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Quite often the reserve assessor becomes enamored with the numbers gen- erated and forgets the basis for his assessment. The quality of the assess- ment can only be as good as the quality of the input data. The use of seismic data from the Gippsland Basin in assess- ing Esso/BHP's oil and gas reserves is an excellent example of this principle. By significantly improving the quality of seismic data, a much more reliable estimate of a field's reserve potential can be made. In addition, it provides the basis for further delineation drill- ing which, as recent experience in Gippsland has shown, often leads to increased reserves.

Jan 1, 1979

Variations in delay timing can have a marked influence on blasting effectiveness and, hence, on total production costs. In single-row bench blasts, delay firing is invariably more effective than simultaneous initiation. In single-row delayed blasts, there is an optimum inter-hole delay above and below which inferior blasting results are obtained. This optimum delay is equal to the time required for each charge to just effectively detach its quota of the burden. The inter-hole delay should seldom be less than 4 ms.m-l of burden.In multi-row blasts in which holes in a given effective row are fired on the same delay, the entire burden on any effective row should be detached from the rock mass just before charges in the next effeotive row detonate. Delays shorter than this give inferior blasting results and an increased likelihood of environmental and slope stability problems. If the inter-row delay is too long, cut-offs can occur, especially where the delay unit is located outside the blasthole. For a surface delay system, the optimum inter-row delay usually varies between 4 ms.m-l and 8 ms.m-l of effective burden. The number of rows that can be fired effectively with surface delay systems (in a single blast) is limited by the threat of cut-offs. Greater interrow delays and a larger number of rows per blast can be fired to advantage with down-the-hole delay systems.There are practical limits to the timing accuracy of all available delay systems. The existence of delay time variability should be recognized and duly considered in the design of blasts.The relationship between delay timing and blasting vibrations is not discussed.

Jan 1, 1977

By Donald Cummings

CERTAIN dusts are dangerous when inhaled, but most hazardous of all dusts are quartz or other forms of pure crystalline silica. The inhalation of dusts containing silica in combination with other elements gives rise to changes in the lung which differ from those produced by pure silica. As a generality, silicates are less dangerous than pure crystalline silica and vary greatly among themselves in harmfulness. Repeated analyses have shown that approximately 70 per cent of the total number of particles involved in any dust-producing operation are below 1 to 2 microns in diameter. (A micron is. approximately 1/25,000 in.) Similar studies of dusts recovered from silicotic lungs post mortem have demonstrated essentially the same size frequency distribu-tion, except that the upper limit of size retained in the air sacs is approxi-mately 10 microns. Experiments carried on by Gardner and the author have further demonstrated that greater changes were produced by a fixed weight of very fine quartz particles (2 to 3 microns and smaller) than by the same weight of slightly larger particles (8 to 10 microns). Any attempt to control a dust hazard should therefore be directed toward the removal from the working atmosphere of particles less than 10 microns in size, and particularly those below 3 microns. All industrial hygienists agree on this matter, but there remains considerable dispute as to the lower limit of particle size capable of causing injury. It has been gen-erally conceded, however, that particles of harmful dusts smaller than ¼ to ½ micron are not essentially concerned in the development of pulmonary fibrosis. This opinion is partly substantiated by the existence of large numbers of these small particles in practically all atmospheres that are, not associated with any known hazard. Such particles are so small that they have very little mass, fail to settle even in quiet air, and probably are not easily retained in the lung. Until further research proves that they are involved in the dangers provoked by the inhalation of certain dusts, engineers will generally agree that it is better to dis-regard them.

Jan 1, 1935

By William M. Gleason

When SME’s 2006 Arizona Conference convened in December at the Hilton El Conquistador Resort in Tucson, AZ, there was considerable excitement among the 387 attendees. There was a noticeable buzz surrounding the progress of Phelps Dodge’s Safford copper mine in southern Arizona, one of the first new major copper mines to be permitted in more than 30 years in the United States. There were also plenty of good feelings about the mining industry in general. Commodity prices remained high and with no signs of a slowdown in the immediate future. Things were good in Arizona. But there were also cautionary tones at the conference and the Mining Foundation of the Southwest banquet that preceded it.

