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By Douglas F. Stevenson

Your committee doesn't assign any easy topics to us speakers. How do you define "successful" in what is essentially a losing game? I am reminded of the fellow who returned from a one-week vacation in Las Vegas, and proudly stated, "I only lost $150." To him, that was "success." I am afraid that workers' compensation is a losing game for employers, too, and success has to be defined in terms of how much or how little is lost. We have no chance of producing a profit for our employer. We will narrow down to some suggestions about conducting a workers' compensation program at the plant level, but first I want to discuss the general legal, social and legislative climate in which your plant program operates. Workers' compensation is a statutory program with its general parameters established by the legislature. These parameters are then amplified by the boards and commissions established to administer workers' compensation. What influences the legislature and the boards and commissions as they establish the framework in which we must function?

Jan 1, 1986

By James S. Graham

Research at the University of Colorado on southern pine and Douglas-fir piling has determined that the existing building code design stress values of 1200 psi and 1250 psi, as determined by ASTM D-2899, are substantiated; but testing procedures should be revised. All full size piling tests should be standardized at 1/d ratios of 2:1, or confined tests performed. Also, it has been determined that theoretical design values for timber piling should not be based on the lumber criteria of D-245 and D-2555, but instead should follow the pattern set by engineers in the utility industry for timber poles, in accordance with ANSI 05.1.

Jan 1, 1986

By Michel L. Bilodeau, Brian W. Mackenzie, Dallas W. Davis

"The paper formulates an evaluation procedure for examining the effects of location on the economics of developing mineral deposits. This methodology is applied to assess locational aspects of Nova Scotia's competitive position f or mine development relative to other Canadian regions and provinces. The appraisal concerns two representative mine development opportunities, a medium-size open-pit tungsten deposit, and a small underground gold deposit. The influence of regional economic conditions is initially assessed. Then, the consequences of taxation are isolated. Finally, the combined impact of regional and taxation conditions is examined. SettingThe economic potential of mining may be assessed in a number of ways. One approach, increasingly used for both corporate planning and government policy purposes, is to evaluate the competitive position of an actual or potential mineral producer in the international marketplace relative to other suppliers.Such examinations of competitive position vary from cost league comparisons of breakeven costs for operating mines, through the assessment of medium-term costs associated with developing new mine capacity, to long-term evaluations of the economics of mineral supply from the start of exploration. The complexity of the analysis increase s with the scope and timeframe of interest. Many factors are involved. One component of competitive position is the quality of the mineral resources available. Other key factors include existing technology, wage and salary rates, labour productivity, the cost of capital, infra structure requirements, distances from sources of materials supply an d to mineral markets, management attributes, organizational efficiency, government mineral policies (particularly taxation), and inflation and exchange rates. The paper fits within this competitive position framework.The variable economic conditions which exist within Canada have a direct bearing on the viability of mine development and, thereby, on mineral exploration potential. The paper examines locational aspects of Nova Scotia 's competitive position."

Jan 1, 1986

By I. A. Tinto

"Labrador City is located in the southwestern portion of Newfoundland-Labrador, approximately 965 kilometers north-east of Montreal. The mine and beneficiation complex of the Iron Ore Company of Canada, known as the Carol Project, is situated 535 metres above sea level in a climatic region characterized by cold winters and short, cool summers.HistoryThe Iron Ore Company of Canada commenced work in the area in 19 4 9' however, it was not until 1958 that the decision was made to proceed with mining operations. The ore body consists of Specular Hematite (Fe203) and Magnetite (Fe304) with small quantities of Limonite and Geothite. The average grade of the ore bodies is 39% iron.The mining facilities, crushing plant, and concentrator were in operation by the early part of 1962. In the summer of 1961, a decision was made to build a pelletizing plant adjacent to the concentrator. This plant was designed, erected and placed in operation during 1962 and the first half of 1963. Since the completion of the pelletizing plant, additional expansions to both the pellet plant and concentrator have taken place in 1967 and 1973. Today, the Carol Project has the capacity to produce 20 million tonnes of concentrate from which 10.5 million tonnes of pellets can be produced.The period 1980-85 spans a period of energy crisis, world-wide recession, and a consequent re-structuring of the North American steel industry as it struggles to survive in an arena of excess world steel making capacity, government subsidized industries, and the increasing competition from overseas and from developing countries.The media headlines over the past few years echo the woes of the industry and the strategy plans for survival of the fittest. Today's buzz words are foreign competition, steel import quotas, joint ventures, employee participation, work rules, quality, productivity, and state of the art technology."

