finally, the statement included in the report accompanying the comprehensive Coal Selection Charts prepared by the Coal Committee of the National Association of Purchasing Agents, and released in 1938, is significant. This Committee worked diligently for a period of 15 years seeking to find a scientific and reliable method for selecting coals. The two following paragraphs are quoted from its report: More important is the fact that no ready-made classification or set of specifications can possibly replace the judgment and resourcefulness of an experienced combustion engineer, or fuel technologist, nor the usual need for full scale plant tests under the exact conditions of use before a final decision is made . . .

Jan 1, 1943

By J. E. Tobey, David R. Mitchell, J. H. Kerrick

DETAILED knowledge of purchase specifications established by coal consumers is essential to the successful design and operation of a coal-preparation plant. ANTHRACITE Specifications should be considered by both the consumer and the producer as guide posts outlining a certain path for both to follow. Plants differ, therefore specifications must differ to meet the varied requirements. Specifications are not of themselves a "cure all" or an assurance of complete satisfaction in fuel utilization. Specifications should not be regarded as a license to engage in an orgy of buying any and all coals that may happen to fall within their limits. This would lead to the indiscriminate mixing of coals which may vary in their burning characteristics. Different coals of equal grade tend to be individualistic in their burning characteristics. Rather, specifications should be used to help simplify coal selection, to reduce the actual number of coals used over a given period; in other words, to have a stabilizing influence on coal or customer turnover. In the final analysis, the use of too many coals per year in a plant is costly to both the consumer and the producer. Too many sources usually result in higher operating and maintenance costs for the consumer and higher sales costs for the producer. Finally, the statement included in the report accompanying the com¬prehensive Coal Selection Charts prepared by the Coal Committee of the National Association of Purchasing Agents, and released in 1938, is significant. This Committee worked diligently for a period of 15 years seeking to find a scientific and reliable method for selecting coals. The two following paragraphs are quoted from its report: More important is the fact that no ready-made classification or set of specifications can possibly replace the judgment and resourcefulness of an experienced combustion engineer or fuel technologist, nor the usual need for full scale plant tests under the exact conditions of use before a final decision is made ...

Jan 1, 1943

By Ernest Gayford

When the United States Government started buying gold at varying prices per ounce, set by the President and the Treasury Department, the gold miner found himself facing new conditions, as gold became a commodity with a fluctuating market price. While it was self-evident that the miner was to receive more for his gold than the old established price of $20.67 per ounce, there was an element of uncertainty, which made it difficult, and perhaps dangerous, to decide to invest his time and money to produce gold, especially if the profit would represent only the difference between $20.67 an ounce and the new price as set from day to day by the Government. When, however, on Jan. 30, 1934, the United States went off the gold standard, the price of newly mined gold being rather definitely set at $35 per ounce, with some assurance that the price would be maintained at or near this figure for a long time to come, the gold miner was justified in revaluing his property on the basis of the new price, and the prospector was offered inducement to spend his time and energies hunting for new mines, or going back to old locations previously abandoned as of doubtful value. It is interesting to see what this new price means to the producer of newly mined gold, and how much of the increase is passed on to the producer. It will be found that, as with the base metals, the nearer he can get to producing a finished product himself the greater his reward will be; the net returns for bullion being necessarily higher than for the same amount of gold shipped in concentrates to the smelter. Bullion can be shipped to the United States mints or Government assay offices under the following terms and conditions. An affidavit must accompany the shipment, stating, among other things: 1. The source of the gold; whether ore, tailings or placer. 2. The tons of ore, tailings or cubic yards of gravel from which the shipment was recovered.

