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By W. C. PAGE

AS the pioneer operation treating the mixed lead- zinc-iron ores from the district tributary to the Salt Lake Valley, the International Smelting Co.'s plant has offered an extremely interesting and instructive opportunity to study some phases of this problem. Basically, there were two main reason for our attempting to work out a successful operation for the separation and concentration of the values contained in the rather widespread deposits of these so- called lead-zinc ores. In the first place, the time was ripe and demanded some method of curtailing the economic waste resulting from the costs of past and present practice of smelting ores of this character, or rather, those ores which could stand the charges inherent with smelting them. Secondly, but rather primarily with us, we believe that such a solution would greatly in- crease in general the production of lead in the district tributary to the Salt Lake Valley. It is generally known that there were and are three relatively large lead smelting plants in the Salt Lake Valley and the decreasing production of correspondingly clean lead ores was not efficient to justify the existence of all three. We could not hope for better lead smelting metallurgy nor more efficient business management than was being practised, so the only prospect was to at- tempt to work out some way to increase the primary production and thus widen the scope of operations.

Jan 1, 1926

By HAROLD VINTON COES

THE motive for merging or consolidation today is conspicuously different from that actuating business men in the late eighties and early nine- ties. Then they combined to secure added productive capacity and to monopolize their respective industries with a view to exploiting the consumer. So flagrant were some of these cases that they brought about their own correctives via retaliation on the part of the public and the subsequent restrictive legislation and legal curbs. The objective of the present-day merger, writes W. R. Hill in Printers' Ink, December, 1927, is summarized as follows : "In the golden days when an industry was being cut to pieces, the prevailing cure was to combine. The reason for such trusts was to strangle competition and by creating a monopoly, dominate the market, raise prices, regardless of economic business methods, and simply force larger profits.

Jan 1, 1930

By Harvey S. Mudd

WHEN talking about Europe it is well to endeavor to keep politics and economics apart but they have become so intermingled in recent years that the discussion of one topic inevitably leads to the other. Economic influences formerly prevailed over politics but today national and international economies are governed by political forces. Commerce in raw materials, food, and manufactured products is now so restricted by governmental controls that the capacity of the world to produce and to consume, to exchange goods and to pay for them, cannot be gauged by the past or predicted by a multitude of experts. In prewar days there were some yardsticks but today there are none. Thus it is hazardous to make forecasts, for in all fields of human effort the world has been cast upon an uncharted sea.

Jan 1, 1947

By Harold G. Moulton

IT is highly significant that engineers should seriously consider the interrelations of technology, economics, and government. It is indicative of the emergence of maladjustments and problems that perplex our thinking and frustrate our activities. Instead of a world in which scientific discoveries and their applications through engineering to the processes of wealth production are regarded as the royal road to progress, we now find science and engineering being made responsible, in no small degree, for our economic and social troubles; and the powers of government are even being invoked to stem the tidal wave of technology. Indeed, there is a deep-seated fear, manifested in the writings of some of our greatest scientists as well as in popular discussions, that science may destroy our civilization.

Jan 1, 1938

By Arthur La Motte

I NDUSTRIAL explosives, as distinguished from military explosives, include high explosives and blasting powder. The high explosives which are best known are straight dynamite, gelatin dynamite, ammonia dynamite and permissibles. There are two kinds of blasting powder, saltpetre blasting powder and nitrate of soda blasting powder. Blasting powders are mechanical mixtures of nitrate of potash or nitrate of soda with sulfur and charcoal, highly compressed, granulated and glazed. They ignite from a spark and burn with relative slowness, the rate of burning and hence the rate of conversion into gases depending upon the size of the granulation and upon the degree of. confinement under which the powder is placed. High explosives, on the other hand, are chemical compounds which detonate; that is, when the explosive is subjected to a violent shock, provided in practice by a blasting cap or an electric blasting cap, the molecule of the essential ingredient, usually nitroglycerin, is disrupted and the energy and heat released cause any other explosive ingredients which may be present, such as ammoniuin nitrate or T.N.T., to decompose with a resultant evolution of gases at an extremely rapid rate varying from 6000 to 20,000 ft. per second.