Jan 1, 2007

By Tim O’Neil

Tire companies have historically used the mining industry as a platform to launch new technologies. And the mining industry has been receptive to that. So, while developing its Two Piece Assembly, Goodyear noted a number of trends in the mining industry: •The global market sophistication of equipment and operations requires the packaging of products and services to provide the best return on investment. •Industry consolidation and growth have resulted in fewer, more powerful mining houses, leveraging purchasing power in the marketplace. •User productivity demands continue to drive original equipment manufacturers to develop higher pay-load equipment. •Technology needs include improved ergonomics, to reduce fatigue and increase operator productivity. •Increased laws and environmental regulation prohibit on-site whole tire disposal practices.

Jan 1, 2003

By Dan Armour

Bolting solutions traditionally offered only wet drilling or dry drilling options; each with advantages and disadvantages. Joy Mining Machinery has developed a Mist Drilling System that incorporates the best of both types of drilling. Compared to wet drilling, mist drilling offers as much as a 90% reduction in water use. As a result, floor and roof conditions are tremendously improved. This offers a safer and more comfortable work environment for operators. Mist drilling can offer a significant reduction in noise levels compared to dry drilling and in recent trials, bit life has been greatly improved. Holes are cleaner and operators experience less exposure to respirable dust.

Jan 1, 2005

By Martin Herrenknecht

After the successful breakthrough at the end of 2006 of both TBMs into the multifunctional site Faido (MFS), in the middle of 2007 the two tunnel boring machines resumed the 12 km long section between Faido and Sedrun. In the roughly a 10 month interval both approximately 465 m long tunnel boring machines were partly dismantled, pushed through the 2.5 km long MFS, rebuilt for the new larger diameter of 9.5 m and reassembled to be ready for operation. In the rebuilding phase, improvements were made to the equipment, especially as a result of experience gained from the previous 14 km long drive in the section Bodio and taking into account the latest information regarding the upcoming 14 km section Faido. Both TBM drives are currently in the rock formations of the Lucomagno gneiss, which stretch over a section of 3.5 km from the MFS Faido to the predicted Piora Syncline. This section is divided into two fold axes of the Chièra Synform, where the Lucomagno gneiss pass from a sub-horizontal into vertical bedding. The drives, with current rock overburdens exceeding 1,500 m and, as known from the excavation phase of the MFS, in part highly disturbed rock formations, are characterized by the locally intense rock squeezing conditions with large convergences in the vicinity of the driving TBM as well as backwards due to the interaction of the two drives. High expenditure for the support measures, reduced driving performances together with extensive extra work associated with deadlines and increased costs are the result. In the paper the previous experience with the TBM drives in the section Faido and the challenges still awaiting us are presented and discussed.

By Rees J. Llewellyn

Improved product development, assessment methods and evaluation studies of materials for oil sands applications have traditionally focused on low and high stress abrasion and slurry erosion resistance mechanisms, because they were considered to be the predominant wear modes prevailing in oil sands mining, transportation and bitumen recovery. More recently with the very successful introduction of oil sands hydraulic transportation systems, there has been increasing use of crusher systems in which materials of construction are also required to have good toughness and gouging abrasion properties to withstand impact and the severe indentation and ploughing forces that are involved. To assess material property requirements for mitigating this additional wear mechanism, jaw crusher gouging abrasion tests using a modified ASTM G81 procedure, have been carried out on a range of wear materials of interest for oil sands mining service. The method involves a comparison of the wear losses that occur for reference and selected test plates when a controlled amount of standard feed rock is comminuted in a laboratory jaw crusher. Among the classes of material evaluated have been Q&T plate steels, austenitic manganese steel, chromium and chromium molybdenum white irons as plain castings and in laminated forms and also chromium carbide and tungsten carbide overlaid wear plates.

May 1, 2004

By D. S. Choi

The paper presents the result of analysis of subsidence data collected from coal mines operating in Northern West Virginia and Southwestern Pennsylvania. A particular emphasis la placed on the measurement of the angle of draw for the protection of surface structures.

