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From "Knots and Lashings," of Oct. 10, 1918, the military publication of Canadian Engineers' Training Depot, St. Johns, Que. During the early hours of Sunday morning last (the 6th inst.) there passed from our midst one of the most affable and estimable officers who, during our brief connection with the Depob, it has been our fortune to meet. Sidney A. Lang was born in Ontario in the year 1884 and lived in Toronto for a number of years. He ahtended Toronto University, where he displayed remarkable ability, and after graduating followed the profession of mining engineer. Being young and endowed with the spirit of adventure, he followed his profession in the mines of Chile and Peru; he could speak Spanish fluently. Always a reserved man, of refined tastes, it was difficult to induce him to relate some of his adventures in those countries so shrouded in mystery and romance. He joined the Canadian Engineers in Toronto as a sapper and shortly after came to this Depot.

Jan 1, 1920

several days before leaving Buffalo; influenza developed, and when his train reached Nashville, Tenn., he was too ill to continue his journey and was taken to the Kissam Hall Hospital, Vanderbilt University, where he died of pneumonia. He was a young man of unusual ability and high moral character, always brigh.t, happy and kind, faithful and honorable in all things; loved by both his associates and those under his authority. His life and character cannot be better described than by the following quotation from one of his superior officers: "Lieutenant Ohnsorg was a man loved by all of us, always cheerful, just and kind, with unusual executive ability. We can never expect to find a man who has his ability and fine temperament and his position can never be sled as he filled it." He was happily married and leaves to mourn his loss a wife, Constance E. (Rogers) Ohnsorg and a baby girl born since his death, Nov. 29, 1918, a father, W. H. Ohnsorg, mother, Ida May Ohnsorg, and a sister, Mrs. Stuart Strathy McNair. He was a member of the American Institute of Mining Engineers and of the Florida Phosphate Miners' Association. Lieutenant Edward Hale Perry At the height of the first great German'offensive -of'the Spring of 1918, Edward Hale Perry, of Boston, First Lieutenant, Company D, Sixth Regiment Engineers, U. S. Army, was killed on March 30, near War fusee—Aban-court, Picardy, France, while defending the Boisdes Tailloux against the terrific plunge aimed at Amiens. Lieutenant Perry was born in Boston, Jan. 23, 1887, the son of Georgianna W. and the late Charles F. Perry. After completion of his college preparatory course, he travelled for a year in South America and Europe before entering Harvard with the class of 1910. It might have been regarded as the natural thing for Perry, upon graduation, to choose a path that would lead to a business or professional career at home, but there were in his character a solidity, a horror of sham, a contempt for the "soft" things, and a love-of the open which caused him to be attracted to a life of stern and sturdy reality. Accordingly, he entered the graduate mining school at Harvard, and received the degree of Mining Engineer in 1913. In the meantime, two summers spent in Western mining camps had at-

Jan 1, 1920

cation received from Brigadicr General Thos. G. Hanson said: "It is my painful duty to communicate to you the fact of the loss of your son, Martin F. Bowles. About 11 o'clock on the night of September 3, Lieutenant Bowles, with Lieutenant Joseph B. Keckler, 355th Infantry, in command of a reconnoitering patrol of our troops, encountered the enemy. In the ensuing engagement your son received a rifle bullet through his heart. His death was instantaneous and painless. His remains were intcrred with full military honors on the 4th of September." He was promoted to First Lieutenant, but his commission did not reach him before his death. He was president of the Missouri Mining Association, Missouri School of Mines, for the year 1916-17.