Jan 1, 1924

By Cornelius F. Kelley

DURING the war, events moved with unprecedented rapidity. Situations, industrial, economic and financial, arose over night that stressed to the uttermost the ingenuity and ability of those who dealt with them. It was essentially a time demanding action rapid and concentrated, and not one for discussion, either academic or polemic. As a result, matters of importance were necessarily transacted without the desirable opportunity being afforded of enabling a general understanding to be gained as to the relative merit or demerit involved, and in some instances, legislation essential to enable the consummation of an important matter was passed without attracting the public attention then deeply engrossed in the larger aspects of the situation. The result was that so long as the public mind was occupied, little or no concern was given to questions that ordinarily would have invited immediate attention; and in some instances, only when as an aftermath of war a particular subject has become a matter of discussion, criticism not altogether fair is made without first obtaining accurate knowledge as to the conditions that prevailed, the purpose sought to be accomplished, or the results obtained by the action taken.

Jan 1, 1921

By James R. Finlay

SOMETIMES the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers appears to be a strictly technical society, and if so my paper should deal with the technical operations of finding and producing gold. But I have not been engaged in practical gold mining since 1910. What I have been doing mainly for the last 25 years is to try to figure out what the income of a mine-gold, or any other-would be worth to an investor. So I have been in contact with gold mining, in one way or another, for some 42 years. I say that with a purpose. In that time the industry has been through one of its cycles. The value of gold mines is very dif¬ferent at different points in one of these cycles. For this reason the cycle of gold mining is a highly practical study. The cycle of gold is a more or less rhythmical change in its value or purchasing power measured in the grand average of other commodities, which is the same thing as its price. Taking the price of gold in 1897 as a stand¬ard, a dollar at that time declined to 55c. in 1913, to 26.8c. in 1920, and since then it has risen to 47.4c. in 1930 and to about 64c. in 1932. It is worth about 21/ times as much now as it was in 1920, but less than two¬thirds as much as in 1897. When this change is applied to the value of a gold mine still greater differences are evident. The cost of producing gold is of course measured in labor and other commodities, and as that cost goes down the margin of profit measured in the gold itself increases. Thus a mine which might make only 10 per cent profit in 1920 on its gross output may easily make 25 per cent now. The stockholder gets 2 ½ times more gold that is worth 2 1/2 times as much in purchasing power, therefore the real value of his holding has risen by the one factor multiplied by the other, giving him 61/4 times as much goods or services as he had in 1920.

Jan 1, 1933

By JAMES SCULLY

For the last 4 years political leaders have found a new subject on which they can safely generalize wihout creating opposition. That subject is commodity prices. Since the four-fold increase in OPEC crude oil prices, public attention has focussed as never before on the subject of commodity prices. To advocate stabilizing commodity prices is akin to supporting motherhood or peace or better schooling. Everyone gives lip service to the concept that stable commodity prices are desirable. It is easier to state the principle than to achieve it. Prices that are stable in terms of one currency may be clearly unstable in terms of a different currency. This has become a troublesome matter since 1971, when the world's leading trading currencies were set free to float in relation to each other. To illustrate: consider copper prices in the interval between the end of 1974 and the end of 1977. During those 3 years, the copper price in pounds sterling on the London Metal Exchange rose by 25 per cent. During that period, however, in terms of the USA dollar equivalent, the price was unchanged. And during that period, in terms of the German mark equivalent the price shrank by 13 per cent while the Japanese yen equivalent fell by 20 per cent. Thus a price that appears stable in dollars, rose in terms of pounds sterling and fell in terms of marks and yen. Had this result been achieved as a consequence of an international effort to stabilize prices, an American would have said the effort was successful. An Englishman would have said it had failed to prevent a price rise. And a German or a Japanese consumer would have been happy to have covered his copper needs at a lower cost in terms of his own currency.