Jan 1, 1986

Tax for Toxic Waste Cleanup. - The Superfund Act of 1980 became effective April 1, and provides that producers of certain metals and chemical substances are to be taxed in order to fund toxic waste cleanup. Industry will provide 88% of the 5-year, $1.6 billion fund. The Environmental Protection Agency will administer the Act, but the Internal Revenue Service will be responsible for collection of the industry tax. Under the Act, nickel companies, for example, will be required to pay a tax of 0.225 cents per pound on pure nickel products produced or imported into the United States. Standard for Exposure to Lead. - The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSPA) has announced a stricter standard on the test of a worker's exposure to lead. Effective May 15, in all lead intensive occupations with the exception of those at primary and secondary lead smelters, a worker would have to be removed from his work station if the level of lead in his blood tests out at 60 micrograms of lead per 100 grams of blood, instead of the previous standard of 70 micrograms. In the case of primary and secondary lead smelters, the ruling has been stayed until June 1, 1981, to allow time for further study.

Jan 1, 1981

By Andrew E. Nevin

The government of India convened a precedent-setting meeting in New Delhi on Nov. 12, 2001.The meeting brought together regulators and the mining industry in an attempt to fix the industry’s mine development problems in that country. More than 150people attended the all-day session. Ram Vilas Paswan, Minister of Coal and Mines, chaired the meeting. Ravi Shankar Prasad, Minister of State for Coal and Mines, was also present. The secretary of the Department of Mines and the Joint Secretaries and Additional Secretary also participated. The Department of Mines’ mandate is for economic growth: to get new mine development going and to make investment in mining attractive for both domestic and foreign-owned companies.

Jan 1, 2002

Throughout history, many of the world's achievements, conflicts and problems can be traced to the demand for minerals. With the rapid expansion of our industrialised society in recent years the demand for minerals has grown to such an extent that uncertainties about availability and cost have arisen, especially in the case of energy minerals.Minerals have acquired a new dimension for governments as the availability of these resources is interwoven with the ability of governments to achieve their developmental goals on national and international levels. Accordingly, the supply of minerals will increasingly be affected by social and political factors.

Jan 1, 1986

I have spent most of the past 35 years working as an economic geologist in the area of exploration and development of base and precious metals. Most of this period has been as an employee of Trans-National-Corporations (TNC's). I presently act as a consulting geologist to a joint venture company, bringing together two such TNC's: Anglo American Corporation and affiliated companies De Beers (Diamonds) and Minorco (Metals mining outside of Southern Africa), and Normandy Mining Limited ofAustralia. Normandy is presently through its gold arm PosGold, Australia's largest gold miner and Anglo American can claim to be the world's largest gold company producing over 280 tonnes of gold a year, more than twice its nearest rival Gold Fields of South Africa. In addressing this topic, the role that Government can, and should play in mineral development, I will be drawing heavily on some examples from these and other TNC's experience in recent offshore mining investment.

Jan 1, 1995

By Van Dusen M

The involvement of concerned parties in all aspects of the Lihir Project from an early stage has promoted good relations between all groups. Activities involving landowners, the Lihir community, the New Ireland Provincial Government (NIPG) and the prospective developer include the Lihir Liaison Committee, Lihir Working Group, Environmental Planning Committee, Provincial Mining Task Force and the Lihir Mining Area Landowners Association (LMALA). With modifications, the Lihir Liaison model may be of use in promoting good relationships among parties in other mineral developments.

