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By R. A. Jankowsi, S. K. Ruggieri

Airborne respirable dust levels on longwalls can be reduced if operators approach the dust control problem in a logical and fundamental manner. This can be accomplished through the proper application and continued use of effective dust control techniques. The Bureau of Mines is currently assessing the effectiveness of longwall dust control techniques in use today to provide mine operators with guidelines for selecting the most appropriate control technology. This paper presents a fundamental approach to the problem of shearer dust control. Three dust control techniques to be discussed are: deep cutting/increased pick penetration for reducing the amount of respirable dust generated; drum water sprays/improved water supply system to suppress the amount of airborne respirable dust; and improved external water spray system, the "shearer-clearer," to push the dust close to the face. The techniques have been evaluated in field trials and have been shown to be both practical and effective in applications to control shearer generated dust.

Jan 6, 1985

By William A. Griffith

The recent recession has severely impacted the performance and results of virtually all of our natural resource companies. The depressing climate continues to linger and recovery maybe sometime away. Problems remain for resource companies in the steel and petroleum industries as well as the mining business. In February, at the AIME Annual Meeting in New York, an All-Institute session presented a variety of views on the situation. A. T. Yu, chairman of ORBA Corp., Mountain Lakes, NJ, organized presentations by top management personnel of four natural resource companies. This well attended session heard management strategems for the present and views for the future. A compilation and synthesis of these presentations, gathered by Dr. Yu, are presented here for ME readers. Leading off will be William A. Griffith, president and chief executive officer of Hecla Mining Co., Wallace, ID. Other speakers presented here include Wilfred P. Schmoe, executive vice president of Du Pont Co., Wilmington, DE; Frank W. Luerssen, chairman and chief executive officer of Inland Steel Co., Chicago, IL; and Adam H. Zimmerman, president and chief operating officer of Noranda Mines Ltd., Toronto, Ontario. First, then Griffith's remarks. Introduction The key to successfully managing a natural resource company in austere times is good management in good times. In other words, position the company during prosperous times to survive the times when the well dries up. Although we know how to manage properly, for various reasons we sometimes do not do it. We forget the lessons of history. We allow ourselves to be carried away by our egos. We fail to position our companies properly in good times. As a result, in bad times we find ourselves in deep trouble. We need constant reeducation in the things we already know. In the natural resource industries, proper positioning in good times involves becoming a low-cost producer, retaining the flexibility to pull in our horns, developing a lean and effective organization, and maintaining a healthy balance sheet. Nothing improves the chance of survival during austere times as much as being able to produce at a lower cost than your competitors. In our business, that means having low-cost mines - low cost because the ore bodies are high grade or favorably located, and because they are efficiently operated. It also means recognizing the competition. The key numbers are the cost to produce an ounce of silver or gold. Nothing else really counts. And our competition is every other precious metal mine in the world. Flexibility is important when one gets stuck with a high-cost operation, often because things do not work out as we expect. It is important to be able to shut down an operation quickly and easily, without high holding costs, and without disrupting the corporate organization. A lean and mean, effective organization of competent people is vital during bad times. A company will not have that if it is not developed and maintained during good times. Finally, a natural resource company has to develop a healthy balance sheet during good times if it is to survive the bad. Money in the

Jan 6, 1985

Diesel powered machines are doing some specific operations in the cyclic order required by the technical process. The dynamics of this process in certain conditions has an essential influence on environmental health conditions in the working area. The main purpose of this paper is to show, using computer simulation, how the movement (dynamic) of diesel vehicles effects environmental health standards and also how to determine the required air quantity for ventilation.