Jan 1, 1978

By Simon D. Strauss

What are future prospects for U.S. mining? In many quarters the assumption is made that this country has passed its zenith as a mineral producer -- that it is in a period of decline and that it is becoming a have-not nation like Japan and much of Western Europe. These industrial rivals of ours must depend almost entirely on others for their mineral supplies. In trying to answer this question one must of course distinguish between resources and productive capacity. In today's volatile and competitive markets, the definition of what are reserves and what are merely identified resources becomes ever more difficult. Many large deposits have been found that are unlikely to be viable in the marketplace under normal conditions but that can be of significance to the nation's military and industrial security in times of emergency. I should like to draw on personal experience from World War I1 for illustration. 4fter Pearl Harbor great concern developed over the availability of a long 1ist of strategic materials for which this country was largely dependent on imports. Included were a number of minerals of which domestic deposits had been identified. Among these were chromite, manganese ore, mercury, mica and tungsten.

Jan 1, 1982

By J. Robert Van Peli

IT was a strange but highly fruitful marriage-that union of hardy explorers, seeking the rich treasures of copper in the Lake Superior wilderness, with Boston's aristocracy of brains, capital, and enterprise. This historic wedlock, which has continued happily to the present day, was the means by which the wealth of Lake Superior's copper was won for the use and benefit of an expanding America. One branch of this family tree, the western branch, begins with prehistoric Indian miners, embraces the early French explorers of the Upper Lakes, and finally includes the British and American pioneers who reduced the vague rumors of copper to known fact and actually began the mining of copper in the wilderness. The other branch, the New England line, begins

Jan 1, 1948

By AIME AIME

A PERIOD of business depression and falling prices always raises questions as to the possible responsibility of the monetary or banking system. This is natural enough, for it is agreed that the supply of money or credit is a very important factor in modern business and in prices. However, it is far from being the only important factor. One of the chief merits of the gold standard is that under its workings the supply of currency and credit is regulated automatically to the masimun extent, in- stead of by the control of any arbitrary authority. The supply of new gold comes from the mines, and mining is free. It is distributed among the countries by the currents of trade and the play of economic forces, with the general result that the distribution tends to be in accordance with the economic development of the countries and their ability to use it or command it. Inasmuch as the accumulated stock of monetary gold is very large in comparison with the annual additions, the total avail- able supply changes but little from year to year, and it may be assumed that price-changes that are properly chargeable to gold will take place gradually rather than suddenly.

Jan 1, 1930

F. E. Thompson, Pottstown, Pa.: If Mr. Webster's endeavor to open up the subject of cast-iron should prove as prolific of results as did the discussion on " The Physics of Steel," he must certainly feel richly repaid. His remarks concerning the secretiveness and conservatism of the average foundry-man recall to my mind an instance of a blast-furnace which, for the last year, has been producing much foundry-iron. The manager, believing that much more of his product could be used in the foundry than the foundry-men were will-

Jan 1, 1896

The Iron and Steel Committee of the American Institute, of mining and Metallurgical Engineers held a joint session with the American Foundrymen's Association during the Annual Meeting of the Institute in February, 1928, for the purpose of discussing blast-furnace operations and the character of pig iron and castings. Dr. Richard Moldenke presided. H.. H. Sweetser, who was named on the program as the presiding officer of the session, was unable to be present, but sent a letter in which he said: " The meeting we had here last year and the meeting held in Chicago last June showed a desire on the part of blast-furnace men and users of pig iron to get the facts regarding the influence on castings made from pig iron produced in blast furnaces under varying conditions of temperature, mixture and local furnace operations. It has been my hope that at this Round Table we might he able to formulate a series of tests that, would give us the desired information. "Several independent blast-furnace investigations have. been, and still are being, carried on in different sections of the country. The furnaces investigated include a southern furnace, a middle-west furnace, a western furnace and a Chicago district furnace. The results so far show distinct characteristics for each of the four furnaces. It is possible that a furnace in the eastern part of the United States would be different from all the others. "It is hoped that a plan of action can be worked out at your meeting today whereby the IT. S. Bureau of Mines will be able, to carry on more extensive work in connection with the research departments of the different iron and steel companies and the big consumers of pig iron. "No one group can get all of the, information but if the different investigations can be coordinated it will he possible for us to (Iran. conclusions regarding the effects of varying conditions in blast-furnace practice on the pig iron produced and the castings made there from." DISCUSSION R. Moldenke, Watehung, N. J.—I was across the -water this summer and saw some of those interested in an investigation of this kind. 'I'hey told me that in Germany, where they had a joint committee of blast-furnace operators and foundry-