Jan 1, 1935

By Charles E. Parsons

One of the greatest factors in our industrial development is cheap and convenient power. Long-distance electrical transmission has now reached such a stage that it is feasible, and practicable, to utilize the water-power of the country which was heretofore too remote for consideration. In all of the changes of energy from its various sources to its electrical applications, water-power stands pre-eminent in point of economy. Power-users the world over have endeavored to utilize this force in preference to any other, and until long-distance transmission was found practicable it seemed that every available water-power in this section of the country was doing its full share for the benefit of mankind. The success of each great industrial development has been clue in a greater part to some one man one who is just a step in advance of the rest in his particular field; one who is able to grasp a situation and foresee possibilities; and, above all, one who has that indomitable pluck and perseverance which sees in each obstacle one more step toward success. Such a mail is Eugene L. Ashley, for it was through his efforts that the development of the greatest power on the Hudson river was made possible. For several years prior to 1897 the various properties along the river between Glens Falls and Palmer Falls were in the hands of speculators. These men knew the value of waterrights, but they had not the ability to assemble the properties and finance such an undertaking. In 1897 Mr. Ashley began buying these water-rights, and, after two years of litigation, title mas secured to all of the properties along each side of the river, and the Hudson River Water-Power Company was organized to construct a dam and transmit power to the surrounding cities and villages. A contract was let for a dam

Jan 1, 1904

By Amos L. Beaty

The oil industry can prosper only if crude production is not excessive. This is true for several reasons. In the first place, the marketing branch of the business is so highly competitive that there is little room for profits in it. There are too many service stations, too many middle men or jobbers, too many refiners eager to press their products upon the market. And the battle is between the strong. If any money is being made in oil today it is by small marketers who buy products from the refining companies and sell on guaranteed margins. In the second place, refineries are overbuilt. There is a large surplus refining capacity. If refined stocks were drawn down they could and would be replenished in short time on short notice. This excessive refining capacity is not serious, however, if the supply of crude is limited to trade requirements. True, it may reflect upon the intelligence of the industry, but if there were a shortage of crude for a few years refining capacities would be readjusted. In the meantime no great harm could result from some idle capacity. It requires no computation to see that refiners could not produce surplus stocks of products from a short supply of crude. I have in mind, of course, the increased yields from cracking. Allowance must be made for that. Still, the picture is the same; less crude is required. I think we can have prosperity in the oil business if too much crude is not produced. A proper limit at this point would be felt all the way down the line. It would slow the refiner and slow the marketer inevitably. Once this constant pressure to make more and sell more is off, operations will be normal and there will be some return on investments. Peices in Relation to Production Potential production at this time is very large, and this condition has existed for many months. As a result the price of crude is low. It is below the average cost of production. Nevertheless, if restraints were withdrawn actual production would immediately increase and the situation would become even worse than it is now. Eventually, of course, the

Jan 1, 1932

By W. A. Thomas

STEAM is, and doubtless always will be, the basic power in the anthracite industry, either directly applied through engines and pumps or electrically. The rapidity with which electric power is being applied to the mining and preparation of anthracite leaves little doubt as to its utility and economy. There is practically no operation, except possibly the drilling of hard rock, that has not been successfully electrified and the matter of drilling is handled economically with electrically driven compressors and the standard compressed-air drills. Conservation and the seemingly ever-increasing cost of production, justify careful consideration of the possible results of the more extensive use of electric power in the industry. It is not planned to discuss, herein, the relative economies of individual applications but to consider the relative economy and flexibility of steam and electric power. The reports available for the year 1920 indicate a production of slightly over 80,000,000 tons of anthracite, of which 8,843,500 tons were used for power and heating purposes; in other words, over 11 per cent. of the production was used at the mines. Some of this was used to generate electric power at the mines, about 160,000,000 kw-hr., while 150,000,000 kw.-hr. was purchased from the public utility companies. One large producer, who is buying some electric power and generating some, used over 13 per cent. of the production for power and heating at the mines. Another producer, where considerable electric power is generated on the properties, is using less than 9 per cent. of the output for power and heating. One of the largest producers has a fuel consumption of over 15 per cent. of the output, besides which considerable power is purchased. A careful study of the field indicates that steam-operated plants use upwards of 13 per cent. of the production for power and heating, while electrically operated plants use about 1 per cent. for heating; so that, for steam-power purposes at least 12 per cent., or 268.8 lb., are used for power out of each ton produced.