Jan 6, 1985

By Kim W. Wright

Introduction Mining operations require maps for each phase of project development. Engineering plans, cross-sections, and isometric drawings are also needed. Maps are used for geologic interpretation, reserve estimation, permitting, property acquisition, site studies, development work, and production. Maps and drawings are essential to mining. They provide needed information. Generating these products, however, requires many manhours. The filing and organization of maps and drawings is cumbersome, due to their size. Major map changes can necessitate the production of entirely new documents and, thus, additional manhours. The volume of maps and drawings generated in the life of a single project can be extensive. For example, some utility companies have data bases containing more than a million individual maps (one reported eight million). These problems were considered necessary evils in the past. Now, with the automation of map and drawing production, improvements can be realized. Computer-aided mapping and design offers a new approach for the production, management, and storage of drawings and maps. This approach promises benefits in time management, productivity, efficiency, and flexibility. In all economic projects, the bottom line is cost reduction. And implementing computer-based mapping and design techniques can lower costs and increase project profitability. AM/FM/CAD/CAM Automated Mapping/Facility Management (AM/FM) and Computer-Aided Design/Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) are becoming buzz words in the engineering world. Most relevant to mining are the concepts of AM and CAD. These terms relate to the application of computers, specifically computer graphic technology, to mapping and design. CAD refers primarily to the design of components and structures in two and three dimensions. But it can apply to the three dimensional modeling of mine workings, ore bodies, and geologic structures AM refers to the automation of conventional map production. AM/CAD systems use computers to store, manipulate, produce, and update drawings and maps in two and three dimensions. Ideally, the calculating capabilities of computers are also used in conjunction with design and drawing generation, offering capabilities not available with conventional, manual mapping and design processes. To better understand concepts associated with AM and CAD applications, the understanding of a few computer-related terms is necessary. Table 1 explains some of these terms. System Features The capabilities of AM/CAD systems are based on viewing transformations. These are the basic, manipulative tools by which AM/CAD packages generate visual representations of data. Examples include the rotation of a three-dimensional object through space, the expansion or contraction of maps to fit a given scale, enlargements of small areas on maps or drawings for detailed viewing, and the generation of cross-sections from three dimensional data. AM/CAD systems incorporate data base management in their architecture. This allows a user to modify, move, delete, or manipu-

Jan 6, 1985

By Frank W. Luerssen

Introduction "Austerity" is perhaps an overly generous description of the past three years in the American steel industry. Steel plants operated at an average of only 57% of their capability in 1982-84. The dismal losses for last year are still being totaled. But during the two years before this period, American steelmakers recorded an aggregate net loss of a staggering $6.8 billion. Steelmakers responded by closing numerous marginal facilities. And production capability was cut by 13.6 Mt (15 million st). Capital expenditures still averaged $2 billion annually. But this was inadequate to maintain the existing base of steelmaking facilities. The general economy experienced a satisfactory recovery during this period. American steel, however, continued to suffer from a lagging recovery in the capital goods sector. This was due to record penetration of its domestic market by imports and from very weak realizing prices on the volume that was available. In addition to the direct influx of offshore steel products - which itself depressed prices - the industry also became painfully aware of the growing importance of "indirect" imports. These came in the form of steel-containing producer and consumer durables. Industrial equipment and autos fabricated from foreign steel accounted for the equivalent of 6 Mt (6.5 million st) of lost market opportunity for domestic steel-makers last year. That is over and above the 23.5 Mt (26 million st) of direct steel imports. Given these factors, Inland Steel was not spared from the threeyear downpour of red ink. Despite its record of continuing modernization in steel, our single-plant location in the world's best steel-consuming market, and the high proportion of consumer durables related products, such as cold rolled and coated sheet in our mix, Inland suffered aggregate losses of $277 million during the 1982-84 period. Strategic Planning The foregoing establishes a perspective - a base from which we have restructured our view of the steel industry, and of our own role within that picture. Until possibly two years ago, this present weakness in steel demand was viewed around the world as an aberration, eventually to pass. By contrast, it is now recognized that austere times are the normal steel environment. The topic here is management of resources. This implies an emphasis on strategic planning. It is worthwhile to examine some of the more critical assumptions that were driving strategies among a number of steel companies just before the 1980s. Those projected characteristics of the future steel environment were arrived at through painstaking analysis. They were carefully and heavily quantified and were generally shared by outside observers and our peers within the steel industry. • First, the assumption was made that domestic steel demand would continue to grow at an average rate of 2% per year. • Second, it was assumed that this growth in the American market would continue to be filled predominantly by US mills. It was believed that increases in steel and steel-related demand overseas would absorb much of the ominously growing capacity of third

