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By R Williams, P Kohout, J Comins

The Northside Storage Tunnel (NST) is the largest tunnelling project ever undertaken in Sydney. The tunnel extends deep underground from the western bank of the Lane Cove river to the North Head sewage treatment plant (STP), with a branch tunnel from Scotts Creek connecting to the main tunnel under Tunks Park. The aim of the tunnel is to intercept wet weather overflows from four key points along the northernsuburbs ocean outfall sewer (NSOOS) and provide short-term storage and transfer of sewage to NorthHead STP for treatment prior to discharge to the ocean through the deep ocean outfall. The project was an ambitious undertaking by an alliance between the client Sydney WaterCorporationand the engineering firms of Montgomery Watson, Connell Wagner and Transfield to design andconstruct approximately 20 kilometres of tunnel, tunnel declines and shafts in just over three years. In order to achieve this tight timeframe construction of the NST has been undertaken simultaneously at seven construction sites located across the northern suburbs of Sydney. As with most tunnelling operations, tunnel boring machines (TBMÆs) and roadheaders dominated the excavation activities. Tunks Park and North Head STP are the major tunnelling sites. An access decline was excavated using roadheaders at both of these sites to facilitate tunnelling using TBMÆs. Three TBMÆs 3.8 m, 6.0 m and 6.3 m diameter) were launched from Tunks Park and one TBM (6.5 m diameter) was launched from North Head. At the overflow interception sites of Scotts Creek, Lane Cove River and Quakers Hat Bay two vertical shafts known as drop and access/ventilation shafts were constructed. These shafts would provide the linkage between the existing sewer and the tunnel. As their names suggest the drop shaft would convey the wet weather sewage overflows to the tunnel while the access/ventilation shaft would provide access during dry weather and ventilation during a filling event. The fourth overflow site of Tunks Park would use the tunnel decline as its link to the tunnel. Originally these shafts were to be excavated using the raise bore method. This technique however, is entirely dependent on the TBMÆs reaching the shaft locations at the specified time. This was not the case at two of the three shaft excavation locations and top down methods of excavation such as, a percussive cone fracturing (PCF), blind bore, mechanical excavation and drill and blast were investigated to ensure the project met its completion schedule. Traditionally project decisions are dominated by cost and schedule objectives. The contractual arrangement of the Alliance however, required that the objectives of safety, community and environment also be considered in any decision making process. Thus each of these top down methods of excavation were assessed against these five objectives. On considering all of these factors the use of explosives was considered to be the superior technique.

Jan 1, 2001

By P A. Lang, J G. Ayotte, R W. Humphries

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has the responsibility for research, and development of technologies, for the safe and permanent disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel wastes. As part of this comprehensive program, AECL is constructing an Underground Research Laboratory (URL) near Lac du Bonnet, Manitoba, to evaluate aspects of the concept of waste disposal deep in stable geological formations. No nuclear wastes will be used in the URL program.

Jan 1, 1986

By Steve Dillingham

Blasting crews, explosive product drivers, drillers, blasters, supervisors, and salespeople all arrive daily at customer blast sites in vehicles of every type whether passenger cars, pickup trucks, or bulk trucks. The majority of these vehicles are company owned and re p re s e n t a substantial investment and risk for the company. That may explain why the costs resulting from blasting incidents is often surpassed by those involving motor vehicle accidents.

Jan 1, 2003

By Steve Dillingham

There are some blasters and blasting companies that just seem to have better safety reputations than others. This is in spite of the fact that they are essentially doing the same type of work under similar conditions. To achieve that enviable safety reputation, it simply comes down to a strong safety culture prompted by a responsibility for others, as well as yourself and your company.

Jan 1, 2003

By Steve Dillingham

The horrific events surrounding September 11th left Americans with a feeling of sudden helplessness...the shock of being unprepared and powerless. From this tragedy, we can understand the need to prepare for the unexpected, and can apply this hard lesson into operational planning for those involved in the commercical explosives industry.

Jan 1, 2003

By Steve Dillingham

Change occurs all of the time. In fact, it’s fair to say that change is a constant. Sometimes the change is inconsequential, but sometimes the change impacts us d i rectly and severely. Take regulations, for instance. Complying with regulatory requirements is just part of the job for those involved with explosives. But in recent years, it seems as if new or revised regulations in areas such as hazardous materials training, drug and alcohol testing, security issues, or local licensing/permitting standards are changing the way we operate on a recurring basis. Simply keeping track of all of these regulations has become a full-time job.