Jan 1, 1920

By Marshall Pease, R. J. Brandon

A UTILITY that has a large consumption of coal must insure an adequate and sound supply of fuel. The Detroit Edison Co., which has an annual coal consumption of about four million tons and spends approximately $32 million a year for coal, including freight charges, has developed a program for fuel procurement and for evaluation and selection of fuel for reliable and efficient plant operation. Fuel Procurement Coal Purchasing Division: The Fuel Supply Div. of the Purchasing Dept. combines all of the procurement functions in one group, which must maintain adequate stocks of fuel. In addition to its usual purchasing duties, the division also governs transportation, follow-up, invoice and freight bill, in cooperation with the Accounting Dept. The Fuel Div. is comprised of the fuel agent, an assistant fuel agent, a coal buyer and five coal clerks, who follow the movement of each car, initially approve freight bills and invoices, and file claims whenever there is a shortage of one ton or more. The fuel agent reports directly to the purchasing agent of the Company, and all major programs are planned jointly with the chief purchasing officer. The apparent individuality of the fuel section is necessary because of the tremendous volume of coal cars handled each day, sometimes as many as 500, which must be handled promptly to complete the fastest possible move from the mines to the plants. Determining Annual Coal Volume: Through the combined studies of a Production Dept. Load Committee and the Controller's office, accurate predictions of coal requirements for any given year are provided the Fuel Dept. from 12 to 15 months in advance. This is divided into the requirements of all individual power plants and central heating plants. This in turn determines the quantity and quality for plants whose specific fuels vary with the type of equipment installed. In the Detroit area, which has a high industrial load, early estimates of annual coal consumption usually are resolved at the end of the year within 4 or 5 pct of the original plan. Operating in a highly developed industrial area eases the task of estimating primary output; and, with the residential demands increasing in a steady and fairly well-defined pattern, the overall coal schedules are not subject to radical changes during any given year. Selecting Suppliers: At any time, but especially during or before an emergency, the coal supply factor must be made secure. This is particularly true in the procurement of utility fuel. There are always extreme quantities of so-called "bargain" coal available during the buyers' markets, such as recently prevailed. These opportunistic offerings may be considered a means of averaging down overall price, rather than as a steady and dependable supply source. Coal is purchased on contract from mine operators and sales agents who have proved reliable. They are not opportunists who desert for higher dollars in times of duress; they do not fail to fulfill contracts when markets rise or overship when markets dip. The progressive operator today who is willing to expend capital to improve quality and service deserves much more consideration than a matching of short-term pennies. When a company has a high volume of annual needs, all phases of the mine supply must be considered. The mine must be able to produce the quality required at a fair price and be able to sell oversizes of coal in enough volume to screen sufficient nut and slack. It must crush coal and sell mine run at prices in line with competitive nut and slack and be willing to do so when there is no demand for prepared sizes. Determining Price: The public utility is in direct competition with any of its customers who can, if savings are guaranteed, generate their own power. Today, to a greater extent than ever before, private industry must do a better overall job than Government-controlled operations. The price of coal must be realistically balanced with the price paid by almost all industries and the railroads as well. The supply-demand ratio in coal is not difficult to discern. There is access at all times to Govern-

Jan 1, 1952

not weaken. I saw him shortly before he was killed; his conduct under fire was splendid and an inspiration to his men. His loss is felt deeply by all ranks. Thanks to him and to others, who like him, paid the full measure of devotion to their country, our line was held until the critical situation in that vicinity was at an end. He died the true death of a soldier, with his face to the enemy. As we now look back, it is easy to believe that this holding of the line of defense intact by General Carey and his men was a determining factor in the outcome of the war. To have played so important and noble a part in this vital effort as that taken by Perry is assuredly the privilege of few. Our lives, it seems, are like capital entrusted to us to be expended as wisely and effectively as we may. With them we purchase whatever of accomplishment the stuff that is in us permits. It is impossible to escape profound regret that a career so full of the highest promise, and a personality so overflowing with all that is fine and lovable, should have been cut short at the age of thirty-one. Yet who can doubt that in a few months Perry bought with his life the fullest achievement of a life-time—a glorious part in the salvation of Liberty and Justice and Decency, indeed of Civilization itself! L. C. Graton.

Jan 1, 1920

not weaken. I saw him shortly before he was killed; his conduct under fire was splendid and an inspiration to his men. His loss is felt deeply by all ranks. Thanks to him and to others, who like him, paid the full measure of devotion to their country, our line was held until the critical situation in that vicinity was at an end. He died the true death of a soldier, with his face to the enemy. As we now look back, it is easy to believe that this holding of the line of defense intact by General Carey and his men was a determining factor in the outcome of the war. To have played so important and noble a part in this vital effort as that taken by Perry is assuredly the privilege of few. Our lives, it seems, are like capital entrusted to us to be expended as wisely and effectively as we may. With them we purchase whatever of accomplishment the stuff that is in us permits. It is impossible to escape profound regret that a career so full of the highest promise, and a personality so overflowing with all that is fine and lovable, should have been cut short at the age of thirty-one. Yet who can doubt that in a few months Perry bought with his life the fullest achievement of a life-time—a glorious part in the salvation of Liberty and Justice and Decency, indeed of Civilization itself! L. C. Graton.