Jan 1, 1986

In Australia we usually define "resource" in purely material terms, and rarely relate it to intellect and human capacity. We look at the sheer abundance of our natural resources and are satisfied with the feeling that we don't really need-to rely on using our brains. Certainly our country is fortunate to have the mineral resources it does, but in many ways Australia's worst enemy is its "lucky country" syndrome because we tend to underutilise the great resource we have in the capacities of our people. Raw material exports will undoubtedly continue to contribute a major share of our export revenue, but to harness the riches our country has to offer most effectively we need the vision and planning necessary to bring together our material and human resources. There is a need not only to find, exploit and process our minerals economically, but to turn as much of our mineral wealth as possible into high value products before it leaves the country. In particular we must use our brainpower if we want to maximise economic benefit from and political influence over the strategic minerals which leave our shores. In the past we have been successful in finding and exploiting minerals because our mining industry has been in the forefront of private sector research and development. But if Australia is to have an advantage over other mineral rich countries in insulating itself from the effects of cyclical swings in commodity prices, then the future of the industry must lie even more in technological sophistication rather than depending. on such considerations as size and location of mineral deposits. To survive, our mineral industry must have the foresight and resourcefulness to make its own luck. There are two keys to increased efficiency in exploration and production and in further processing methods: enhancement of the skills of the workforce and continual improvement of R&D.

Jan 1, 1986

By Martinick WG

In July 1986, Cable Sands (W.A.) Pty Ltd commenced mining for mineral sands at Minninup, approximately 16 km south of Bunbury, Western Australia.The area being mined is from the heel of the foredune to the rear of the hind-dune. The vegetation is mostly native vegetation with some old degraded pasture.The mining operation will be by suction cutter dredge, with continuous dredging, mineral separation and re-depositing of the sand.

Jan 1, 1986

The first grant of land rights in Australia was pursuant to the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976. That Act has been at the core of the dispute between land rights and miners' rights. The mining industry believes that the Act, in giving a right of veto to Aborigines with respect to exploration and mining on Aboriginal land, has been responsible for a stagnation in exploration amd mining activity in the Northern Territory. In February 1985 the Commonwealth Government released for public comment its preferred model for national land rights legislation. The model has been opposed by the mining industry because it believes, first, that land rights is a matter which should be left to the States and, secondly, that the detailed mechanisms contained in the model constrain the industry in the manner of the Northern Territory legislation. Aboriginal leaders have opposed the model because it does not, in their view, measure up to undertakings given by the Commonwealth Government and, in addition, it provides for amendments to the Northern Territory legislation which are likely to result in the loss of the Aboriginal veto right. Are land rights and miner's rights compatible? The answer is yes provided all parties, including Governments, are prepared to talk and compromise and Governments recognise that the grant of land rights and any control by the Aboriginal people of exploration and mining on their land is not a substitute for raising the living standards of Aborigines as a significant group of disadvantaged Australians.

Jan 1, 1986

By D. L. Blakeman, Trimble. J. W., S. W. Banning

Noranda's Grey Eagle mine and mill, in the Siskiyou Mountains of northern California, began shakedown operations in the late fall and early winter of 1982. This paper describes some of the unique features in mineralogy, milling, and water treatment operation at Grey Eagle. In addition, major start-up problems in the mill and water treatment plant are discussed along with measures taken to correct these problems.