Jan 6, 1985

By Wilfred P. Schmoe

Introduction An integrated oil company has two options in approaching strategic planning. It has to decide whether it is in business for the long-term. I state this in all seriousness. Those who help manage public companies have the responsibility of good stewardship of other people's money. We must decide whether continued investment in our basic business will generate a reasonable rate of return. With a world surplus of petroleum production capacity, and continuing downward pressure on prices, this question should be addressed by all oil companies. And a positive answer is not necessarily a foregone conclusion in all cases. The decision should be made based on proven competence in finding and developing petroleum reserves on a cost-competitive basis with other producers, and on a frank analysis of future prospects. This should include a realistic assessment of the projected rate of return on specific investment projects. If a company did not pass these tests, its strategy could take one of four paths. Diversification First, it could diversify. But recent history suggests that oil companies are not good at managing other businesses. Second, it could seek a buyer for its business at the optimum return for its owners. Third, it could sell its assets on a piecemeal basis. And, fourth, it could adopt a longer-range plan of self-liquidation by living off current recoverable reserves. In other words, by not investing in exploration and development, it could maximize short-term profit and pass the money back to shareholders in the form of dividends. The Conoco component of DuPont has a below-average cost of finding petroleum, a good track record of efficient production, and a full plate of projects that pass the test of return-on-investment. In short, Conoco is in business for the long-term. That fact, in itself, determines at least one key element in strategy. This is to extend the life of the petroleum reserve base while at the same time maintaining maximum efficient rates of production to provide a strong cash flow. A company that is able to maintain a strong reserve base will ultimately see the value of those reserves escalate as world oil supplies tighten. Our planners expect this tightening to occur within the next decade as demand grows and production in non-OPEC areas of the world begins to decline. An exploration program tailored to meet the requirements of reserve replacement and current production should have two basic parts. The first is relatively low-risk exploration in proven oil provinces. This is augmented by

Jan 6, 1985

By E. D. Attanasi, J. H. DeYoung

Mineral exploration activity in the US suffered through another depressed year in 1984. And continued strength in precious metals (and possibly industrial minerals) exploration failed to make up for declines in other minerals. 1984 offered little solace for the explorationist. But some new data on mineral exploration provided better statistics for analysts of US mineral exploration trends. The Society of Economic Geologists (SEG) published data from its survey of 1980,1981, and 1982 exploration by US and Canadian companies - 96 companies responded (Barber and Muessig, 1984). In addition, a Mining Engineering (April 1984 p. 345) article by Emerson and Ivosevic presented their data on annual exploration expenditures in the US for gold and for all minerals from 1961 through 1983. A review of 1984 domestic exploration and development activities reported in several industry journals indicates that almost 90% of those projects were directed at gold and silver deposits. Statistics on 1984 exploration expenditures are not available. But some industry observers believe that precious metals accounted for an even larger share of industry's exploration budget in 1984 than in 1983. According to the data of Emerson and Ivosevic (ME, April 1984, p. 349), gold exploration expendi-

Jan 5, 1985

By Stanley Lefond

The health of the industrial minerals industry appears to be improving year by year. In fact, preliminary information suggests that only three commodities (asbestos, bromine, and sulfur-other) failed to show a production gain in 1984 over 1983. In 1983, 10 commodities failed to post gains and six remained constant. The total value of industrial mineral production in 1984 was $16.7 billion, up $1.4 billion from 1983. Cement, clays, gypsum, and crushed stone production increased. Since these are used in housing and construction, this suggests these industries are moving out of their recent doldrums. Barite and clay production also improved in 1984. Local US barite production, however, still has a long way to go to attain the 1981 high of 2.6 Mt (2.9 million st). Barite imports remain high. But they are not as high as the 1982 importation of 2 Mt (2.3 million st). Bentonite production in 1984 increased 20% in volume and 25% in value over the previous year. This suggests improvement in the drilling industry and an increase in demand for iron ore pelletizing grades. All in all, the industrial mineral industry is alive and well. And it shows signs of great improvement in the next few years. Many thanks to those industrial mineral technical committee members for their assistance in assembling this industrial minerals review: M. F. Dibble, H. W. Allen, G. H. Gallup, S. G. Ampian, D. W. L. Spry, H. G. Fleshman, and L. J. Czel.