Jan 1, 1991

"Lax, misguided, and dangerous" is Rep. James Santini's description of the official US position on strategic nonfuel minerals. Santini (D-NV), chairman of the House Mines and Mining Subcommittee, criticized the Interior Department for "its long record of benign neglect" regarding the domestic minerals crisis. Santini made his remarks at a news conference at the American Mining Congress convention in San Francisco, where he released his subcommittee report "US Minerals Vulnerability: National Policy Implications." The report-said to be the first major congressional study of the minerals issue by a committee of jurisdiction is the result of a two-year inquiry. The investigation was undertaken, according to the chairman, "because no person or agency in the executive branch of government fully grasps the critical importance of nonfuel minerals to the nation's economy, defense, and quality of life." The report also urges a larger role for the Department of Defense, which has "stood passively by for many years as a consuming by-stander," according to the report. President Carter's incomplete Non-fuel Minerals Policy Review also drew the committee's ire; Santini calls it "a tragic waste that cost tax-payers $3.5 million and the loss of some 13,000 person-days." The subcommittee examined the following issues for its report: • The US minerals industry's inability to meet national raw material needs under a "hodgepodge of contradictory, restrictive, and irrational" federal regulations; • Dependency on foreign sources of strategic minerals in times of "increasing resource nationalism" and "Soviet mineral expansionism;" • National security needs for foreign mineral resources that do not have effective substitutes; • The US government's approach to national minerals policy "amid a growing realization that such a policy does not exist." The subcommittee report includes an analysis of public and private studies on nonfuel minerals and discusses a series of policy problem areas that negatively affect domestic production. Capital formation disincentives, tax policies, antitrust enforcement, environmental laws, health and safety regulations, technical problems, and restricted access to federally-controlled public lands contribute to what Santini calls a "tragic irony." "The irony is that we are a nation vastly rich in mineral resources yet our own government chooses to stifle development of these critical raw materials and thereby increase offshore reliance. The tragedy is that we also are ensuring US vulnerability to severe economic dislocations and a weakening of our national security." In just six years, from 1973-1978, the US trade deficit in nonfuel minerals rose from $2 billion per year to $8 billion, according to the report. The country imports more than 50% of 23 critical minerals, including 100% of its manganese, chromium, cobalt and platinum. The US is promoting its dependence on foreign mineral sources at the very time the security of many of those sources is becoming less certain, the report notes. Santini said the subcommittee investigation revealed a vulnerability that may be more serious and pervasive than that of foreign oil. The US may be able to develop alternate energy resources, but there are no effective substitutes for many nonfuel minerals. The report also discloses that US stockpiles of critical and strategic minerals are of inadequate supply and quality. Holdings of some vital minerals are far below present objectives, and for some there are no holdings at all, according to Santini. To resolve the current crisis, the report makes the following recommendations: • Complete immediately President Carter's Interagency Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review; • Implement (throught the Interior Department) the 1970 Mining and Minerals Policy Act; • Create an Office of Energy and Minerals with the same stature, power, and oversight responsibilities as the Council on Environmental Quality; • Ease federal restrictions on mineral exploration and development on public lands and implement a complete review of public land use policies; •Fund for and fulfill US nonfuel minerals stockpiling objectives; •Increase federal funding for non-

Jan 11, 1980

By G. R. Mansfield

THE third year of Government exploration f or potash by the U. S. Geological Survey and-the U. S. Bureau of Mines under the authorization of the act approved June 25, 1926 (Public 424-69th Cong.) is drawing to a close. The results thus far obtained are thought to be sufficiently interesting and satisfactory to justify the presentation of a brief preliminary account of the work. REVIEW OF EARLIER EXPLORATION The general geologic similarity of the Permian basin of Texas and New Mexico to the potash field of Germany had long ago suggested the possibility of the presence of potash salts somewhere in that basin, but petroleum exploration was then making little headway there and the necessary data could not be obtained. The discovery by Udden in 1912 of potash in brine from the Spur well in Dickens County, Texas, was the first direct evidence of its presence. In 1915-17 the U. S. Geological Survey drilled a test well with standard tools at Cliff side near Amarillo, but failed to find potash. Nevertheless, an observer has been kept in the field, at first in cooperation with the Texas Bureau of Economic Geology but since 1922 by the Survey alone, to `secure data and samples from oil and gas tests. Since the discovery of oil in Reagan County in 1923 exploration by drilling has been rapidly extended to many parts of western Texas and southeastern New Mexico. The identification of the potash-bearing mineral polyhalite was first announced by the Geological Survey in June, 1921, the material having come from cuttings from the Bryant well in Midland County and the Burns well in Dawson County, Texas. Successive discoveries and announcements of similar purport aroused widespread interest in potash exploration, which culminated in the action by Congress already noted.