By T. A. Rickard

The writing that is effective is woven with a fine texture into an agreeable pattern; it is free from knots, loose threads, and stray fluff. The instrument that weaves this literary fabric, whether it produce a homely sock or a lordly tapestry, a simple story or a learned 'Itreatise, is a disciplined intelligence, as sure as a steel needle, as precise as a swift loom. The simile breaks down at this point, for the product of the pen is instinct with the human spirit and therefore transcends in beauty anything made by a mere machine. If words are to be woven into eloquent meaning, they must be well knit. Upon the relation of words to each other and of groups of words to other groups, known as phrases, clauses, and sentences, depends the success of writing as a means of trans¬mitting thought from man' to man. To be understood beyond question, you should know not only what your words denote but how to build your sentences; you must not only choose your words aright but construct your sentences properly. A sentence is a combination of words that makes complete sense; it says something about something. ' A clause is a subordinate sentence or a sentence within a sentence. A phrase is a group of words without a predicate; it makes sense, but not complete sense. For example: I shall wait for a few minutes before I go home: The whole statement is a sentence; "I shall wait" and "before I go home" are clauses; "for a few minutes" is an adverbial phrase. The orderly arranging of words and of combinations of words is called `syntax'; and from the original Greek form, ouvaeis (suntaxis), is derived the Greek name for an editor,

Jan 1, 1931

By E. H. Burdick

THE difficulties inherent in table concentration operations as applied to gold, silver, lead and zinc ores, are accentuated in the scheelite mill, which has a flowsheet that is similar in general principles. The narrow "spread" in the specific gravity between scheelite and the usual gangue in which it occurs often makes its clean separation extremely difficult and in some cases impracticable. The problem is further complicated by the extreme friability of the mineral and its inordinate tendency to "slime," particularly where fine grinding is necessary and wet grinding methods are employed. The physical aspect of the occurrence of scheelite in the ores, the kind and character of the rock in which the mineral is present, its hardness, friability and the specific gravity of its constituents, as well as like characteristics of the associated minerals-pyrite, pyrrhotite, sphalerite, and others, all have a bearing on the successful milling of crude ores and the production of a concentrate that is marketable with minimum price penalty or none at all. Most tungsten deposits are considered low grade when the limiting factor of low percentage recovery by gravity methods is borne in mind. The great majority of deposits developed or in process of development carry from 0.4 to 1.0 per cent tungstic oxide. Ore carrying I per cent is considered good grade; 0.7 to 0.8 per cent, fair, and below that figure, low grade. Steady mill feed averaging upward of 1.0 per cent W03 is exceptional. Inasmuch as buying specifications demand a 60 per cent W03 content, the mineral content of the ores as mined must be concentrated to at least that degree. A few companies have constructed chemical plants for the treatment of their complex concentrates and low-grade flotation product, but the smaller operator must rely on table concentration, borrowing the tools and to a large extent the methods of his predecessors in the gold, silver, lead and zinc mills. Whether these are the best tools and methods that can be devised is an open question. Except in rare instances, table concentration, however carefully conducted, does not yield a satisfactory final recovery of the mineral content in headings as indicated by chemical determinations of tungstic oxide content. A saving of 60 to 65 per cent is considered fair, and an average 80 per cent recovery, exceptional. Each scheelite ore body is a separate problem. Details of handling that give best results in one case may not be successfully operative at a property on the same contact zone and but a short distance removed. Supplementary treatment of tailings by flotation may be successful in producing a low-grade concentrate of around 15 per cent WO3, which is adapted to further treatment chemically at a given property and entirely unsuccessful at another. This problem constitutes another of the unanswered questions. The following paragraphs relate solely to the beneficiation of scheelite ores by table concentration and supplementary methods.