Jan 1, 1986

By R. Q. Phillips

INTRODUCTION Since Canada commenced sulphur exports in the early 1960's, the volume of exports has grown steadily and by 1984 Canadian sulphur accounted for 45% of internationally traded sulphur. In 1984 a total of 7.6 million tonnes of Canadian sulphur was shipped to offshore markets and the U.S.A. Total shipments, including domestic sales, were 8.3 million tonnes. With a production of some 5.6 million tonnes, inventory was drawn down by nearly 3 million tonnes in order to keep pace with demand. Since 1979, world consumption has exceeded total world production and Canadian sulphur inventory has played a truly crucial role in balancing world supply and demand. Consequently, by the end of 1984 the Canadian inventory, which stood at 21 million tonnes in 1978, had been almost halved to 12 million tonnes. This inventory, however, is still by far the largest in the world and will continue to play a vital role in the world supply until expected depletion around 1990. Canada is the world's second largest producer of sulphur following the U.S.A.. The Current production level of between 5 and 6 million tonnes per annum is forecast to be maintained to 1990 with only a marginal fall in that production level in the following decade to the year 2000. This will ensure that Canada retains its position as one of the largest producers and most important suppliers of sulphur in the world market well into the future. CANADA AS WORLD SUPPLIER OF SULPHUR Since Canada commenced sulphur exports in the early 19601s, exports have grown steadily. (Figure 1) The rate of growth accelerated in recent years and in 1984 a total of 7.6 million tonnes was sold for export, compared to 3.0 million tonnes in 1975 and less than 1 million tonnes in 1964. World trade in sulphur also increased during this period, from 11 million tonnes in 1975 to 17.0 million tonnes in 1984 (Figure 2). Most of this increase in volume was accounted for by Canada and Poland. As a result, the importance of Canada as world supplier expanded from 28% in 1975 to 45% in 1984. The markets for Canadian sulphur can be divided into two broad categories, i.e., solid and liquid (Figure 3). The solid market is the largest, taking about 70% of Canadian output, virtually all of which is sold offshore. The U.S.A. and the Canadian domestic market take about 20% and 10% respectively, in liquid form. In 1984, (figure 4) total Canadian sulphur sales exceeded 8 million tonnes with offshore export sales at a record 5.8 million tonnes and sales to the U.S. of 1.8 million tonnes. Domestic sales accounted for only 0.7 million tonnes. The general trend for offshore export sales has been upward whereas there has been relative stability in domestic sales. The exceptional growth in offshore sales in the 1970's necessitated considerable capital investments by the industry in order to establish a logistics system capable of handling increasing offshore tonnages. Over 50 sulphur plants are currently operating in Alberta and British Columbia. Some of these are connected by rail, (Figure 5) the balance being generally connected by road. There are currently fourteen of the larger rail-connected plants designated as export plants, and these are equipped with sulphur forming facilities. The long distances between these plants and tidewater terminals in Vancouver is a very significant factor in complex logistics of Canadian offshore sulphur exports (Figure 6). Alberta and B.C. plants are located an average of 1,400 kilometers from tidewater.

Jan 1, 1986

Australia as a leading producer of mineral sands has also occupied a leading position in many areas of research'in the processing and applications of these minerals. Research in upgrading ilmenite to produce synthetic rutile has resulted in the develop- ment of many processes, e.g,., Becher, Murso, Chlorine Technology, and ICI processes. Studies on the reducibility of ilmenites, aqueous leaching of reduced ilmenites, Fe-Ti-O system, leachability of natural and treated ilmenites in hydrochloric acid and selective chlorination of iron from ilmenites have been carried out in order to develop and improve the efficiency of the above processes. While research on the processing of zircon sand to produce high purity (99.99% ZrO2 zirconia powder and zirconium chemicals started only recently, research by CSIRO in the early 1970s led to the discovery of the phenomenon of transformation toughening in partially stabilized zirconia (PSZ) ceramics. Australia, with very significant resources of lanthanide-containing ores, pro- duces substantial quantities of monazite each year but research in processing and appli- cations of rare earths was neglected in recent years in this country. However, research to improve processes for the recovery of rare earths is now under way and studies on the production and testing of Nd-B-Fe magnets which are 1.5-2 times stronger than the strongest magnets (Sm-Co) currently available, have also commenced.' An overview of the research in the pro- cessing and applications of mineral sands during the last two decades in Australia and its implications for the industry are pre- sented in the paper.