Jan 9, 1921

By J. B. Newsom

In the Indiana limestone district, some 50 or 60 per cent of the merchantable stone in a quarry opening is waste, and only about 40 or 50 per cent of the stone from the opening is finally sold. So long as the present system of 'quarrying is used, the wastes measured and reported in this paper will continue. Comprehensive development of an entirely different method of quarrying, using wire saws for cutting, promises great improvement. Some of the savings to be expected are pointed out in the following pages. No attempt has been made to measure losses due to variations and natural flaws in the stone, since these vary greatly in different quarries, and accurate measurement would be difficult. The wastes that have been measured account for about 30 per cent of the total ledge, which leaves 20 or 30 per cent chargeable to unmeasured sources of loss. General Causes of Waste There are four general reasons for quarry waste: (1) the structure of the deposit, such as its shape, bedding planes, solution cavities and strain fractures; (2) efforts to quarry blocks which do not contain distinct color or textural variations; (3) the trade custom which permits purchasers to specify the size of the quarry blocks which they will buy, which is a matter of competition for business on the part of stone producers; (4) quarry methods, which cause the greatest amount of waste. Wide channeler cuts, hook holes, crooked splitting and uneven breaking on quarry floors are included in this category. Waste Due to Structure of Deposits The peculiarities of structure cannot be eliminated, but a chance for saving lies in quarrying to take advantage of them. The commercial deposits of Indiana limestone are lenticular masses from 20 to 70 ft. thick, and nearly horizontal. All of these deposits of good stone are in the Salem limestone, a bed in the sub-Carboniferous. The Salem is traversed by two systems of vertical fractures, a major system running from northeast to southwest and a minor system running from northwest to southeast. Where the stone is covered by an over-

Jan 1, 1932

By Richard Moldenke

So FAR as the quality of the product is concerned, the history of the production of pig iron for foundry purposes is one of constant retrogression. The steps in this deterioration began with cold-blast charcoal pig iron, then anthracite iron, coke iron; then gradually warm to hot-blast coke iron, with the charcoal furnaces also heating their blast to get greater tonnages, and finally the present day hot-blast coke irons with scrap additions to the ordinary burden that, according to one European report, have gone as high as 135 per cent. Parallel with this quality retrogression is the enormous increase in furnace tonnages from about 15 tons daily to over 1000 tons per day in exceptional instances of modern practice. The key to this situation is economic pressure. The effect is a growing differentiation between furnace production for gray iron and malleable foundries and for the production of commercial steel. As the foundry is often compelled to draw upon the pig irons made for steel purposes, for economic reasons, whereas the steel industry does not draw upon foundry pig irons proper, the situation is resolving itself into one of grave consequence for the life of the gray-iron castings industry, and hence the intensive present-day feeling in foundry circles for rigid specifications to govern the quality of pig irons sold for foundry use. In the discussion of a paper on the use of scrap in the blast furnace held recently in the Institute, a very pertinent remark was made by one of the participating furnacemen, who confessed that "the things found wrong by the foundryman with his iron were beyond his depth." It may be added that those things are also beyond the depth of most foundrymen who, however, know from their results that they are getting poorer castings today with many pig irons than they did with those same brands in former years. Under the former fracture buying, the foundryman at least could select the strongest metal, as judged by the sledge, from various brands of similar fracture and pig section, and his results proved the soundness of his conclusions. With the advent of iron analysis, and in spite of the growing uniformity of the metal through greater tonnage

Jan 2, 1927

IN discussing the art of the goldsmith, it is apparent that it is an art requiring skill. He who wishes to be acclaimed a good master therein must be a good universal master in several arts, for the different kinds of work that come to his hands to be done are infinite. Those who work in gold and silver must outdistance all other craftsmen in learning and achievement to the same degree that their materials outdistance other metals in nobility. Therefore, it is necessary first of all to be a good designer, because design is the key that opens the doors not only to the goldsmith's craft but to all others. Then it is necessary that he understand melting and that he know well how to work with a hammer and how to use flat gravers and burins in engraving, as well as files and chisels. He must also possess certain secrets that are needful to the art, which in truth are parts of alchemy, such as softening gold when it is brittle and raw, coloring it when it has little color, soldering, enameling, working in niello, blanching, gilding, and an infinite number of things which must all be known in detail. But above all he who wishes to do this art well must be very patient in working, must know how to mould and how to proceed with the melt and with the file, hammer, chisel, or other implements for bringing his gold or silver work to the final state which he plans. He must also have good judgment in gems and know well how to recognize every [134v] good or defective quality they possess, and to distinguish the false gem from the true, either when set or when unmounted, as there is need; also how to value them both in buying or selling and in satisfying others who seek his appraisal. He should also be experienced not only in the technique of melting but also in the methods of assaying, parting, refining, cementing, and the like, and still many others. But if I wished to tell you of every part