Jan 1, 1929

By David E. Jones, Dean K. Hunt, C. Y. Chen

INTRODUCTION Of all the numerous geological hazards that threaten the well-being of urban areas in the United States, probably none is so widespread, persistent, and diversified as surface subsidence (HRB-Singer, Inc., 1977). Simply defined, subsidence is the vertical displacement or sinking of the ground surface caused by either natural phenomena or man's activities. The downward movement, however, can be accompanied by horizontal movement, strain, tilt and even by a locally upward movement. Damage to structures and the environment can result from any of these movements. Extracting subsurface materials, fluids and solids, accounts for most man-induced subsidence in the United States. Among all the mining-related subsidences, the collapse of voids created by underground coal mining has been the major cause in inflicting surface damage (Comptroller General of the United States, 1979). Subsidence from coal mining may occur within a few weeks or be delayed for years, depending upon the mineral layer's depth below the surface, the overlying rock strata's characteristics, the extent and methods of mining that were employed, and the time deterioration of pillar and mine structure. Unless underground resources are not mined or control measures are implemented to prevent or minimize damage, some degree of surface subsidence and its accompanied deleterious effects are often inevitable. The ways to control the subsidence and minimize surface damage may include: 1. Precautionary measures built into new structures or surface features. 2. Preventive works applied to existing structures or surface features. 3. Mine design incorporating special underground layouts. 4. Any combination of the above measures. Upon the enactment of Public Law 95-87, the Secretary of the Interior, through the recently created Office of Surface Mining (OSM), was authorized to promulgate rules to regulate mining reclamation including subsidence control. Proposed on September 18, 1978, these rules were finalized, following public comment and hearings, on March 13, 1979, as part of the permanent regulatory program for the regulation of surface mining and reclamation operations which include the surface effects of underground mining. On January 28, 1981, Secretary Watt of the Department of the Interior issued an order to re- quire all agencies to identify with recommendations all regulations which are believed to be excessive, burdensome or counterproductive. Also on February 17, 1981. President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12291 requiring all Federal agencies to conduct a regulatory review to make a determination that each promulgation of a regulation is clearly within the authority delegated by law and consistent with Congressional intent (Federal Register, 1981). As a result, OSM initiated the regulatory reform to revise the permanent regulatory program. Following a brief discussion of the technical aspects and the effects of subsidence on man and his environment, this paper presents a historical overview of how rules and regulations are used to govern the subsidence related problems. The development of the regulation of subsidence under Public Law 95-87, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA or the Act) are also discussed, including the new regulations being developed under the regulatory reform program. SOME TECHNICAL ASPECTS Am EFFECTS OF FINE SUBSIDENCE An extensive historical review of mining subsidence is given by Zwartendyk (1971) and Shadbolt (1978). Comprehensive technical presentations have been given by Henry (1956), King and Whetton (1957), Hall and Orchard (1963). Muller, et al. (1968). Grard (1969), Voight and Pariseau (1970). Kapp and Williams (1972), Cummins and Given (1973), Brauner (1973) , and NCB (1975). A theory of surface subsidence due to underground mining was perhaps first fundamentally stated by a French engineer, Toillez, in 1838, and formulated by a Belgian engineer, Gonot, in 1839 (Goldreich, 1913, cited by Zwartendyk, 1971). Since that time,

Jan 1, 1982

By A. Eftimie, M. Stanley

The World Bank Group (WBG) believes that extractive industries can make significant contribution to sustainable development and poverty reduction, providing that environmental, social, and corporate governance issues are properly managed. The WBG recognizes that stakeholders have legitimate concerns about the impact of extractive industries, and management proposals are built around the central theme that investments and policy advice in the extractive industries should lead to poverty reduction. To help governments create appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks, this paper focuses on the linkages between overarching policies and laws and the management / governance of extractive industries at the local communities. It encourages the use of new instruments designed to help ensure that local communities benefit from extractive industries.