Jan 1, 1920

B. S. and E. M. from the School of Mines at Socorro, New Mexico, in May, 1912. Immediately after graduating, he began as a practical miner in the U. S. mines at Bingham, Utah, but in November, 1912, he entered the operating department of the Chino Copper Co.'s concentrator at Hurley, New Mexico, where he stayed until July, 1913. During the latter half of 1913, he was employed as chemist in the laboratory of the El Paso smelter, at El Paso, Texas. In December, 1913, he became engineer and geologist with the Empire Zinc Co., at Socorro, New Mexico, which position he held at the time of his admission to the Institute in 1914, and until he entered the army in June, 1918. Before beginning the study of mining, Mr. Ringlund had completed a course in pharmacy, which accounts for his enlisting in the Medical Corps. Lieutenant George Roper, Jr. George Roper, Jr., a Junior Member of the Institute, was killed in an aeroplane accident near Shotwich, England, on Play 25, 1918. He was born at Steubenville, Ohio, in 1893, and at the time of his admi~sion to the Institute in 1916 was a student in mining and metallurgy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston, Mass., from which he received the degree of S. B. in June, 1917. In August, 1917, he enlisted in the Royal Flying Corps, and after preliminary training on this side of the water, was sent to England. He was making the final cross-country flight of his course of training when the accident occurred.

Jan 1, 1920

FRANCIS B. SILSBE,* Washington, D. C. (written discussion?). ?This paper is an interesting example of the -solution by the methods of metallography of what seemed at first a purely chemical problem. The authors have shown: in detail, how the well-known corrosion of spark-plug terminals is due to the dropping out of the individual crystals of the metal as it becomes surrounded by an oxide film. This corrosion is usually quite slow but in special cases may become a serious factor in limiting the life of spark plugs. There still remains the problem for the metallurgist to produce a material that will be entirely free from, this trouble. One of the most startling results of the work is. the demonstration that it affords of the deleterious effect of a mechanical stress continuously applied to material that is at the same time subject to adverse chemical or thermal conditions. The particular style of spark plug shown in the illustration, and in which serious trouble was caused by this corrosion, has the side terminals fastened at both ends and the method of assem-bling is such that a considerable initial tension is applied to the wire. It is without doubt this superimposed tension that causes the inter-crystal-line network to line up, as it were, into a few continuous and deeply penetrating transverse fissures instead of forming a great number of shallow surface cracks. This result is clearly shown both in the case of

Jan 11, 1919

By GEORGE H. DERN

IF THE engineer is to go into politics, as I think he should, I believe the curriculum of every engineering school should be amended to include a good stiff course in public speaking. My observation has been that the engineer in private conversation can scintillate as brightly as a life insurance agent or an oil stock salesman, but before an audience, with rare exceptions, he is a total loss. He will not get up and talk. He hides his light under a bushel, and sits on the bushel as dumb as an oyster. I have seen meetings of the Utah Section at which some topic of general interest to the members was up for discussion, and where an animated debate was the logical thing to expect. After the chairman states the subject and invites discussion, there is dense silence. Finally a member, bolder than the rest, gets up and with trembling voice and knees makes a motion. The motion carries, the meeting adjourns, and then the members gather into groups and begin to discuss the question seriously -and intelligently, giving cogent arguments on either side and embellishing their remarks with appropriate or inappropriate epithets illustrations and figures of speech. Now, I am not pleading for more speechmaking. The good Lord knows we have too much of this great American indoor sport already. But I think every man ought to be able and ready to express his opinions at the proper time. Some men have a reputation for wisdom because they do not talk much. We speak of the wise old owl because she never speaks, but in my opinion the owl's reputation for wisdom is vastly overrated. silence is more apt to be a cloak for stupidity than for wisdom. The person who has ideas can- not exert any influence by keeping them locked up in his own mind. The great motive force of the world is not muscle, but ideas, and ideas in order to get in their work must be released.