Jan 1, 1942

By David B. Reger

The year 1936 in West Virginia was characterized by increased activity in natural gas. The number of actual completions was only slightly increased but many more wells were drilling than at the end of 1935 and there was almost feverish activity in taking new leases. This pronounced revival is partly due to the fact that the extremely cold winter of 1935-1936 showed that additional supplies of gas would be desirable and partly to the hope of finding new pools in the deeper sands. No new pools have actually been found, but the Oriskany sand (L. Dev.) development of Kanawha County, which was already assured by the end of 1935, was greatly extended into wider and richer territory. The Middle Devonian shale (Childres sand), reached incidentally by Oriskany exploration as well as by direct design, has been productive of gas in much wider areas of Boone, Lincoln, Putnam and Kanawha Counties than heretofore known. Routine drilling to the upper sands in dehed territory, also, was greatly increased, although not yet much reflected in completions. Thc supply of marketable gas, however, has been substantially enlarged. In preparation for further exploration there has been an extensive leasing campaign throughout the entire territory where gas seems at all probable, or ever possible. Exact figures are lacking, but new leases have certainly been taken on more than 1,000,000 arres. One operator estimates that 500,000 acres have been leased in the Appalachian geosyncline alone between Parkersburg and Charleston. Exploration, both for shallow and deep-sand gas, on some of these new leases is now under way. There was little activity in oil. No special search for new pools was made and none was found, but the usual routine drilling in old pools occurred. One major gas pipe-line enterprise was undertaken and completed. Operating technology was much the same as usual. In certain localities repressuring for oil has become a matter of routine, and in others the use of acid in treating small wells in calcareous beds has been continued. Financially, the year has been eventless. Some attempts to buy and

Jan 1, 1937

By John J. Croston

IN the closing months of 1936 the copper industry gave every evidence that it was at last on the threshold of an improved era. At the beginning of the year prices stood at 9 ¼ ¢, which in itself was a great improvement over prices prevailing for the three previous years. Industry generally was showing signs of moving forward in this country, and business was definitely good in certain foreign quarters. The threat of war and preparations for rearmament in Europe and Asia acted as a further stimulus to purchasing. By midsummer the situation had so improved and stocks had been so reduced that the cartel of foreign producers (including American producers with foreign mines) decided to increase the production quota to 75 per cent on Aug. 1. Large-scale buying gave continued strength to the price and by Oct. 1 the quota was increased to 80 per cent, and again on Oct. 15, to 85 per cent. Notwithstanding this the price of copper continued its advance and on Nov. 1, with stocks declining continuously, the cartel increased operations to 95 per cent, then to 105 per cent on Nov. 5. In the meantime the domestic producers, because of the great increase in home consumption, had increased their production by nearly one-half. At the close of the year copper sold at 12¢ per pound, and since the turn of the present year has reached 17¢. This rapid increase has not been wholly justified. Much of the increase was due to the legitimate demands of recovering industry, but rearmament orders plus accumulation of reserve stocks in case of war, purchases in anticipation of labor strikes and purely speculative activities on the London Metal Exchange accounted for the balance. Certainly in view of the state of industry and the general world price level, it appears unnecessarily high. Talk of a copper shortage is sheer nonsense, the recent condition in the market being created by overbuying, leaving but a small volume for speculative supplies. It takes some months for an increase in mine output to reach the market, but production is again overtaking apparent consumption, stocks have begun to increase, and this, together with the reopening of many small