Jan 1, 1986

International tenders for contract mining opportunities require the Contractor to make an assessment of risk for an operation with a life span of up to twenty-five years usually based on data made available by the Client. This paper seeks to address how the Contractor assesses the data and quantifies the risks associated with the project. The areas of risk are common to most projects, but in the--Lontractor's case, risk assessment is carried out on the Client's data base and within a compressed time frame of usually less than six months. Incorporation of that risk assessment into the contract documentation is also discussed. Practical examples are given in a number of areas.

Jan 1, 1986

By P. D. Waters

"Mineral deposits are where you find them; they have no allegiance to territorial boundaries. Over the past decade much of the new investment in mining has been outside of continental North America, let alone Canada. The larger Canadian Banks have pursued this offshore business through their multi-national organizations; this reflects both the increasingly international orientation of today's business environment, and to a degree, the competitive advantage of these offshore developments.The current oversupply situation in mineral markets and the increasing maturity of the Developed World Economy reduces the need for new mining projects relative to growth' in GNP. Those that are brought on stream in the future due to their competitive advantage, will continue to be pursued by lenders and equity investors alike. IntroductionProspects facing those who search for mineral wealth were described rather well more than 200 years ago by a Scottish professor of moral philosophy, who also happens to be the father of modern economics.In search for new mines, Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nations, ""there seems to be no certain limits either to the possible success or to the possible disappointment of human industry"".How true that statement remains today, where we are seeing economic cyclical problems compounded by basic fundamental structural change within the mining industry.Despite the enormous advances in earth sciences during the past two centuries, the rewards of mineral exploration still remain uncertain. Even though a promising orebody is found, ultimate profitability may still depend on the vagaries of the marketplace, where large and unanticipated changes in supply, demand and prices can play havoc with the best of calculations.The Canadian mining industry has had its share of disappointment during the past few years, with savage competition, shrinking demand, declining prices, and disappearing profits. But it has also had some share of success, such as at Hernlo, which now seems certain to provide some of the lowest cost gold production in the world"

Jan 1, 1986

By Lawrence S. O’Rourke

Pricing for tantalum raw materials experienced explosive increases in the period 1978-1979, and-similar declines over 1980-1982. The causes for this are examined. Negative effects on the industry are highlighted. Analysis is provided of subsequent structural changes within the industry which minimize probability of future pricing excursions. Data on markets, sources of material, and outlines of concentration and extractive processes are reviewed. The conclusion is reached that expanded sources, future flat demand, and a broader international base of industry participants are principal forces in this restructure. Flat demand is reviewed as a function of increasing application of tantalum, but in more cost effective forms. This is driven by technical advance, notably in electronics applications.