Jan 5, 1985

By J. Hoover

Real growth in the economy, increasing demand for electricity, and consumer stockpiling for a possible United Mineworkers of America (UMW) strike in October made 1984 a banner year for coal. Production and consumption climbed to record heights. Precautionary purchases brought inventories close to the peak levels of early 1981 when coal miners walked out for 72 days. Production slowed in the fourth quarter after labor and management concluded negotiations without a walkout. But output in every major coal producing state showed significant gains during the year US coal production totaled 807 Mt (890 million st) in 1984. This is a 13.8% increase over 1983 output. Lower production rates, principally in Appalachia, and sustained demand in the final quarter put downward pressure on coal stocks by the end of the year. Demand All market sectors experienced greater requirements for coal in 1984. Electric utility coal consumption increased 6.3%; exports climbed 4.8%; coke plants consumed 18.9% more coal; coal requirements in the other industrial sector expanded by 11.8%; and consumption in the residential/commercial sector rose 8.1%. Domestic consumption of coal reached a record 718 Mt (791 million st) in 1984. This is a 7.4% gain over the previous consumption high of 668 Mt (737 million st) in 1983. Electric Utilities The 4.6% increase in electric power generation in 1984 was coupled with expanding coal use relative to other energy sources. This resulted in a 6.3% rise in coal consumption, totaling 603 Mt (664 million st) for the year. Thirty-eight of 45 states where coal-fired electric power plants were operating shared in the 36-Mt (39 million-st) increase in electric utility coal consumption

Jan 5, 1985

By P. Rosten

US mine production of iron ore in 1984 showed some improvements compared to 1983. But reduced demand from the iron and steel industry caused temporary shutdowns of many iron ore mines and pelletizing plants. US raw steel production in 1984 was slightly above 1983, but still at a depressed level. Production was 83 Mt (92 million st), compared with 77 Mt (85 million st) in 1983 and 68 Mt (75 million st) in 1982. Two major production trends continued in 1984. They were the increased production from electric furnaces and the growing use of continuous casters. Electric furnace production included 33.2% of the steel poured in 1984, compared with 31.5% in 1983. Continuous casting was used for 39% of 1984 steel production, compared with 32.1% in 1983. Statistical Process Control Statistical Process Control (SPC) has taken on new proportions in the iron ore and steelmaking industries within the last year. This mathematical technique is used to monitor, control, evaluate, and analyze a manufacturing process. The technique charts variability of important quality parameters. Training and adaptation of SPC techniaues for process control have been initiated at Inland, Steel's Minorca, Pickands-Mather's Hibtac, Cleveland-Cliff's Empire and Sherman operations, and at Reserve Mining. One of these operations has requested its bentonite supplier provide SPC charts on quality specifications. Some of the steelmaking operations (Inland Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Dofasco, LTV Steel, National Steel, Stelco, Weirton Steel, and Wheeling-Pittsburgh) have set up SPC programs within their operations. And they also have insisted that some of their suppliers use SPC. Plant Shutdowns The permanent closure of Stelco's Griffith mine at Red Lake, Ontario, has been delayed by one year. This gives employees more time to adjust. The mine is now set to close in April 1986, instead of April 1985. Sidbec (Canadian government) and its other partners (including British Steel Corp., Quebec Cartier Mining, and US Steel) closed its iron mining operations at Gagnon, Quebec. The pellet plant has been leased to Quebec Cartier. New Iron Ore Operations The massive Carajas iron ore project in Brazil is scheduled to come onstream in Jan. 1986. It is to achieve full-scale commercial shipments by July of that year. The 66% iron crude ore requires only crushing and screening before shipment. The product consists of 83% sinter feed and 17% coarse ore. Annual production capacity will be 32 Mt (35 million st) when the project is completed. Principal customer for the ore is Nippon Carajas Iron Ore Co., a consortium of Japanese steel mills. The Arab Iron & Steel Co. (AISCO) has started up a $US300 million, 3.6 Mt/a (4 million stpy) iron ore pelletizing plant built by Kobe Steel Ltd., at Al Hidd-hide in Bahrain. By 1986, this grate-kiln-cooler plant will supply high quality iron ore pellets to feed direct reduction plants in the immediate Gulf area and Far East markets. Iron ore supplied from Brazil, Peru, India, and Mauritania provides the feed to the pellet plant. Hydrated lime (2%) is used as a burden.