Jan 1, 1937

By Louis Huber

DESPITE the fact that centrifugal fans were first developed for ventilating mines and that artificial ventilation was first practiced in mines, the lack of knowledge of mining men on mine ventilation in general, and on fan performances and characteristics in particular, is very much in evidence today. While it is true that mines are much better ventilated now than they were 20 to 30 years ago, we have made very little progress in the study of mine ventilation, or in mine ventilating fan design. Today the average mine operator is woefully dependent on the engineers of mine fan manufacturers when he is in the market for a fan, and this situation works to the disadvantage of both the operator and the manufacturer. The former may be imposed upon by an unscrupulous sales engineer and induced to buy a fan which is not the proper one for the mine; when it is operating it may be wasteful of power and even accessory to a serious mine disaster. More often, however, it is the fan manufacturer who is imposed on. If the operator asks the manufacturer to build for him a fan that will deliver a certain quantity of air against a certain specified pressure and requiring a specified number of horse power when operating under these conditions, the manufacturer may build a fan that will comply with these specifications to the letter. When the fan is installed it is frequently found that it is delivering a greater quantity of air against a lesser pressure or a lesser quantity of air against a greater pressure, and is requiring more horse power than specified in the first case and less than that specified in the second. In either case the operator usually upbraids the manufacturer for not meeting specifications, and refuses to pay for the fan. The trouble in either case outlined above is that the pressure necessary to force the specified quantity of air through the mine has been estimated incorrectly by the operator or his engineers. When a fan is designed and built to deliver a certain quantity of air against a certain specified resistance it will operate at its maximum efficiency only when it is operating under

Jan 2, 1926

By C. D. Keen

In the latter part of the summer of 1913 the Conservation Commission of the State of Louisiana, under presidency of M: L. Alexander, decided to stop the waste of natural gas going on at the "burning gas-well," Located about 2 mile southeast of Oil City, La. On several occasions, both in newspapers and in reports, comment had been made on the condition of this well, its harmful effect on the Caddo gas field, and the considerable loss, estimated at several thousand dollars each month, caused by the escape of the valuable fuel., But nothing had been done to bring the well under control and prevent further waste of gas until the State Conservation Commission took the matter in hand. The gas fields of Louisiana are among the greatest in the country. So far most of the gas has been found in the Caddo field proper, although considerable development has been done in and around the city of Shreveport and near the town of Mansfield in DeSoto parish. To extend the life of the gas fields and to prevent the quick exhaustion of the supply of the natural fuel are matters of vital importance for this section of the country. Four gas companies have entered the Caddo field and supply the surrounding towns and cities With gas. The Arkansas Natural Gas Co. has pipe lines to Little Rock, Ark., and supplies gas to the following cities and towns in that State: Texarkana, Hope, Garland, Emmet, Prescott, Boughton, Beirne, Gurdon, Arkadelphia, Gum Springs, Mal-vern, Dsnaldson, Gifford, Perla, Beaton, Beauxite, Mabelvale, Bryant, Sheridan, Pine Bluff, Little Rock, Argenta, Pulaski Heights, and Hot Springs. The Southwestern Gas & Electric Co. transports gas to Mooringsport, Blanchard, Caddo, Rodessa, Oil City, Vivian, Bloomburg, Hosston, Ida, Dixie, Belcher, and Shreveport. The Marshall Gas Co. supplies gas to the town of Marshall, Texas. The Louisiana Co. has a line to Shreveport. In, the oil field the gas is used for drilling purposes, and the operators either have their own gas system or buy from the gas companies. At the present time the surrounding territory depends for its fuel supply on the Caddo field, and the importance of the conservation of the natural-gas

Jan 1, 1915

By Richard Moldenke

So far as the quality of the product is concerned, the history of the production of pig iron for foundry purposes is one of constant retrogression. The steps in this deterioration began with cold-blast charcoal pig iron, then anthracite iron, coke iron; then gradually warm to hot-blast coke iron, with the charcoal furnaces also heating their blast to get greater tonnages, and finally the present-day hot-blast coke irons with scrap additions to the ordinary burden that, according to one European report, have gone as high as 65 per cent. Parallel with this quality retrogression is the enormous increase in furnace tonnages from about 15 to over 1000 tons per day in excep tional instances of modern practice. The key to this situation is economic pressure. The effect is a growing differentiation between furnace production for gray iron and malleable foundries and for the production of commercial steel. As the foundry is often compelled to draw upon the pig irons made for steel purposes, for economic reasons, whereas the steel industry does not draw upon foundry pig irons proper, the situation is resolving itself into one of grave consequence for the life of the gray-iron castings industry, and hence the intensive present-day feeling in foundry circles for rigid specifications to govern the quality of pig irons sold for foundry use. In the discussion of a paper on the use of scrap in the blast furnace held recently in the Institute, a very pertinent remark was made by one of the participating furnacemen, who confessed that "the things found wrong by the foundryman with his iron were beyond his depth." It may be added that those things are also beyond the depth of most foundrymen who, however, know from their results that they are getting poorer castings today with many pig irons than they did with those same brands in former years. Under the former fracture buying, the foundryman at least could select the strongest metal, as judged by the sledge, from various brands of similar fracture and pig section, and his results proved