Jan 1, 2003

By Steve Dillingham

In every aspect of conduct, on the blast site or off, the issue of credibility is raised. Promises are made, commitments are satisfied, safe practices are obeyed, communication is maintained, and proven procedures followed. Only by fulfilling these objectives, are we deemed trustworthy and reliable - in other words - credible. Unfortunately, at times, we fall short of achieving our goals. Whether intentionally or accidentally, everything is not completed according to plan or accuracy. On the blast site, falling short of achieving such goals may contribute significantly to a chain of events that can potentially produce accidents. At the very least, a blaster’s credibility will be jeopardized. The fact remains that the blaster that continuously conducts business in a professional manner will less likely find him or herself as a defendant in future claims.

Jan 1, 2003

By Steve Dillingham

The explosives business by nature is providing a specialized, valued service and associated products to a variety of customers whether mine, quarry or construction related. The level of performance demanded by the customer will typically coincide with his or her individual needs. Some will seek out the skills and knowledge of a blasting expert, while the focus of others is simply on production amounts.

Jan 1, 2003

By Steve Dillingham

Whenever misfired holes or portions of misfired holes remain after a blast is fired, a hazardous situation exists until the unfired explosive materials have been disposed of properly. Yet, there are so many factors that can contribute to misfires that it is impossible to give blanket instructions on how to handle them. To complicate matters, misfires today are rare due to reliable blasting products. As such, it isn’t very surprising that many blasters have never had to deal with a misf i re condition. While the likelihood of a misfire occurrence is minimal, you should always be pre p a red to handle a misfire should you be involved in such an event. To begin, every blaster and blasting org a n i z a t i o n should develop a misfire policy which contains the company’s safe operating pro c e d u res, emergency contact list, as well as any regulatory compliance re q u i re m e n t s . Tailgate and/or company-wide safety meetings should communicate the company’s contingent misfire pro c ed u res and any special site-specific precautions BEFORE the start of any project.

Jan 1, 2004

By Midori Sakamoto, Nobuaki Sakuma, Tsuyoshi Murashita

Recently, tunnel blasting works near the residential area and existing building are increasing and environmental problems caused by vibration have become serious public concern. In order to solve these problems, blasting works have been conducted with segmented blasting and reduce advance per round. However, with these blasting, work efficiency is not obtained, and regrettably the cost and risk of accident tend to increase. We developed a new controlled tunnel blasting technique with electronic delay detonator. Electronic delay detonator can supply extremely large range of delay period which could not be achieved with conventional pyrotechnical delay detonators. We utilized advantages in initiating hole by hole over entire tunnel face at the same round. Much seismic data obtained from tunnel blasting with conventional detonator was statistically analyzed in order to find average duration time of vibration caused by a single hole initiation. Numerical simulation using sample waves from a single hole initiation was carried out in order to find an optimum delay time which can separate vibration in each hole initiation and without decreasing blast performance. Trial blasting was conducted to examine the correctness of optimum delay time obtained from numerical simulation. This blasting technique was applied to an actual tunnel construction. This tunnel is 2 lane automobile tunnel with a total length of 659 meters and internal cross section of 70 square meters. The purpose of the use of blasting technique on occasion, was the protection of fresh water reservoirs directly above the tunnel, and to keep the effect on local private houses to a minimum. The vibration level against this station was limited under 20 mm/see P.V.V. With this blasting, the tunnel construction was completed without exceeding the limited vibration level, with minimum cost and construction time.

Jan 1, 1998

By Herschel Sanson

Success of underground blasting operations depends upon a number of interrelated factors. These include conditions at the place, blasting methods, face preparation, type of cap, powder selection, transportation and storage. In addition, much of the work is closely regulated by state and federal regulations.