Jan 1, 1925

By Morton Macartney

FOR many years the developers or owners of worthy mining ventures in need of financing have found it almost impossible to obtain such financing under the conditions existing in most other lines of business. High rates of interest and unfair participation in profits have robbed the developers of much of their holdings, and have resulted in over-capitalization and many other like evils. When the general financial condition of the country is bad, this difficulty increases to a point where many operations must cease and hen are thrown out of employment. In 1.934 this situation had developed to such a point that Congress attempted to aid the mining industry. It first authorized the RFC to make loans to recognized and established corporations, individuals, and partnerships engaged in the business of mining, milling, or smelting of ores in June, 1934, limiting such authority to loans adequately secured, the security to consist of mineral acreage. The requirements of the law were stringent and of the 252 requests for loans received up to June 1, 1935, 35 were authorized.

Jan 1, 1936

By J. D. Cooner

SINCE my working life of 32 yr has been spent in and about the anthracite mines of the Hudson Coal Co., and the previous 4 yr in a college school of mines, I can write best about the safety program of a coal mining company. However, most of the suggestions, statements and practices mentioned herein are applicable to the members of a safety organization and program of almost any industry. It is realized that industrial officials actually interested in real safety work are fully acquainted with the requirements of a practical safety program. Therefore, for such persons there may be nothing new in this paper. The Hudson Coal Co. of Scranton, Pa., employs 7,000 men and produces 5,000,000 tons of anthracite annually at nine collieries scattered for a distance of 40 miles throughout the Lackawanna and Wyoming valleys of northeastern Pennsylvania. For the past 17 yr of the above mentioned 32, I have been engaged in safety work as a safety inspector, assistant mine superintendent, and at present the safety engineer. I have also had the privilege of visiting coal and metal mines in other parts of the United States and Canada. We Americans are the most careless people in the world. If any one doubts this statement why are 100,000 of our people killed accidentally annually? Or why during the almost four years we were engaged in World War II were more of our people killed accidentally at home than were killed in our army, navy, marine corps, coast guard, and other services during the same period? We are careless everywhere in our homes, on the highway, at work and at play. The purpose of this paper is to outline the requisites of a safety department and its program to stop the accidents occurring to employees at work in mines or industrial plants. The first requisite for a safety program is that the management must be convinced of the need and value of a real safety program. By "management" is meant each department head from the president down. Otherwise a good safety department with a good safety program will not succeed because it will not have the proper personnel and equipment to work with, its rules and regulations will not be enforced, and the members of the safety department will be belittled in the eyes of most of the workmen and supervisors. Next, a safety engineer and his inspectors should have worked in the production end of the mines as workmen and also in an official capacity. They are then in a position to have practical and first hand knowledge of the accident hazards of the industry, how to prevent them, and in general the problems of both the workmen and officials. Some men are appointed as safety inspectors when they are physically unable to carry on as mine officials. Such men may know the safety end of the industry and even be safety-conscious, but if they are physically unable to be mine officials they are also physically unable to be safety inspectors, as a safety inspector in our mines must walk from 2 to 4 miles on each daily inspection-and visit each working

Jan 1, 1948

By Edward Capillon

THE problem of scrap is probably of greater importance inn the production of gold, silver and other precious metal alloys than is the case for base metals and alloys. Remelting of gold and silver scrap in the shop is always a costly process because it involves losses by oxidation of the base metals in the alloy with a consequent increase in the percentage of precious metal. This is most marked in the case of alloys containing the low-boiling and easily oxidized metals zinc and cadmium. Since it is. not generally feasible to assay every shop remelt it follows that the possibilities of lost values are large. So-called rolled gold and silver plate is made by soldering or welding the precious metal alloys onto base, metal. Such plate when defective must be sent to the refinery to recover the gold and silver values, thereby involving additional expense in the form of refining charges. It is obvious therefore that gold and silver alloy scrap is an important item in manufacturing cost and must be reduced to a minimum. The amount of scrap resulting from poor metal will depend on a number of factors in the manufacturing operations, not least among which is the melting and casting practice. The notes which follow are a summary of experiments performed at various times to determine what variables in melting and casting are influential in the production of sound alloys.