Jan 1, 1927

By Dr. O’Neil Thomas J., Donald W. Gentry

"We should be concerned about the future be- cause we will have to spend the rest of our lives there. " -Charles Kettering INTRODUCTION Since the early 1970s, there has been no economic phenomenon that has been more widely discussed or experienced in the United States than inflation. Al- though its precise definition and measurement are elusive, inflation has had pro- found and extensive impacts on the manner in which nearly everyone lives. It is painfully obvious to consumers that inflation is characterized by a continuing up- ward spiral of prices. In a capital-intensive industry like mining, those increases can be positively breathtaking. An interesting example is shown in Table 1. Table I shows that on a unit basis, the equivalent 1980 capital cost of Cuajone was over six times the cost of the adjacent and quite similar Toquepala operation completed in 1959. Such sobering statistics weigh heavily on the minds of executives who are contemplating major investments in new mining facilities. In spite of its monumental presence, inflation has usually been either inadequately covered or totally ignored in textbooks on engineering economy. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but a contributing factor is the inherent difficulty in accurately predicting inflation. However, under certain conditions, inflation may become the most important factor in a mining investment, and it can rarely be safely ignored in capital investment analyses. DEFINING AND MEASURING INFLATION Defining inflation and related terms is relatively easy. Its measurement, how- ever, is the source of almost endless debate in economic and political circles. How- ever, much of that debate is not relevant to the scope of this book, so that only those issues which impact directly on the capital investment decision are covered in this section. Inflation is the general decline in the value of money as measured by what it will buy. It is clear, then, that the rate of inflation varies with the particular currency under consideration as well as the type of goods and services being purchased. One would find, for example, that the general rate of inflation relative to German marks

Jan 1, 1984

By John J. Croston

In the closing months of 1936 the copper industry gave every evidence that it was at last on the threshold of an improved era. At the beginning of the year prices stood at 91/4c, which in itself was a great improvement over prices prevailing for the three previous years. Industry generally was showing signs of moving forward in this country, and business was definitely good in certain foreign quarters. The threat of war and preparations for rearmament in Europe and Asia acted as a further stimulus to purchasing. By midsummer the situation had so improved and stocks had been so reduced that the cartel of foreign producers (including American producers with foreign mines) decided to increase the production quota to 75 per cent on Aug. 1. Large-scale buying gave continued strength to the price and by Oct. 1 the quota was increased to 80 per cent, and again on Oct. 15, to 85 per cent. Notwithstanding this the price of copper continued its advance and on Nov. 1, with stocks declining continuously, the cartel increased operations to 95 per cent, then to 105 per cent on Nov. 5. In the meantime the domestic producers, because of the great increase in home consumption, had increased their production by nearly one-half. At the close of the year copper sold at 126 per pound, and since the turn of the present year has reached 17c. This rapid increase has not been wholly justified. Much of the increase was due to the legitimate demands of recovering industry, but rearmament orders plus accumulation of reserve stocks in case of war, purchases in anticipation of labor strikes and purely speculative activities on the London Metal Exchange accounted for the balance. Certainly in view of the state of industry and the general world price level, it appears unnecessarily high. Talk of a copper shortage is sheer nonsense, the recent condition in the market being created by overbuying, leaving but a small volume for speculative supplies. It takes some months for an increase in mine output to reach the market, but production is again overtaking apparent consumption, stocks have begun to increase, and this, together with the reopening of many small

Jan 1, 1937