Jan 5, 1985

By J. D. Morgan

Demand for nonfuel minerals depends on the overall state of the economy, which steadily improved each quarter in 1984. New housing starts rose to 1.8 million units. Automakers turned out about 15% more cars (7.8 million) and 30% more trucks (3.1 million) than in 1983. Nevertheless, many domestic mineral operations experienced difficulties in 1984. This resulted from import competition greater use of newer engineered materials, emphasis on multi-unit housing and downsizing of motor vehicles. About 15% of our energy was imported. This in cluded $36 billion worth of crude oil and $22 billion in refined products This added significantly to the overall merchandise trade deficit of $12; billion. On the bright side for mining, coal production rose 14% to 810 Mt (890 mil lion st). Three-fourths o: the coal was burned to generate electricity and more than half of our electricity was derived from coal-burning plants. With the exception of a few large-bulk, low-value raw minerals, most minerals move relatively freely in world trade. The strong dollar encouraged imports and made exporting more difficult. Consequently, our nonfuel minerals trade deficit rose 60% to $19 billion, reflecting imports of $39 billion and exports of $20 billion. There were increased pressures from some major segments of the minerals industry for some form of import protection. But President Reagan said, "Our goal is a system of free and fair trade in goods, services, and capital. We will work toward this goal through both bilateral and multilateral trading agreements." The US minerals industry consists of domestic mines, concentrators, smelters, refineries, mineral manufacturing plants, and recyclers. It also includes many wholly- or partially-owned operations in many parts of the world, providing employment and income for US citizens and others as well. Compared with 1983, the value of US raw nonfuel mineral output rose 8%, to $23 billion. The $253 billion worth of goods processed from this crude mineral output was a 14% increase. Major Metals Raw steel production - a major indicator of both material use and mineral production-rose 10%, to 84 Mt (93 million st). This stimulated a 36% rise in domestic iron ore production, to 52 Mt (57 million st), about 98% pelletized. Iron ore imports rose 44%, to 14 Mt (15 million st). Despite the increase of steel production, output remained well below levels of just a few years ago. For example, 1984 production was still 23% less than in 1981. Raw steelmaking capacity remained steady at 122 Mt (135 million st). The industry continued to cite steel imports as a major reason for low domestic capacity. In December, pacts with seven leading steel exporting nations were announced. This is an effort to reduce import penetration to about 18.5% of the domestic market. Domestic producers of bulk ferroalloys of chromium, manganese, and silicon operated at about 50% capacity. The US mined no manganese or chromium. Only a small quantity of ferronickel was produced from domestic laterite mining in Oregon. Molybdenum production, at 45 kt (49,500 st), rose threefold. Mine shipments of tungsten, another mineral tied to steel