Jan 1, 1930

Albert Ladd Colby, New York, N. Y. (communication to the Secretary†):—I observed (Trans., xxxvii., 585) that to obtain tenders from several American mills, the foreign engineer should modify his maximum phosphorus to 0.10 per cent., not as Mr. E. Windsor Richards quotes me, that no American rail-maker can produce rails under 0.10 per cent. of phosphorus. Mr. Richards claims that no English engineer would agree to accept 0.10 per cent. of phosphorus on any terms whatever. Mr. Webster writes that only after an engineer has .been convinced that rails can be made in America equal in every respect to those he is getting abroad, should he be asked to modify ally conditions in his specifications. I know it to be a fact that during recent years in many cases, as, for instance, When delivery could be secured more promptly in the United States than in Europe, the consulting engineers of several British and colonial railroads have frequently agreed to modify their phosphorus requirement to a maximum of 0.10 per cent., and the rails delivered' under these modified specifications have, under like conditions, given just as satisfactory service and proved to be no more brittle than similar sections of 0.07 per cent. phosphorus rails, rolled in England under the same specification except without modification as to phosphorus. Furthermore, it would appear from the analyses of British rails, quoted by E. A. Dancaster,2 in his discussion of Mr.

Jan 1, 1908

By J. D. Cooner

Since my working life of 32 yr has been spent in and about the anthracite mines of the Hudson Coal Co., and the previous 4 yr in a college school of mines, I can write best about the safety program of a coal mining company. However, most of the suggestions, statements and practices mentioned herein are applicable to the members of a safety organization and program of almost any industry. It is realized that industrial officials actually interested in real safety work are fully acquainted with the requirements of a practical safety program. Therefore, for such persons there may be nothing new in this paper. The Hudson Coal Co. of Scranton, Pa., employs 7000 men and produces 5,000,000 tons of anthracite annually at nine collieries scattered for a distance of 40 miles throughout the Lackawanna and Wyoming valleys of northeastern Pennsylvania. For the past 17 yr of the above mentioned 32, I have been engaged in safety work as a safety inspector, assistant mine superintendent, and at present the safety engineer. I have also had the privilege of visiting coal and metal mines in other parts of the United States and Canada. We Americans are the most careless people in the world. If any one doubts this statement why are 100,000 of our people killed accidentally annually? Or why during the almost four years we were engaged in World War II were more of our people killed accidentally at home than were killed in our army, navy, marine corps, coast guard, and other services during the same period? We are careless everywhere— in our homes, on the highway, at work and at play. The purpose of this paper is to outline the requisites of a safety department and its program to stop the accidents occurring to employees at work in mines or industrial plants. The first requisite for a safety program is that the management must be convinced of the need and value of a real safety program. By "management" is meant each department head from the president down. Otherwise a good safety department with a good safety program will not succeed because it will not have the proper personnel and equipment to work with, its rules and regulations will not be enforced, and the members of the safety department will be belittled in the eyes of most of the workmen and supervisors. Next, a safety engineer and his inspectors should have worked in the production end of the mines as workmen and also in an official capacity. They are then in a position to have practical and first hand knowledge of the accident hazards of the industry, how to prevent them, and in general the problems of both the workmen and officials. Some men are appointed as safety inspectors when they are physically unable to carry on as mine officials. Such men may know the safety end of the industry and even be safety-conscious, but if they are physically unable to be mine officials they are also physically unable to be safety inspectors, as a safety inspector in our mines must walk from 2 to 4 miles on each daily inspection and visit each working

Jan 1, 1949

By Samuel Hoyt

THE hardness of annealed copper has been given in the literature and is easily obtained by any of the standard methods of hardness testing. It is not our intention to correct published values or to add to them, but to describe tests of two bars of annealed electrolytic copper in which the methods of Meyer's analysis were employed. MEYER'S ANALYSIS OF BALL INDENTATION TEST The ball indentation test is probably the most valuable hardness test we now have but, as it is carried out in the Brinell or Rockwell test, the result may be seriously in error without the operator suspecting such to be the case. This condition results from the isolated and uncontrolled nature of the measurement. The accuracy depends on the accuracy of the equipment and the care and skill used in the operations; there is nothing in the impression diameter, which is all that is measured, to indicate the presence of error. Meyer's analysis supplies a control of the measurements that goes far toward eliminating unsuspected errors. The principles of this work maybe obtained from elsewhere.1 As this subject has not received the attention of this Institute, it may be well to summarize the more important points as follows.