Jan 1, 1986

By Ted Schwinden

It's my pleasure to welcome the Rocky Mountain Coal Institute to Montana. Now that you've ended a 74 year history of meeting outside our borders, I hope you'll be back more often. Even if I can't convince you to come back before 2060, when another 74 years will be up, I'm confident the Kalispell and Flathead Lake area will do the persuading for me. In recent weeks, I've made a number of speeches around the state pointing out just how wrong the revenue projections in Montana's state government made in April of '85 were when we came to April of '86. Since the middle of this month, Montana's legislators have been in Helena struggling to balance a state budget that, by the end of fiscal year '87, threatened to be some $88 million in the red. Other western states reliant on natural resource and agricultural economies have found themselves caught in the same deflationary spiral. The "window of opportunity" I proposed and the 1985 Montana Legislature passed, couldn't have been opened at a more difficult time. What was envisioned as an incentive to expand Montana's coal production, and our tax base, ran aground on low oil prices and excess hydroelectric power. De- spite the one-third severance tax rebate offered on new coal production, year-to-date figures published in the June 2nd Coal Week show that production in Montana is down almost 10 per- cent from last year. Again, we're not alone. Production in Wyoming is down 8 percent and in North Dakota, it has dropped 13 percent. An over- all 3 percent production decline in western states looks even worse when contrasted against a 12 percent increase for your eastern competitors. Montana's "window of opportunity" had the potential to be a significant signal to your industry. That potential was quickly tempered by the inability of Arab nations to stabilize world energy prices. If any of us had forgotten, the last twelve months have reminded western states that the well-being of our natural resource economies has a tremendous impact on the ability of all levels of government to provide services. The past year has also driven home that in the world of business and in the business of the world, risk-taking is still the name of the game. The Western Governors recognize the problems facing this industry - and our states - and we're prepared to fight for the future of western coal. In the past two decades, legitimate environmental concerns have created a vast body of new legislation affecting coal producers. The industry has been required to meet new reclamation standards - tough regulations relating to ground water, air quality and wildlife habitat. To the industry's credit, coal companies have hired professionals with the technical know-how to do it right. Rather than considering reclamation laws to be an unreasonable burden, today's coal company is more likely to view its reclamation efforts as a source of corporate pride. In a sense, the industry and the agencies which regulate it have matured together . . . although at times OSM is reluctant to admit that either of us capable of or willing to play by the rules. Certainly some abuses exist and OSM's oversight has been helpful in ensuring parity between those states willing to comply and those that would rather defy federal law. Nonetheless, penalizing the more modem and responsible western coal industry for abuses that occur elsewhere is both unfair and counterproductive. Federal penalties range from "cruel and unusual" reporting requirements to the proposed electricity tax that would effectively force utilities and ratepayers who have already met the sulphur emission standards to subsidize those who have dodged their cleanup responsibilities. As a member of the Alliance for Acid Rain Control, I have joined corporate leaders, academicians, environmental representa-

Jan 1, 1986

By Brian W. Mackenzie

The paper addresses five questions concerning the economic of gold exploration in the western Canadian shield. Can historical footprints be used to project future gold prices for exploration planning? Experience suggests that gold price forecast are too clo ely tied to current market events to provide meaningful guidelines. What range of breakeven gold price will typically be required to ju tify gold exploration in Canada? Minimum price requirements. initially asses ed at $540 to $1080 per ounce, probably lie in the range of $480 to $760 per ounce (expressed in 1985 Canadian dollar). Within Canada, what role do regional conditions and taxation policies play in determining the viability of prospective gold exploration targets? Striking interprovincial differences are found to exist, given the same geological circum tance -Nova Scotia, ew Brunswick, and Quebec rank towards the top in term of motivating exploration, Briti h Columbia provides the least investment incentive, while Saskatchewan and Manitoba place around the middle of the Canadian league. How can minimum acceptable tonnage-grade conditions for gold targets in the western shield be established and, then, constructively applied to provide exploration planning guidelines? Minimum target conditions, realis tically defined in terms of a broad band of doubt, can be used judiciously to help balance the direct costs of uneconomic exploration with the opportunity costs associated with rejecting economic deposits. How does the average cost per ounce of gold discovered in the western shield compare with the overall Canadian experience? Average discovery costs for the we tern shield, apprai ed at $100 per ounce, are shown to compare favourably with the Canada-wide record.