Jan 1, 1942

By E. H. Burdick

THE difficulties inherent in table concentration operations as applied to gold, silver, lead and zinc ores, are accentuated in the scheelite mill, which has a flowsheet that is similar in general principles. The narrow "spread" in the specific gravity between scheelite and the usual gangue in which it occurs often makes its clean separation extremely difficult and in some cases impracticable. The problem is further complicated by the extreme friability of the mineral and its inordinate tendency to "slime," particularly where fine grinding is necessary and wet grinding methods are employed. The physical aspect of the occurrence of scheelite in the ores, the kind and character of the rock in which the mineral is present, its hardness, friability and the specific gravity of its constituents, as well as like characteristics of the associated mineral-spyrite, pyrrhotite, sphalerite, and others, all have a bearing on the successful milling of crude ores and the production of a concentrate that is marketable with minimum price penalty or none at all. Most tungsten deposits are considered low grade when the limiting factor of low percentage recovery by gravity methods is borne in mind. The great majority of deposits developed or in process of development carry from 0.4 to 1.0 per cent tungstic oxide. Ore carrying 1 per cent is considered good grade; 0.7 to o.8 per cent, fair, and below that figure, low grade. Steady mill feed averaging upward of 1.0 per cent WO3 is exceptional. Inasmuch as buying specifications demand a 60 per cent WO3 content, the mineral content of the ores as mined must be concentrated to at least that degree. A few companies have constructed chemical plants for the treatment of their complex concentrates and low-grade flotation product, but the smaller operator must rely on table concentration, borrowing the tools and to a large extent the methods of his predecessors in the gold, silver, lead and zinc mills. Whether these are the best tools and methods that can be devised is an open question. Except in rare instances, table concentration, however carefully conducted, does not yield a satisfactory final recovery of the mineral content in headings as indicated by chemical determinations of tungstic oxide content. A saving of 6o to 65 per cent is considered fair, and an average 80 per cent recovery, exceptional. Each scheelite ore body is a separate problem. Details of handling that give best results in one case may not be successfully operative at a property on the same contact zone and but a short distance removed. Supplementary treatment of tailings by flotation may be successful in producing a low-grade concentrate of around 15 per cent W03, which is adapted to further treatment chemically at a given property and entirely unsuccessful at another. This problem constitutes another of the unanswered questions. The following paragraphs relate solely to the beneficiation of scheelite ores by table concentration and supplementary methods.

Jan 1, 1942

By E. H. Burdick

The difficulties inherent in table concentration operations as applied to gold, silver, lead and zinc ores, are accentuated in the scheelite mill, which has a flowsheet that is similar in general principles. The narrow "spread" in the specific gravity between scheelite and the usual gangue in which it occurs often makes its clean separation extremely difficult and in some cases impracticable. The problem is further complicated by the extreme friability of the mineral and its inordinate tendency to "slime," particularly where fine grinding is necessary and wet grinding methods are employed. The physical aspect of the occurrence of scheelite in the ores, the kind and character of the rock in which the mineral is present, its hardness, friability and the specific gravity of its constituents, as well as like characteristics of the associated minerals— pyrite, pyrrhotite, sphalerite, and others, all have a bearing on the successful milling of crude ores and the production of a concentrate that is marketable with minimum price penalty or none at all. Most tungsten deposits are considered low grade when the limiting factor of low percentage recovery by gravity methods is borne in mind. The great majority of deposits developed or in process of development carry from 0.4 to 1.0 per cent tungstic oxide. Ore carrying I per cent is considered good grade; 0.7 to 0.8 per cent, fair, and below that figure, low grade. Steady mill feed averaging upward of I .o per cent WO3 is exceptional. Inasmuch as buying specifications demand a 60 per cent W03 content, the mineral content of the ores as mined must be concentrated to at least that degree. A few companies have constructed chemical plants for the treatment of their complex concentrates and low-grade flotation product, but the smaller operator must rely on table concentration, borrowing the tools and to a large extent the methods of his predecessors in the gold, silver, lead and zinc mills. Whether these are the best tools and methods that can be devised is an open question. Except in rare instances, table concentration, however carefully conducted, does not yield a satisfactory final recovery of the mineral content in headings as indicated by chemical determinations of tungstic oxide content. A saving of 60 to 65 per cent is considered fair, and an average 80 per cent recovery, exceptional. Each scheelite ore body is a separate problem. Details of handling that give best results in one case may not be successfully operative at a property on the same contact zone and but a short distance removed. Supplementary treatment of tailings by flotation may be successful in producing a low-grade concentrate of around 15 per cent W03, which is adapted to further treatment chemically at a given property and entirely unsuccessful at another. This problem constitutes another of the unanswered questions. The following paragraphs relate solely to the beneficiation of scheelite ores by table concentration and supplementary methods.