Jan 2, 1926

By Elwin L. Fisk

The Cordero mine is located in the Nevada portion of the Opalite Mining district that straddles the Oregon-Nevada state boundary. The mercury deposits of the district occur along the margins of the broad east-west graben valley of McDermitt Creek. The only other major producers, the Opalite and Bretz mines, on the northern margin of the graben have thus far exploited only shallow deposits within 100 feet of the surface. Through December 1965, Cordero has produced 94,680 flasks of mercury, the most of which came from the large underground cinnabar deposit. Nearly all of the mercury ore deposits in this district have been found in Miocene rhyolitic intrusives, flows, tuffs, and lake beds. These rhyolites have been argillically altered at depth and extensively silicified at or near the surface. These silicified areas or "opalite" masses were the original cinnabar-bearing outcrops.

Jan 1, 1968

By Henry Fay

THE CHAIRMAN (ALBERT SAUVEUR, Cambridge, Mass.).-In forcing us to face and to discuss the important question of erosion of steel guns, Prof. Fay is performing a public service. His investigation has been fruitful and his results illuminating and suggestive. It is not in a spirit of adverse criticism, therefore, that I venture a few remarks suggested by his paper, but rather to add my mite to the discussion in the hope that it may not be entirely without value. Prof. Fay considers it conclusively demonstrated that the hard layers forming in the inside of guns of large calibers after they have been fired a number of times consist of martensite. Still, he admits that he never was able to detect in the hard layers the structural characteristics of martensite. This leads him to conceive the existence of amorphous martensite. We may well hesitate before accepting this theory on the strength of the evidence offered. Martensite, as we know it, is essentially a crystalline condition assumed by a close association of iron and carbon, possibly if not probably of the nature of a solid solution. Lacking this crystalline character we are hardly justified in calling it martensite on the ground, merely, of its being very hard.

Jan 4, 1917

CONTENTS PAGE ANDERSON, ARVID E., and CAMERON, FRANK K.-Recovery of Copper by Leaching, Ohio Copper Co. of Utah. Discussed by Thomas B. Brighton, H. C. Goodrich, Arvid E. Anderson, Thos. P. Billings, Frank K. Cameron 2 BEESON, J. J.-Mining Districts and Their Relation to Structural Geology. Discussed by Charles Keyes, Chas. A. Porter 4 DOBBEL, CHAS. A.-Deep-hole Prospecting at the Chief Consolidated Mines. Discussed by G. W. Crane 10 CRANE, G. W.-Notes on the Geology of East Tintic. Discussed by G. W. Crane, H. E. Havernor, N. O. Lawton 11 SACKETT, B. L., BARDWELL, CARLOS, JACOBSON, SIMON, and JENSEN, N. H. Lead Smelting in Utah. Discussed by D. W. Jessup, B. L. Sackett, E. H. Laws 13 BARDWELL, E. S., and MILLER, Roy H.-Pulverized Coal as Fuel for Copper Refining Furnaces. Discussed by L. D. Anderson, E. S. Bardwell, C. P. Crawford 15 WIGTON, G. H.-The Chief Consolidated Volatilization Process and Mill. Discussed by Thomas Varley, S. G. Olmstead, V. O. Lawton, O. C. Ralston.... 16 JESSUP, D. W.-Evolution in the Preparation of Ores for Lead Blast Furnaces. Discussed by W. Spencer Reid, D. W. Jessup, Carlos Bardwell 19 ALLEN, H. P., and MADGE, WM. C.-Chloridizing Mill of the Standard Reduction Co. Discussed by Thomas Varley, H. R. Hanley, H. P. Allen, George H. Dern 20 TUCKER, E. L., and HEAD, R. E.-Effect of Cyanogen Compounds on Floatability of Pure Sulfide Minerals. Discussed by Blarney Stevens 24 Mix, B. E., and BARKER, L. M.-Method of Unloading Ores and Coarse-crushing Practice at Magna Plant of Utah Copper Co. Discussed by W. C. Madge,B. E. Mix 25 KEIGLEY, C. T.-The New Byproduct Coke Plant of the Columbia Steel Corporation. Discussed by W. M. Grant, C. T. Keigley, A. C. Feilder 25 JACKSON, P. W.-Blast Furnace Plant of the Columbia Steel Corporation. Discussed by W. R. Phibbs, H. M. Henton 26 OLDRIGHT, G. L., KEYES, H. E., and WARTMAN, F. S.-Production of Ferric Sulfate and Sulfuric Acid from Roaster Gas. Discussed by G. D. Van Arsdale William E. Greenawalt, G. L. Oldright 27 MAZANY, M. S.-Braden Copper Company Caletones Smelter. Discussed by A. B. Young, G. L. Oldright 36 HARRINGTON, D.-Safety Methods in Utah Coal Mines. Discussed by Edward K. Judd, Otto Herres, Benedict Shubart, A. C. Watts, D. Harrington 36