Jan 1, 1986

By Robert Macdonald, William Coombe, John F. Lewry

Gold occurrences have been known in the La Ronge Domain for many year . Mineable reserves have more recently been outlined and there is every prospect of a major gold camp being established in the domain within this decade. The La Ronge Domain lies in the Lower Proterozoic 'Trans-Hudson Orogen' and is part of a collage of Early Proterozoic crust comprising volcanoplutonic arcs, batholiths, associated volcaniclastics and volcanogenic sediments lying between the Superior Craton to the outheast and the reworked Archean basement/Aphebian cover terrain to the northwest. The domain has several lithostructural subdivisions, the most important of whjch , from a gold exploration point of view, is the Central Metavolcanic Belt. This belt is composed dominantly of a range of metavolcanic rocks and gabbroic to granitic intrusives, which geochemically resemble younger subduction-generated 'primitive' arcs developed on oceanic crust. U-Pb zircon geochronology indicates that the arc volcarusm and pre- to late-kjnematic plutonism occurred about 1890 Ma to 1850 Ma ago. The belt has an attained grade of upper greenschist to amphibolite facies and is relatively undeformed , though high strain zones occur locally. Most gold occurrences in the La Ronge Domain have been found in the Star-Waddy Lakes area of the Central Metavolcanic Belt, and in the Sulprude-MacKay Lakes area to the south which is interpreted as a tectonically dismembered part of the main belt. Both tratiformand vein-type gold occurrences are present in the domain; vein-type predominate and form nearly 90 per cent of the occurrences. The stratiform-type occurrences show a regional lithological a sociation with iron-rich sediments within proximal felsic volcanjc sequences. Some vein-type occurrences appear related to brittle fracturing associated with intrusive emplacement (the magmatic-hydrothermal "syn:' and "subvolcanic" veins) and faulting. However, most of the vein-type occurrences exhibit a spatial association with regionalscale ductile shear and other high strain zones, and were probably formed by metamorphichydrothermal processes.

Jan 1, 1986

By Wilfred P. Schmoe

Introduction An integrated oil company has two options in approaching strategic planning. It has to decide whether it is in business for the long-term. I state this in all seriousness. Those who help manage public companies have the responsibility of good stewardship of other people's money. We must decide whether continued investment in our basic business will generate a reasonable rate of return. With a world surplus of petroleum production capacity, and continuing downward pressure on prices, this question should be addressed by all oil companies. And a positive answer is not necessarily a foregone conclusion in all cases. The decision should be made based on proven competence in finding and developing petroleum reserves on a cost-competitive basis with other producers, and on a frank analysis of future prospects. This should include a realistic assessment of the projected rate of return on specific investment projects. If a company did not pass these tests, its strategy could take one of four paths. Diversification First, it could diversify. But recent history suggests that oil companies are not good at managing other businesses. Second, it could seek a buyer for its business at the optimum return for its owners. Third, it could sell its assets on a piecemeal basis. And, fourth, it could adopt a longer-range plan of self-liquidation by living off current recoverable reserves. In other words, by not investing in exploration and development, it could maximize short-term profit and pass the money back to shareholders in the form of dividends. The Conoco component of DuPont has a below-average cost of finding petroleum, a good track record of efficient production, and a full plate of projects that pass the test of return-on-investment. In short, Conoco is in business for the long-term. That fact, in itself, determines at least one key element in strategy. This is to extend the life of the petroleum reserve base while at the same time maintaining maximum efficient rates of production to provide a strong cash flow. A company that is able to maintain a strong reserve base will ultimately see the value of those reserves escalate as world oil supplies tighten. Our planners expect this tightening to occur within the next decade as demand grows and production in non-OPEC areas of the world begins to decline. An exploration program tailored to meet the requirements of reserve replacement and current production should have two basic parts. The first is relatively low-risk exploration in proven oil provinces. This is augmented by