Jan 1, 1943

By E. H. Burdick

The difficulties inherent in table concentration operations as applied to gold, silver, lead and zinc ores, are accentuated in the scheelite mill, which has a flowsheet that is similar in general principles. The narrow "spread" in the specific gravity between scheelite and the usual gangue in which it occurs often makes its clean separation extremely difficult and in some cases impracticable. The problem is further complicated by the extreme friability of the mineral and its inordinate tendency to "slime," particularly where fine grinding is necessary and wet grinding methods are employed. The physical aspect of the occurrence of scheelite in the ores, the kind and character of the rock in which the mineral is present, its hardness, friability and the specific gravity of its constituents, as well as like characteristics of the associated minerals— pyrite, pyrrhotite, sphalerite, and others, all have a bearing on the successful milling of crude ores and the production of a concentrate that is marketable with minimum price penalty or none at all. Most tungsten deposits are considered low grade when the limiting factor of low percentage recovery by gravity methods is borne in mind. The great majority of deposits developed or in process of development carry from 0.4 to 1.0 per cent tungstic oxide. Ore carrying I per cent is considered good grade; 0.7 to 0.8 per cent, fair, and below that figure, low grade. Steady mill feed averaging upward of I .o per cent WO3 is exceptional. Inasmuch as buying specifications demand a 60 per cent W03 content, the mineral content of the ores as mined must be concentrated to at least that degree. A few companies have constructed chemical plants for the treatment of their complex concentrates and low-grade flotation product, but the smaller operator must rely on table concentration, borrowing the tools and to a large extent the methods of his predecessors in the gold, silver, lead and zinc mills. Whether these are the best tools and methods that can be devised is an open question. Except in rare instances, table concentration, however carefully conducted, does not yield a satisfactory final recovery of the mineral content in headings as indicated by chemical determinations of tungstic oxide content. A saving of 60 to 65 per cent is considered fair, and an average 80 per cent recovery, exceptional. Each scheelite ore body is a separate problem. Details of handling that give best results in one case may not be successfully operative at a property on the same contact zone and but a short distance removed. Supplementary treatment of tailings by flotation may be successful in producing a low-grade concentrate of around 15 per cent W03, which is adapted to further treatment chemically at a given property and entirely unsuccessful at another. This problem constitutes another of the unanswered questions. The following paragraphs relate solely to the beneficiation of scheelite ores by table concentration and supplementary methods.