Jan 5, 1985

By William R. Bond, Jim V. Rouse

Introduction The pressure/vacuum (p/v) lysimeter or soil water sampler has become useful for monitoring vadose zone or unsaturated zone water conditions. The soil water sampler was first introduced around 1961. It was used as a monitoring and research device for studies in agriculture and soil contamination around landfills. Since then, it has been used for many purposes. The use of p/v lysimeters at mining facilities to monitor for solution loss is a relatively new idea. The primary purpose of the lysimeter here is to function as an early warning system. It detects leakage through liners of tailings ponds, heap leach pads, and leachate holding ponds. Their use has proven valuable for collecting baseline data and detecting loss of precious leachate fluid. Different lysimeter designs are capable of vadose moisture sampling from near the surface and down to 90 m (300 ft). They are also capable of sampling soil moisture or saturation plume contaminants from areas not accessible by conventional water well installations. The most common installations are usually simple and cost-effective. In many cases, they can be installed without the use of heavy drilling equipment. A properly placed and installed lysimeter can detect solution leaks in several days or weeks. A conventional perimeter monitor well may take months or years to detect a leak of the same magnitude. A discussion on the general design and installation of p/v lysimeters will give an understanding of its versatility. Three case studies of lysimeter installations at mining sites will be examined in detail. Design, Installation, and Sampling Design The basic design of a p/v lysimeter chamber consists of a porous material through which the soil is drawn into a collection chamber. Access tubes run from the unit to the sample station at the ground surface. Most units currently available range from 25 to 76 mm-diam (1 to 3 in.-diam). The sample collection chamber, or body, can vary from 0.6 to 1.8 m (2 to 6 ft) in length. The body can be constructed of PVC casing or Teflon, depending on the installation desired. The collection chamber functions as a holding reservoir for the collected soil moisture. The intake, or porous material, on the lysimeter is the most complex and vulnerable portion of the unit. The pore size selection varies based on the needs of the installation, type of fluid to be sampled, and type of soil material surrounding the unit. Teflon (PTFE) and porous ceramic are used in fabrication of the porous inlet portion. When using a Teflon material, which is hydrophobic, a larger pore size of 70 µm is needed to overcome surface tension and draw water into the collection chamber. It is typically used at sites involving organic contamination, because of its inert properties. Ceramic material is generally hydrophilic, having less surface tension. Therefore, it has a smaller porosity range to conduct the moisture through the porous medium while under vacuum. Pore sizes may be selected from 0.16 to 6 µm, and can be manufactured for the specific needs of the installation. The final major design component of the p/v lysimeter is the access or sampling tubes. The tubes are usually of 6.3-mm-outside-diam. (0.25-in.-outside-diam). They are made of rigid polyethylene or flexible Tygon with a wall thickness of 1.5 mm (0.06 in.). The con-

Jan 4, 1985

By Gene Mattila, Ron Boyd

Introduction Rock bolting is a general term that encompasses pinning, roof bolting, rib bolting, and cable bolting. Rock bolting contributes the highest nonproductive cost and is the most significant safety risk in mining today. Total installed bolt costs are now more than $20 per bolt. Rebolting or repair work doubles this. And bolting accidents account for about 30% of all fatal and nonfatal lost time accidents. It is only logical, then, for the mine operator to install the highest quality anchors possible. Every bolt on the market - tensioned, untensioned, full contact, or point anchor - has designed capabilities in axial, shear, and fluctuating ground conditions. Bolts will provide a designed support if material specifications and installation procedures fall within the manufacturer's recommendations. This also assumes that there are no unexpected geological or operational changes. Proper material specifications and installation procedures should guarantee the mine operator a quality anchor. To help assure this, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the US Bureau of Mines (USBM), and the AMC Manufacturers group developed stringent ASTM materials standards. These govern mechanical point anchor bolts and bolts using threaded and nonthreaded rebar. There are also minimum standards that suppliers must comply with in the manufacture of frictional bolts. However, most frictional bolt standards are based on the manufacturer's own specifications. It would be impossible to set uniform regulations on frictional bolts. Each bolt provides support in a slightly different manner and thereby requires different material needs. Quality Control In any case, material quality can generally be assured through tight order specifications and periodic quality control checks. The problem with installing quality anchors does not solely lie with the material. It includes all the events that occur from the time a bolt leaves a manufacturer to the time it is installed. The anchoring ability of any major type bolt can be affected by transportation, storage, mechanical performance of installation equipment, installation demands of the operator, proper drilling accessories, and local geology. Table 1 and Fig. 1 document the negative events that can affect each bolt and the degree to which it can be affected. Drilling a hole of oversized diameter, for example, is an operator controlled factor. It will adversely affect most bolts. An over-sized diameter reduces, or even eliminates, the anchorage capability of a mechanical shell. It will reduce the support capacity of a split set to nearly nothing. And it will cause a partial or incomplete grouting around the resin bolt. Frequently, due to bit wear, holes are drilled undersized in diameter and may not be properly cleaned out. In this case, it will be difficult for the operator to push the mechanical shell into the hole, thereby causing him to drill another hole. In cases where the bolt is obviously not providing anchorage, operators will probably drill another hole and place another bolt. Rock Bolt Regulations It is the situations where a bolt is improperly installed in the hole, but gives the appearance of a good bolt, that are frightening. In fact, some safety officials and engineers believe that only 50% to 60% of installed bolts are working. These bolts cause irregular ground load transfers in other bolts and overload them. This causes hazardous situations and overstressing. It is these bolts that fail prematurely 200 to 255 mm (8 to 10 in.) behind the face and possibly contribute to the high accident rate. The government and several manufacturers recognized the need to check the integrity of rock bolts. These programs are in different stages today. Tight torque regulations have been established for mechanical