Jan 12, 1925

By G. Townsend Harley

STOPING methods in which shoveling plays an important part are gradually being replaced by other and cheaper methods. But there will always be considerable shoveling done underground in stopes as well as in drifts, tunnels, urinzes, and shafts. At the mines of the PhelpsDodge Corporation at Tyrone, N. M., the cost of shoveling in all stopes in 1917 amounted to 24c. per T. In the top-slice stopes for the same period, it cost 27 c. per T. or 16 per cent, of the total cost of these stopes. The tonnage for shovelers from all stoping was 9.3 T. per man, and for topslicing 8.2 T. per man. These stopes were not unduly hot, and there was not more than the usual amount of timber to interfere with the work of the men. The tonnages obtained per shoveler were considered low; first, because of a poor grade of Mexican labor, many of the men having come in from railroad grading camps; and second, because of a poor spacing of raises, especially in the top-slice stopes, where, in general, they were spaced 25 ft. by 66 ft. (7.6 by 20.1 m.) centers. The average wage per laborer shift was $2.67 during the year. It was thought, however, that even under these conditions the men were not producing the tonnage that they should, so, with the consent of the management, the writer undertook to determine how the general efficiency of the underground shoveling could be improved. No predetermined plan for conducting these experiments was arranged because we had no definite ideas as to the scope of the work or the number of elements into which the investigation would resolve itself, before all of its phases could be determined. We were sure, however, that any work that would thoroughly cover the ground would have to be in the nature of a systematic time study, combined with a course of instruction in correct shoveling methods and adequate and intelligent supervision of the work. Two or three companies in the Southwest have done some work to determine the proper shovel to be used undcrground, but so far as is known the work has been limited to equipping certain parts of their mines with a particular type and size of shovel and thereafter watching the cost and efficiency records. In each case it seems to have been the shovel that held the 21-lb. (9.5-kg.) load that gave the bcst results. Excepting personal communications from these companies, the only data available on scientific shoveling are contained in F. W. Taylor's book, "The Principles of Scientific Management," and D. J. Haucr's article, in The Contractor for March 29, 1918, "A Hundred Hints for Shovelers." This paper discusses and draws conclusions from several thousand time-study readings, taken both on the surface and in the mines for nearly a year. A sufficient number of readings were taken on each factor in the problem for the plotting of curves of the performances and to obtain accurate indices of the work to be expected from this class of labor. The work is not as complete in all of its details as we would like to havc it, because we were forced to stop the work temporarily, owing to the numbcr of men going into the National service and our inability to get others who could make time studies. The results obtained so far, however, have been of such a startling nature that we have decided to submit them at this time, subject to future modification. It is hoped, also, that a free discussion of this paper will lead to a disclosure of any errors that may have becn embodied and offer some valuable suggestions for the conduct of future work.

Jan 1, 1920

By Mäkinen, Eero

OUTOKUMPU, a large copper mine in eastern Finland, has the distinction of being one of the few important mines in the world discovered by a geologist the late Otto Triistedt, of the Geological Sur- vey of Finland, having found the out- clop in 1910 by tracing glacial ore boulders, some of which had been carried as far as fifty kilometres. As the mine had no connection with either railways or waterways and the possibilities of transport were poor, the owners first tried the Hybinette hydrometallurgical process to extract the copper. The raw ore was finely crushed, treated by a sulphatizing roast. and then leached. The resulting solution was electrolyzed, using lead anodes. This experimental plant, having a capacity of 10,000 tons (all Ions are metric tons in this paper) of raw ore and producing 300 to LEO0 tons of electrolytic copper annually, was built in 1913 and run until dis-

Jan 1, 1938