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Jan 1, 1940

Jan 1, 1940

Jan 1, 1943

Jan 1, 1943

The traditional form of project financing for resource related projects has involved project financings structured with either recourse to the project sponsor(s) or commercial banks accepting the project's risks, usually after project completion, subject to, inter alia, the nature of the project, geographical location, quality of the projected cash flows and commodity price outlook. However, the concept of commodity-linked borrowings hasadded a new dimension for borrowing opportunities for resource-oriented projects and or companies.

Jan 1, 1985

By James M. Barker

No commodity agreements now exist for sulfur and a lack of reference to sulfur commodity agreements exists in the literature. Law (1975) made a passing reference to sulfur as one of a group of commodities where "there have been additional control efforts of various types." Clearly, sulfur was a candidate, at least conceptually in the past, for some form of commodity agreement and the following discussion centers on the world sulfur market of the early 1980's in this context. GENERAL THEORY OF COMMODITY AGREEMENTS The upsurge in demands for commodity agreements seen in the last decade or so stems largely from agitation by the less developed countries (LDC) for better economic treatment by more developed countries (MDC). Several economic factors, real or imagined, adversely affect the LDC's as follows (MacAvoy, 1977): 1) variable demand in MDC's causes wide fluctuations in commodity prices which hurt the economies of commodity producers, who are often LDC's although consumer economies may also benefit from more predictable prices; 2) a general decline of commodity prices relative to the price of manufactured goods which hurts commodity producers in their balance of trade while their stocks and overcapacity rise; 3) instability of LDC economies enhanced by the above factors lowers internal stability, inhibits foreign investment, and retards economic growth; and 4) a lack of self respect when dealing with developed countries o, following the OPEC lead, LDC producers want the stature related to cartel market power.

Jan 1, 1985

By D. G. Keefe, I. C. Robinson

In this paper the authors present their views on the actual and potential role of commodity analysis in mining industry. Owing to the dominant influence of the economy on all commodity markets, it is essential that individual commodities are studied not only in depth but within the broader context of economic influences. A commodity unit, which monitors market developments in a wide range of commodities, is well placed to provide the broader perspective in the study of commodity markets. This paper describes some of the specific functions of such a unit. Some of the methods used for price forecasting are described, and the results of price forecasts by different forecasting methods are compared.

Jan 1, 1980

By F. H. Buttner

Commodity currency intrigues most of us because of the problems it offers to solve for the Third and the First Worlds. What problems might be solved, if commodity currency were to be adopted in the Third World? That is really the question we are probing here right now. It would take a while to think through all their subtle consequences of this question, but, off the top, it might well have at least three important impacts. Most important of these to this audience is relief from unfair Third World competition. Second, it might well liberate Third World economies from financial indebtedness to the First World and give them freedom from the liquidity limitations. The third benefit is that it might help relieve World trade tensions. All three benefits are interrelated. We could start our speculations on the application of commodity currency from anyone of these starting points. But let us use the starting point most important to you, unfair competition to the U.S. mining industry. From there we might wind up with some thoughts on things you, yourselves, can do to improve things.

Jan 1, 1978

1. Domestic Production and Use: Twelve companies operated 31 primary aluminum reduction plants, three firms accounting for 66% of production. Washington, Oregon, and Montana accounted for 32% of the total production; Gulf Coast States, 25%; Northern States, 29%; and other Southern States, 14%. Output of primary metal in 1973 was valued at $2.2 billion. About 80% of the secondary recovery was from new aluminum base scrap and 20% was from old scrap. Aluminum consumption by 25,000 firms was centered in the East Central United States. Of aluminum consuming industries in 1972, building accounted for 28%; transportation 19%; electrical, 13%; packaging, 16%; and consumer durab1es, 10%.

Jan 1, 1974

1. Domestic Production and Use: In 1974 twelve companies operated 31 primary aluminum reduction plants, three firms accounting for 64% of production. Washington, Oregon, and Montana accounted for 32% of the total production; Gulf Coast States, 24%; Northern States, 33%, and other Southern States 11%. Output of primary metal in 1974 was valued at $3.4 billion. About 80% of the secondary recovery was from new aluminum base scrap and 20% was from old scrap. Aluminum consumption by 25,000 firms was centered in the East Central United States. Of aluminum consuming industries in 1974, building accounted for about 27%; transportation 19%; electrical, 13%; packaging, 15%; and consumer durab1es, 9%.

Jan 1, 1975

1. Domestic Production and Use: In 1975.12 companies operated 31 primary aluminum reduction plants, with 3 firms accounting for 67% of production capacity. Washington, Oregon, and Montana accounted for 37% of the total production; Gulf Coast States 21%, Northern States 29%, and other Southern States 13%. Output of primary metal in 1975 was valued at $3.0 billion. Aluminum consumption by 25,000 firms was centered in the East Central United States. Of aluminum consuming industries in 1975, building accounted for about 21%; transportation 19%; electrical 14%; packaging 18%; and consumer durables, 9%.