Jan 1, 1943

By James H. Hance

Discussion of the paper of JAMES H. HANCE, presented at the New York meeting, .February, 1916, and printed in Bulletin No. 110, February, 1916, pp. 299 to 326. FREDERIC P. DEWEY, Washington, D. C. (communication to the Secretary*).-I wish to congratulate Professor Hance and to thank him for his extremely valuable addition to the fund of data upon this subject. It presents clearly conclusive and incontrovertible proof of the unreliability of drill samples of this class of metal for determining the value of such bullion. I am afraid, however, that his hope that some one in the mint service might continue such an investigation upon a more elaborate and exhaustive scale is, for the present at least, doomed to disappointment. As a practical matter, the mint service is not now particularly interested in segregation in crude bullion. So much trouble and friction arose, -both in the original purchase and in the transfer from one institution to another, in handling segregated bullion, that it became necessary to adopt drastic measures and now it is seldom attempted to determine the value of such bullion in the service. When bullion known or even suspected of being segregated is presented for purchase, it is at once strongly refined in the pot and the disturbing elements so far removed that concordant assays may certainly be obtained from the dip samples and a reasonably fair agreement obtained from drill samples. The mint service prefers that the owner should refine his bullion himself, but if he does not we will do it at his expense and return the slag to him when desired. Much work has been done in the mint service trying to arrive at the value of deposits of segregated bullion without strong refining. It was no unusual thing for such deposits to be melted three times at the purchasing office and to have 30 to 40 assays on the metal made before buying it. Yet when shipped to a mint it was found necessary to melt two or three times more and to make 15 to 25 assays before the mint would accept the bar, and there were considerable differences between the valuations of the two offices. In what was undoubtedly the worst case ever investigated, the purchasing office melted the deposit, 953 oz., three times, with a loss of 105.5 oz., and made 46 assays; the mint melted three times, with a loss of 6.6 oz., and made 28 assays. The mint allowed the purchasing office 1.178 oz. of fine gold more than the purchasing office claimed, while an extensive investigation of the mint samples by the Bureau, in which over 100 independent assays were made in various service laboratories, indicated that the metal carried 0.7 to 0.9 oz. more of fine gold than the mint allowed. Preliminary assays on the original metal

Jan 5, 1916

By Walter S. Lutz, J. T. Griffith

The rainfall during the last six months of 1942 in Scranton and vicinity was 24.06 in.—only 4.35 in more than the average for this district in any equivalent period—yet that rain forced The Hudson Coal Co. to handle 38.8 tons of water for every ton of coal mined. It filled to overflowing, or to a higher level, 14 flooded mine areas holding, in total volume, 8.3 billion gallons of water in storage; brought about a pumpage of 11.4 billion gallons in the months of December 1942 and January, February and March 1943 Half of the total energy generated or purchased (44,322,980 kw-hr.) was required to keep the mines sufficiently free of water to permit the mining of coal during a period of much needed output. Fig. I shows the extent to which this flooding of exhausted and idle properties has proceeded, and is known to be proceeding further, at the upper end of the Northern field. This rainfall (24.06 in.) means 80,559,444 tons of water on approximately 46.2 sq. miles of area tributary to the pumping plants. During the high rainfall period, 72,687,661 tons went underground, being pumped at the stations in this territory. This means an inflow of 88per cent, a runoff of 12 per cent compared with 64 per cent during normal conditions in a normal region. During this period no floods, either surface or underground, had to be dealt with, although the streams and rivers were high on several occasions. In general, the rainfall for the first three months of 1943 can be described as heavy but not abnormal.9 These figures not only indicate the large volumes of water to be handled but, by their very size, they also emphasize that the mine-water problem is not to be conquered, at least from an economical standpoint, by merely buying and installing more and more pumps. Into the solving of this water problem must go much planning, adhering to the principle of keeping the highest percentage of water at the highest possible level for the longest period of time; the storage of huge volumes in sumps capable of being reduced after the flood inflow and at rates less than the inflow; plans for prevention of surface inflow; provision of the minimum of pumping capacity arranged to as nearly 100 per cent pumping load factor as is possible; intercompany joint pumping plants; the conducting of water from one plant to another and from one property to another over distances measured in miles; priorities in power to the threatening situations; and. balance of the necessities and dangers existent in one colliery over another, day by day, when quantities of water are running high. Despite these astronomical figures of water volumes, their disposal to the surface is accomplished reasonably cheaply because, although the annual cost of $575,020 is a large sum, the cost per ton is about 0.1168 cents. Credit for this goes

Jan 1, 1947