Jan 1, 1975

By Omer Yilmaz Erkoc, Gulsec Uyar Aldas

Blasting techniques, which have been used for a long time in Turkey, are powerful and economical tool in producing raw material in mining, quarrying, construction .etc. industries. The development of the society within the world has resulted in a substantial increase in the scale of such industrial projects. However, the expansion of such activity has been matched by an increased public awareness of environmental issues, particularly when it occurs in relatively close proximity to residential areas. One of the most troublesome issues facing the mining, quarrying and construction industries when carrying out their blasting activities is that of ground vibration. Because, blasting induced ground vibration can reach to very far distances from the source and has the potential for damage to concern to the inhabitants of property.

Jan 1, 2002

By Dale Preece, Stephen Chung

Blasting induced rock fragmentation is an art that has been developed and refined for hundred’s of years through blasting and recording the results. Good blasting fragmentation practices were thus developed through experience. However, this method requires a history that is typically developed in a mine over a number of years and sometimes at considerable expense. Quantification of fragmentation as a function of rock-mass characteristics and blast design is attractive. Developments towards this end have included semi-empirical methods as well as computer codes that explicitly treat shock wave transmission and the subsequent rock breakage. This paper will present predictions of fragmentation resulting from rock blasting using the computer code AUTODYN and a new state-of-the-art material model for brittle rock and concrete.

Jan 1, 2003

By D. K. Ingram, G. L. Mowrey, T. R. Rehak

Problem: Blasting is a hazardous component of surface mining. Serious injuries and fatalities result from improper judgement or practice during rock blasting. This paper describes several fatal injury case studies, analyzes causative factors, and emphasizes preventive measures. Method: This study examines publications by MSHA, USGS, and other authors. The primary source of information was MSHA’s injury-related publications. Results: During the 21-yearperiod from 1978 to 1998, the mean yearly explosive-related injuries (fatal and nonfatal) for surface coal mines was 8.86 (95% CI: 6.38 -11.33), and for surface metal/nonmetal mines 10.76(95% CI: 8.39 - 13.14). Flyrock and lack of blast area security accounted for 68.2% of these injuries. This paper reviews several case studies of fatal injuries. Case studies indicate that the causative factors for fatal injuries are primarily personal and task-related and to some extent environmental. A reduction in the annual injuries in surface coal mines was observed during the ten-year period of 1989 - 1998 [5.80 (95% CI: 2.71 - 8.89) compared to the previous ten-year period of 1979 - 1988 [10.90 (95% CI: 7.77 - 14.14)]. However, such reduction was not noticed in the metal/nonmetal sector, i.e., 9.30 (95% CI: 6.84 - 11.76) for the period 1989-1998compared with 11.00 (95% CI: 7.11 - 14.89) for the period 1979-1988. Discussion: A multifaceted injury prevention approach consisting of behavioral/educational, administrative/regulatory, and engineering interventions merits consideration. Impact on industry: The mining community, especially the blasters, will find useful information on causative factors and preventive measures to mitigate injuries due to flyrock and lack of blast area security in surface blasting. Discussion of case studies during safety meetings will help to mitigate fatal injuries and derive important payoffs in terms of lower risks and costs of injuries.

In March 2003, Rio Tinto Coal AustraliaÆs (RTCA) new Hail Creek open cut coal mine commenced operations in the Bowen Basin. Hail Creek is a two-seam strip mining operation utilising two 90 m3 draglines and a fleet of excavators and trucks to remove the overburden. All overburden at Hail Creek is blasted prior to excavation. The mine conducts its own drill and blast operations while engaging Dyno Nobel for the provision of explosives supply and loading truck (bulk explosives vehicle û BEV) services. This arrangement was favoured over outsourcing the entire blasting function to a contractor. Subsequent to a value engineering review, the mine set about developing and implementing a blasting operation that did not rely on the need to store bulk quantities of ammonium nitrate on site. There were advantages identified in doing this, in particular the reduction of capital expenditure required and reduced exposure to a number of recently introduced security requirements. This approach also makes sense operationally. The establishment of reload facilities for the BEV close to the blasting location, where turnaround times are kept to a minimum, increases the productivity of the BEV. For this strategy to be successful the logistics of ammonium nitrate supply into the blasting operations has to be well planned and thoroughly executed. This means a robust planning and forecasting arrangement needs to be established with the supplier and transporters of the ammonium nitrate. To date, 80 million bcm of overburden has been blasted at Hail Creek and each year the quantity of overburden requiring blasting is increasing. The purpose of this paper is to present the findings of a study: evaluating the effectiveness to date of the strategy to conduct blasting operations without ammonium nitrate storage on site, and identifying whether there is a limit to which this strategy can operate after which the introduction of bulk ammonium nitrate storage facilities are necessary.