Jan 4, 1985

By J. J. Snodgrass

Faults, sandstone channels, and abandoned mine workings present severe safety hazards, disrupt mining, and necessitate costly precautions or discontinuance of operations. In addition to fault detection, mining companies have a need to map discontinuities such as seam thinning and previously mined areas in both longwall and room-and-pillar operations. Initial field tests demonstrated successful generation and propagation of higher order guided wave modes. Theoretical studies indicate potential for improved resolution by sensing small details in the coal seam and roof structure. Controlled-waveform source transducers and specialized detectors are particularly useful to preferentially excite and detect the Love (SH) and Rayleigh-type (P-SV) waves, including the higher frequency modes. The distinct observation of reflections using the transducers in the shear wave mode makes feasible the detection of the water-filled voids.

Jan 4, 1985

By Robert S. Shank

Introduction The Pinto Valley open-pit copper mine is located in southern Arizona, 11 km (7 miles) west of Miami. Production at Pinto Valley began in 1974. About 350 Mt (386 million st) of ore and waste was removed by the end of June 1982. At that time, the mine was using more than 90 major equipment items with a total mobile fleet numbering 320. Some of the major equipment consisted of four Marion M4 rotary drills; six P&H 15, 11.5- and 19.1-m3 (15- and 25-cu yd) shovels; and 24,136- and 154-t (150¬and 170-st) Wabco haulage trucks. This equipment was used to move more than 139 kt/d (154,000 stpd) of ore and waste. The mill was processing more than 50 kt/d (55,000 stpd) of mine ore. Shutdown A two-week vacation shutdown began in July 1982. Maintenance jobs were scheduled, and most employees left for the vacation. During the vacation period, copper prices fell below $1.32/kg ($0.60 per lb). Inventories remained at alarmingly high levels. At this point the mine was losing more money operating than it would by being shut down. The vacation shutdown was first extended to five weeks. But, after further evaluation, the mine was shut down indefinitely. In Dec. 1982, Cities Services Co., owner of Miami Operations (which included the Pinto Valley mine and mill), was acquired by the Occidental Petroleum Corp. On March 1, 1983, Occidental sold the operations to Newmont Mining Corp., and Newmont created Pinto Valley Copper Corp., as a wholly owned subsidiary. Copper continued to be produced by the Pinto Valley solvent extraction-electrowinning (SX- EW) plant because of its low cost per pound of production. To ensure proper equipment care during the shutdown, maintenance management was given three goals; • maintain the SX-EW plant; • maintain the environmental and pollution control systems such as domestic water pumps and mine dewatering; and