Jan 6, 1985

By R. J. Sweigard, R. V. Ramani

G.F. Learning The paper by R.V. Ramani and R.J. Sweigard is a wonderful description of the labyrinthine web that has been spun about the mining industry by energetic bureaucrats and politicians over the past 50 years. The remedy for the problem, however, is not more of the same, but less. That may be difficult for the industry to achieve, for it is not a technical solution but a political one. And the current fervor for more detailed planning at all levels of government and private enterprise has become deeply ingrained. The authors recommend the provision of more information about mining and mineral resources to "macro" (i.e., government) land use planners. They apparently overlook, however, the already strong tendency on the part of most government land use planners to consider themselves omniscient. Thus, giving them more information about the technical problems of mining will only make them want to get more and more involved in the "micro" (private, site specific) mine development and production plans of the individual mining firm. In fact, this has already happened at all levels of jurisdiction from municipal to federal government. Examples are legion. The most effective way to ameliorate the adverse impacts of government land use planning on existing and potential mining operations is to: (1) introduce greater flexibility in the definition of land use zones by local and state governments; (2) adopt realistic and relevant ambient environmental performance standards in governing relationships between mineral land uses and concurrent or subsequent nonmining land uses; (3) allow greater leeway for economic considerations in land use decisions in contrast to the explicit legalistic approach now in vogue; (4) recognize that all minerals are not the same and that sand and gravel mining should not be treated the same as underground metal mining, coal stripping, oil field production, or in situ leaching; and (5) eliminate the notion that mining operators should be responsible for determining in detail the use of land by subsequent owners of mined land. This last bit of conventional ethic really makes no more sense than requiring the builders of every shopping center or government office complex to provide detailed plans for the use of that land when its use for shopping or government is ended. Did the builder of Ebbetts Field plan for Brooklyn after the Dodgers went to Los Angeles? Should the developer of the Bingham Pit plan for suburban Salt Lake City after the copper mining goes to Chile? The nation's mining industry must address these questions before further bankrupting itself to provide more data to planners and spending thousands of dollars per acre to create land that when reclaimed is worth only a few hundred dollars per acre. Reply by R.V. Ramani and R.J. Sweigard We thank Mr. Leaming for his valuable contribution. His views on the problems of land use planning and mineral resources are most welcome additions to our paper. As the title indicates, our paper was more concerned with the impacts of land use planning on mineral resource conservation than with the details of the planning process. On the whole, his five recommendations would be helpful for mineral resource conservation. However, we would suggest that the argument he presents for his final recommendation does not address the differences between mining as a land use and commercial or institutional uses. We believe that this difference is the crux of the issue. We share Mr. Leaming's desire to ameliorate the adverse impacts of land use planning. Possibly the most detrimental impact is the loss of mineral resources. Any development, whether mineral or community, that does not give proper consideration to other resources can result in permanent loss or sterilization of resources. With proper planning, some of these losses can be avoided. As our paper indicated, one factor that limits the consideration of mineral resources, and ultimately leads to their sterilization, is the generally inadequate levels of resource characterization and understanding of the unique nature of mineral resources and mining operations. The last point raised by Mr. Leaming is also important. In terms of reclamation and land use planning in mining districts, we certainly do not advocate spending more than what the results are worth. The main thrust of the paper was to explore the avenues for conserving the mineral resources so that, at some appropriate time, the issue of mining and reclamation can still be addressed.

Jan 4, 1985

By D. W. Gentry

Introduction Until recently, there were many jobs for mineral engineering graduates. Traditionally, minerals-related career paths available to university graduates stem from rather standard offerings in the disciplines of mining, metallurgy, petroleum, geology, geophysical engineering, and mineral economics. Within each discipline, there exists many career opportunities. In fact, until fairly recently, the most difficult decision for most graduates was choosing among all the available alternatives. Unfortunately, this relative state of euphoria changed quickly and dramatically within the minerals sector. Within two or three years, graduates from minerals-related engineering disciplines found it exceedingly difficult - and then almost impossible - to secure employment in the minerals sector upon graduation. At the same time, there were dramatic reductions in production requirements and, ultimately, mine closings. This resulted in massive layoffs and often termination of professional personnel possessing significant and valuable industrial experience. Obviously, this worsened an already bad employment picture for those hoping to begin a career in minerals. Certainly, there is no universal agreement on what the future offers for the US minerals industry or the career opportunities associated with it. However, there are a number of considerations that deserve study by students, faculty, administrators, and industrial personnel before minerals-related career paths are chosen. Where Will the Jobs Be and How Many? Everyone is aware that the minerals industry is very cyclic. It is not surprising then that job opportunities for new graduates also fluctuate. Typically, there is a two-to-four year lag between industry's engineering manpower needs and the academic community's ability to produce this talent. Due to the response lag, there will necessarily be years when supply and demand do not match. Employment Projections It is extremely difficult to anticipate what the key career paths might be within the next few years. Considerable speculation remains with respect to whether activity in the US minerals sector over the short-, intermediate-, and long-term will improve, remain status quo, or further deteriorate. However, some information pertaining to the prospects for career opportunities in mining engineering was offered by Tingley and Ghose (ME, Sept. 1983, p. 1274) from a study performed by Fenvessy and Schwab. Results from this industry-sponsored survey suggest that the US will experience 700 more mining engineers than needed in 1985, 1300 in 1990, and 1800 in the year 2000. These conclusions were based on the assumptions that future graduate levels remain flat and demand increases 3.6% annually. Educators quickly argued that depressed job markets, coupled with university student mobility, would negate the assumption of flat mining graduate levels in the immediate future. Student Mobility Student mobility from one engineering discipline to another is high. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the tremendous growth in programs such as computer engineering and computer science at the expense of enrollments in the more traditional engineering programs. The ability and willingness of students to quickly change engineering disciplines in response to existing and perceived job market demands have created significant student, faculty, and resource dislocations within universities nationwide. This has resulted in problems for university faculty and administrators responsible for effective use of