Jan 1, 2007

By R. J. Jones, L. D. Clark, R. C. Howell

This research provides an empirical approach toward further analysist10 of the variables in rock breakage under direct, hydroimpact (impacting on fluid) and explosive impulse loading. That the strain on the face of a block of rock, below an impact pin or explosive charge, is directly proportionate to the rupturing force F and inversely proportionate to the product of the burden W and the hole periphery S, is borne out in the laboratory using electrical resistance strain gages to measure a peak strain during rupture by small explosive charges detonated in boreholes. Furthermore, such findings established the validity of the expression F = Ss • Wy • R as a useful relationship from which, it is believed, can be derived practical applications in commercial rock blast design.

Jan 1, 1972

By L. Donovan Clark

The term "powder factor" is almost universally accepted as the measure of the efficiency of a blasting program. It represents the economics of blasting since it designates quantity of explosive (thereby providing quality control in rock fragmentation) in terms of the associated volume broken. It is the wide use of this concept that explains the interest shown in an approach to rock blasting preferred by A. W. and Z. W. Daw* in a treatise on 3 blasting (1) substantiating its use in the form, Q = CVW3 for single shot hole, where Q = quantity of explosive lb Cv = blasting coefficient W3 = unit volume of rock It is obvious that the term Cv could also be called the apparent powder factor should the equation be written in the form, Cv = Q/W3 (lb per cubic unit). However, while the approach was ingenious** and the practical applications straightforward, their original, rather limited experimental work, along with certain assumptions, was questioned.

Jan 1, 1970

By Jean-Sébastien Lambert, Joseph Kabuya, Richard Simon

Managing a highwall failure risk in an open pit mine by controlling and mitigating the impact of vibrations produced by blasting operations is key to achieving safe and cost-effective operations. The impetus behind this study was the risk of multiple bench failures in an open pit mine that was detected by Slope Stability Radar (SSR) following blasting at the foot of a highwall. The unstable high wall was over 140 meters(459.3 ft)high and 200 meters(656.2 ft)wide. The quantity of associated material was estimated at 3,000,000 metric tons(3,306,934 US tons). The overall slope angle was 44 degrees. In order to continue mining without causing the highwall to fail, this study was initiated as part of a risk management plan to mitigate this major risk by identifying mitigation measures related to blasting operations and assessing the response of the rock mass to each blast. Identifying blasting mitigation measures consisted of optimizing blasting parameters to avoid failure of the highwall. First, a signature hole operation was carried out to obtain seismic records that were georeferenced and associated with known single charges. The method used made it possible to determine the propagation velocity of the P-waves associated with the various lithologies studied and to calculate, from the geomechanical properties of the rock masses, the maximum peak particle velocities to be respected. Subsequently, the targeted area of operation was modelled with the I-Blast software in order to optimize the firing sequences to be used according to the different lithologies present. The model also made it possible to optimally predict the particle velocities associated with each blast and ensure compliance with the previously determined peak particle velocity limits. The assessment of the rock mass’s response using SSR consisted of defining alarm thresholds and an intervention plan for various possible alarms as well as quantifying the damage to the highwall from blasting. Controlling the impact of blast vibrations on the highwall’s stability was successful, as the mitigation measures used during mining did not accelerate the highwall’s movement. No upward trend in the stabilization time of the rock mass was observed by the SSR after each blast. Post-blast geotechnical inspections and analysis of post-blast deformations in the highwall also did not reveal significant damage to the highwall as a direct consequence of the blasting.

By Scott G. Giltner, Alex Schwenk

Blasting within 250 ft of a crusher was successfully executed through the application of electronic detonators, 3-D imagery, signature hole analysis, custom loading of blast holes. The blast was well contained, the vibrations were minimal, and there was no flyrock.

Feb 1, 2020

By Frederick R. Cosgrave

Blasting near buried Natural Gas pipelines has always been an area of great concern. Given the many variables that the blaster must contend with in determining how to break the rock while trying to keep the vibration low and doing so while not compromising the pipeline.

Jan 1, 1995