Jan 1, 1976

Domestic Production and Use: In 1976, 12 companies operated 31 primary aluminum reduction plants, with 3 firms accounting for 63% of production capacity. Washington, Oregon, and Montana accounted for 36% of the total production; Gulf Coast States 19%, Northern States 29%, and other Southern States 16%. Based on published producer prices output of primary metal in 1976 was valued at $3.8 billion. Aluminum consumption by 25,000 firms was centered in the East Central United States. Of aluminum consuming industries in 1976 building accounted for about 25%; packaging 22%; transportation 19%; electrical 13%; , consumer durables 8%; and other uses, 13%.

Jan 1, 1977

By G. Pierson

Explanations for commodity price levels (or movements) commonly focus on the fundamentals of supply and demand otherwise they are simply assigned to speculative activity. Comparisons of metal-price histories to monetary and other economic data support the argument that the supply of and demand for money are no less important in the determination of price than are the supply and demand of the commodity itself. That these relationships should exist is evident in the price identity and they are consistent with monetary theory. The patterns developed have limited usefulness as predictors, but their recognition is essential for the construction of price scenarios for planning purposes.

Jan 1, 1998

By G. Pierson

Explanations for commodity price levels (or movements) commonly focus on the fundamentals of supply and demand, otherwise they are simply assigned to speculative activity. Comparisons of metal-price histories to monetary and other economic data support the argument that the supply of and demand for money are no less important in the determination of price than are the supply and demand of the commodity itself. That these relationships should exist is evident in the price identity and they are consistent with monetary theory. The patterns developed have limited usefulness as predictors, but their recognition is essential for the construction of price scenarios for planning purposes.

Jan 1, 1997

By G. Pierson

Explanations of commodity price levels, or movements, commonly focus on the supply and demand fundamentals of the particular commodity, or else are assigned to speculative activity. Comparisons of metal price histories with monetary and other economic data support the argument that the supply of and demand for money are no less important in price determination than are the supply and demand of the commodity itself. That these relationships should exist is evident in the price identity and are consistent with monetary theory. The patterns developed have limited usefulness as predictors, but their recognition is essential for the construction of price scenarios for planning purposes.

Jan 1, 1996

By Dennis Peterson

INTRODUCTION The business arena has dramatically changed for most producers and consumers of commodities. International debt, currency shortages, political upheavals, etc., require corporations today to be sophisticated and flexible enough to change their purchasing and sales techniques in order to maximize returns. Many external factors, such as interest rates, trading partners, currency changes, and government edicts, can have an adverse effect on a company's bottom line. Totally out of a company's ability to control or predict, these. factors force the commodities based corporation to constantly re-evaluate its operating scope and domain. The principle of back-yard only operations and the laissez-faire with blinders style of management is no longer a viable way to run a business. The industrial world has been operating for the past 10 to 15 years as though there were no commodity nor raw material crisis. For developed countries the primary products sector has become marginal, whereas it was central in the first half of the century. A radical change in the method of doing business is necessary to offset a depression in the industrial economy. The risk of collapse may be heightened by a banking crisis caused by massive defaults on the part of commodity producing debtors, whether in the third world or in our own farm producing sector. The raw materials economy has become divergent with the industrial economy. This is a major change in the world economy with tremendous implications in both developed and developing countries for economic and social policies and economic theories. Basic competition issues, such as low labor costs, are likely to become less of an advantage in international trade. In developed countries these costs are going to account for a smaller portion of total costs. The total costs of automated processes are lower than those of traditional plants with low labor costs. Automation in the commodities sector eliminates the hidden but high cost of not processing at capacity created by poor quality, rejects and maintenance for product change-overs. The cost of capital will become increasingly important in international competition. Over the last ten years the U.S. has become the highest cost country in this area. Reversing the U.S. policy of high interest rates and costly equity capital should be a priority for management decision makers. In the rapid industrialization of this century, Japan developed by exporting raw materials, (principally, silk and tea), at steadily increasing prices. Germany developed by leap frogging into the high-tech industries, mainly in electricity, chemicals and optics. The United States did both. Both avenues are blocked for today's rapidly industrializing countries because (a) the deterioration of the terms of trade for primary products, and (b) it requires an infrastructure of knowledge and education far beyond the scope of a poor country. Many explanations exist for the explosion of international money flows. The shift from fixed to floating exchange rates in 1971 may have given initial impetus by inviting currency speculation. The surge in liquid funds flowing to petroleum producers after the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 was definitely a major cause. There can be little doubt that the U.S. government deficit also played a big role. The American budget deficit has become a massive void, sucking in liquid funds from all over the world and making the U.S. the world's major debtor country. In reality, a trade and payments deficit is actually a loan from the seller of goods and services to the buyer, that is, to the U.S. From now on, the global ramifications of business will have to be treated in economic theory and business policy alike. Economic theory teaches that the comparative advantage factors of a real economy determines operative and financial policy. These comparisons -- labor costs, productivity, raw materials cost, energy costs,

Jan 1, 1990

By R. L. Virta

Common clay is a natural, fine-grained material composed of hydrous aluminum silicates. Shale is a laminated sedimentary rock formed by the consolidation of clay, mud and (or) silt. Government and legislative programs The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) invited industry to nominate representatives to a review panel that will help the EPA develop rules to regulate air toxics from the production of brick and structural clay products. The EPA was required to establish a review panel because these regulations will significantly affect small businesses. The regulation of air toxics falls under the Clean Air Act.