Jan 2, 1985

By William P. Lohden

INTRODUCTION It is recognized that, for a variety of reasons, some companies in the mineral industry today are by no means cash-rich and, in fact, are reporting a growing proportion of long-term debt in their capital structures. A review of recent balance sheets of small, medium-size, and some larger companies, indicates that a fair number still have substantial positions in cash equivalents such as U.S. government issues and other short-term money market instruments. In part, this paper concerns itself with companies which have sufficient cash and equivalents and/or cash generation to internally finance mining projects or expansions but which, for some reason, choose to borrow funds. Misconceptions which appear to frequently underlie so-called "leveraging" decisions are explored in this paper. Also considered arc' those circumstances under which any company, including one that is cash rich, should consider borrowing for a project in an amount beyond what would otherwise be necessary based upon its internal financing ability. I do not attempt to cover the raising of equity capital in public markets in this paper. OVERALL RETURN ON INVESTABLE CASH If you approach an individual with an investment which can be financed from savings, or by borrowing at a rate higher than one is earning on savings, that individual will quickly tell you that to pay interest at a rate higher than is being earned on savings would reduce overall income. Assuming that additional investment opportunities are not currently being considered, the individual concludes that a draw-down on savings, leaving a cushion for contingencies suited to individual circumstances, is the correct financial decision. For reasons discussed later, the simple mathematical logic leading to this conclusion tends to become obscured at the corporate level. When Leveraged Studies Are Inappropriate or Premature Surprisingly, I have heard of a number of companies that could afford to finance an investment solely with internal funds, which have made DCFROR (i.e. discounted-cash-flow rate-of-return) studies not only on a 100% equity basis but also on a leveraged basis. Certainly, a leveraged study would be appropriate if additional projects were competing for more capital than was available internally. Often, however, other projects are not far enough along to warrant a leveraged study and there is some danger that a project may be undertaken because it has an estimated acceptable rate of return, on a leveraged basis, that is not ultimately earned because some of the other projects are postponed or abandoned and borrowing is less than expected. For the above reasons, until it has been determined that (1) borrowing is a reasonable certainty for a particular project and (2) the timing and amount to be borrowed has been determined within a reasonable range of accuracy, I believe it is inappropriate and misleading to calculate DCFROR for a project other than on a 100% equity basis. Even when there are several projects currently competing for funds and borrowing will be required to finance one or more of them, using the common yardstick of calculating DCFROR on a 100% equity basis is a safer method to initially evaluate and compare the attractiveness of the projects. Many companies, whether they would have to borrow or not, will reject projects that on a 100% equity basis do not meet their minimum rate of return standards. Some companies which have to borrow will undertake a project provided the project's DCFROR on a leveraged basis meets its minimum return standards. The danger of this approach is that even moderate shrinkages of estimated cash flows could plunge return below

Jan 1, 1985