Jan 1, 2005

The administration came on as a strong supporter of the mining industry in April of 1982 when President Reagan delivered his long-awaited minerals policy statement. He promised to reduce America's minerals vulnerability, and called for spending billions on meeting stockpile goals for strategic minerals, opening up federal lands for mineral exploration, elimination of barriers to deep sea mining, and regulatory relief. He defended the favorable tax incentives in the Economic Recovery Act as a stimulus to private research and development that would ensure the availability of materials essential to the nation's economy and national defense. But the administration just didn't seem to get anywhere. Congress, environmentalists, and even foreign governments fought White House-proposed legislation on all fronts, delivering the ultimate coup in forcing Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Anne Burford's resignation and the subsequent EPA staff house cleaning in early 1983. Anti-Reaganites scored victory after victory against Reagan's efforts to stimulate the minerals industry. Congress was stalemated on so many mining-related issues that not much was done either for or against the industry. And the US was not to get its way on the issue of sea mining either. Most of Reagan's mineral policy objectives failed to be met. Three months after the National Materials and Minerals Program Plan was presented and the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment was made its coordinator, the head of the Cabinet Council James Watt blamed lack of progress in reviving the mining industry and creating a better strategic stockpile on the weak economy and the House of Representatives, which repeatedly thwarted efforts to open wilderness lands to mining. Congress The 97th Congress spent much of its time saying no in 1982-to the Reagan administration's deep cuts in energy and environment programs, to major changes in clean air and water laws, to oil and gas leasing in wilderness, and to killing the Department of Energy. Most of 1982 (and 1981) was spent in heated budget disputes. Some things that did not happen: • The administration and industry failed to get changes in controls of hazardous air pollutants and sulfur dioxide emissions that are implicated in the phenomenon known as acid rain. Industry had wanted to relax requirements for new industries building in clean air regions where the air act demands prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) of air quality, and to relax requirements tightening up the regulation of emissions of hazardous air pollutants. The air battle is expected to continue on five major fronts-acid rain, hazardous air pollutants, PSD, automobile pollution, and nonattainment. • Regulatory reform legislation to overhaul the way government carries out the law died a slow death last year. Business groups and the administration said federal agencies should be required to consider cost-effective measures of reaching regulatory objectives of protecting public health, safety, and the environment. Opponents, including environmentalists, feared such action would delay, weaken, or scuttle important regulations. • Congress turned thumbs down several times on proposals for oil and gas leasing in wilderness but could not agree on any new wilderness recommendations (see The Wilderness Battle). • Congress refused to open the door to the Reagan administration's plan to raise up to $4 billion a year from sales of federal lands. The administration identified surplus and excess federal lands, mostly obsolete buildings or isolated tracts of land, that could be sold by the General Services Administration (GSA) to help out the federal budget deficit. Congress took no action. Some things that did happen: • Congress extended the Defense Production Act (DPA) for six months through March 1983 without changing the 32-year-old law. That came after it failed to resolve sharp differences over proposals for critical minerals programs. Differences concerned both the amount of funds and the scope of programs that would be authorized under the DPA's Title III. Some proponents pressed for $5 billion in funding for loan guarantees or purchase commitments to spur domestic production of minerals such as cobalt. Other members of Congress wanted smaller amounts of funding, and the Reagan administration, until about November, had opposed any use of federal funds for strategic mineral programs. These measures were certain to come up again before the DPA extension expired in March. • House supporters of the Critical Materials Act of 1982 were unable to come up with the twothirds majority needed to pass the bill, so it died on the House floor in December. The bill proposed that a council be established with responsibility for coordinating federal materials research and development. The administration opposed the council creation contending that the Cabinet Council

Jan 5, 1983

By H. S. Marshall

Optimum Colliery is an opencast strip mine producing 18Mt of bituminous coal per annum for the export and inland markets as well as for domestic power generation at the Hendrina PowerStation. Coal is exposed by four 60m3 and four 11m3 walkingdraglines and transported from the open cuts to the processing plants by twelve 130 ton coal haulers. Overburden and interburden areas are drilled by nine 250mm-diameter rotary drill rigs. Until 1997 all surveying tasks were conducted by electronictotal stations requiring accurate control points from which line-of-sight XYZ readings could be taken. In 1997 a GPS system was introduced which consisted of a fixed base station and two rovers. The rovers were able to perform most of the survey tasks assigned to total stations. In addition, two overburden drills were equipped with blasthole drill navigation systems, which includes the drill monitoring and material (strata) recognitions system. The rest of the drilling fleet will also be equipped with GPS systems. Blasthole positions are designed in the office based on survey and geological/geophysical information and transmitted via radio link to an industrial PC on the drills. Together with GPS positional data, both the planned and actual drill positions are displayed on an LCD screen. This eliminates the need for surveyed hole positions to be staked before drilling, and for actual hole positions to be surveyed after drilling. As holes are drilled, performance and rock property data transmitted back to the office. Future applications will include GPS monitoring of dragline positions and pad elevations. GPS receivers on the draglines will utilize the existing base station to calculate and transmit XYZ co-ordinates. Another application will be locating of boreholes in the field prior to the pumping of specified explosive charges into the blastholes. Charging instructions for each blasthole will be loaded into the computer on the explosives truck which will be equipped with a GPS system for hole identification.

Jan 1, 1998