Jan 1, 2010

By James P. Bennett

The successful reuse/recycling of refractory materials after removal from industrial service is limited because of contamination, the low value of spent materials, the low cost of virgin raw materials, the lack of driving forces such as regulations or taxes, and low disposal costs. Most spent refractory is disposed in landfills. Concerns over future liability for waste materials, corporate images, and IS0 14000 have helped to encourage recycling at some companies. The recycling practices and application for spent refractory materials at facilities successfully recycling used refractory materials will be discussed, with emphasis on similarities.

Jan 1, 2002

By S. T. Krukowski

Traditionally the lime industry is governed by market, location, and transportation. These factors also may act as obstacles to global market access. Lime manufacture responds to market opportunities by first focusing on location. Lime markets are diverse and widespread, and ubiquitous occurrences of limestone make development of a widespread industry possible. Lime’s low to moderate unit value restricts transporting it long distances. Other factors (including lime reactivity, dedicated container use and other liabilities) limit shipping lime far. In the past many small to medium size companies made lime for local use. Today the global aspect of the industry is ownership by few large companies producing lime for local consumption.

Jan 1, 2003

By Victor F. Hollister

Introduction Trends of successful discovery technology and psychology emerge from a thoughtful study of various companies' exploration programs. These subjective patterns can be generalized into groups of factors for discussion. Here, for convenience, factors that influence exploration success are separated into management and geologic concerns. Most successful discoveries have a demonstrably favorable management combined with a technically competent geologic input. Both are required. But the management input is decisive. Management factors include the correct definition of management's role; cost of exploration; time needed for exploration; commodity selection; and the fostering of autonomy, creativity, and confidence in the geology department. Geologic factors include imaginative technical competence (field as well as academic), correct development and use of empirical exploration or prospecting models, and dedication. Success comes to those entities that are properly managed and have technological competence. A management team that directs a company's business has been compared to a dynasty. The dynasty lays out policy and follows up with appropriate action. In that management's power is pervasive, the term is appropriate. Management's role is, however, more important. Many examples can be cited where the geologic input was impeccable. But management somehow snatched defeat from the jaws of victory, and the exploration success was turned to a third party's profit. Management Factors Management's role can be broadly generalized to four parts. These are to identify the commodities it seeks, define its part in the exploration process, develop a functioning exploration department, and have the desire to succeed. It must have confidence in its geologists and delegate to them the authority and responsibility they need to operate successfully. Head office management cannot do the thinking for a field staff thousands of kilometers away. There is no substitute for confidence and delegation of authority. Successes came to those who had the freedom to act. Motivation is a management requisite. Management's role is to prevent destructive, internecine political battles within the corporate structure. Most large US mining corporations have well known histories of political strife that have damaged their exploration efforts. Management's role must, above all, include the desire to succeed. There are cases where management has been confronted with a commercial exploration success, but their reaction is to request additional study or exploration. Perhaps the problem of bringing a commercial find into production is beyond their capabilities. But a bona fide discovery sent back for additional work commonly is lost due to that management. The cost of exploration is a factor that management must accept. A variety of studies made during the past 40 years shows the cost per discovery to be $25 million, $38 million, $200 million, or even $290 million. These figures are derived by dividing the total exploration expenditure by the number of discoveries. However, successful management dynasties have a much lower cost per discovery during their management regime. Asarco, from 1948 through 1963, had one of the lowest cost discovery rates in the world. Duval Corp., from 1948 through 1968, had comparably low discovery costs. Placer Development, from 1955, was equally successful. Western Mining in Australia has had one of the longest lived dynasties associated with exploration success. Time is vital in exploration success. Most successful exploration case histories stress sufficient time in project exploration so that the target is well tested. A large target cannot always be adequately evaluated by a few holes (strat or concept testing). Serendipity helps in exploring large targets, but it best operates in a lengthy program. Numerous case histories include pleasant surprises. But these came mostly after the 10th hole. Commodity markets are important factors governing exploration success. Management's decision to explore for a specific commodity can doom its effort if that product suffers from severe oversupply. Unquestionably, progressive copper price increases from 1948 through 1968 helped convert marginal porphyry copper discoveries

Jan 8, 1985