Jan 4, 1985

By R. J. Sweigard, R. V. Ramani

G.F. Learning The paper by R.V. Ramani and R.J. Sweigard is a wonderful description of the labyrinthine web that has been spun about the mining industry by energetic bureaucrats and politicians over the past 50 years. The remedy for the problem, however, is not more of the same, but less. That may be difficult for the industry to achieve, for it is not a technical solution but a political one. And the current fervor for more detailed planning at all levels of government and private enterprise has become deeply ingrained. The authors recommend the provision of more information about mining and mineral resources to "macro" (i.e., government) land use planners. They apparently overlook, however, the already strong tendency on the part of most government land use planners to consider themselves omniscient. Thus, giving them more information about the technical problems of mining will only make them want to get more and more involved in the "micro" (private, site specific) mine development and production plans of the individual mining firm. In fact, this has already happened at all levels of jurisdiction from municipal to federal government. Examples are legion. The most effective way to ameliorate the adverse impacts of government land use planning on existing and potential mining operations is to: (1) introduce greater flexibility in the definition of land use zones by local and state governments; (2) adopt realistic and relevant ambient environmental performance standards in governing relationships between mineral land uses and concurrent or subsequent nonmining land uses; (3) allow greater leeway for economic considerations in land use decisions in contrast to the explicit legalistic approach now in vogue; (4) recognize that all minerals are not the same and that sand and gravel mining should not be treated the same as underground metal mining, coal stripping, oil field production, or in situ leaching; and (5) eliminate the notion that mining operators should be responsible for determining in detail the use of land by subsequent owners of mined land. This last bit of conventional ethic really makes no more sense than requiring the builders of every shopping center or government office complex to provide detailed plans for the use of that land when its use for shopping or government is ended. Did the builder of Ebbetts Field plan for Brooklyn after the Dodgers went to Los Angeles? Should the developer of the Bingham Pit plan for suburban Salt Lake City after the copper mining goes to Chile? The nation's mining industry must address these questions before further bankrupting itself to provide more data to planners and spending thousands of dollars per acre to create land that when reclaimed is worth only a few hundred dollars per acre. Reply by R.V. Ramani and R.J. Sweigard We thank Mr. Leaming for his valuable contribution. His views on the problems of land use planning and mineral resources are most welcome additions to our paper. As the title indicates, our paper was more concerned with the impacts of land use planning on mineral resource conservation than with the details of the planning process. On the whole, his five recommendations would be helpful for mineral resource conservation. However, we would suggest that the argument he presents for his final recommendation does not address the differences between mining as a land use and commercial or institutional uses. We believe that this difference is the crux of the issue. We share Mr. Leaming's desire to ameliorate the adverse impacts of land use planning. Possibly the most detrimental impact is the loss of mineral resources. Any development, whether mineral or community, that does not give proper consideration to other resources can result in permanent loss or sterilization of resources. With proper planning, some of these losses can be avoided. As our paper indicated, one factor that limits the consideration of mineral resources, and ultimately leads to their sterilization, is the generally inadequate levels of resource characterization and understanding of the unique nature of mineral resources and mining operations. The last point raised by Mr. Leaming is also important. In terms of reclamation and land use planning in mining districts, we certainly do not advocate spending more than what the results are worth. The main thrust of the paper was to explore the avenues for conserving the mineral resources so that, at some appropriate time, the issue of mining and reclamation can still be addressed.

Jan 4, 1985

By Syd S. Peng

Introduction Modern longwall mining, introduced to the US coal industry in the mid-1960s, is the latest coal mining technique. Today, longwall mining produces more than 15% of all underground coal production. The growth of longwall mining in the US is slow. However, nearly two decades of longwall mining have demonstrated that its benefits outweigh the disadvantages. Longwall Advantages Production and Economics - A typical longwall production ranges mostly from 0.9 to 1.8 kt (1000 to 2000 st) of clean coal per shift. This is about three to six times the production of comparable continuous mining units. Furthermore, there are much less rejects in longwall mining, typically 15% to 25%. It must be noted, however, that a new longwall with an inexperienced crew may produce less, depending on mining conditions. But as experience gains, production increases rapidly. Due to its high production, the cost per ton of coal mined over the mine's lifetime is cheaper with longwall mining than with continuous mining. A study on a conceptual mine of 25 year life using actual operational data (Dangerfield, 1981) concluded that the cost per ton of coal mined is 32% cheaper by longwall than by continuous mining. Another benefit from its high production potential is that it enables the production to be concentrated in a few longwall faces versus many units of continuous mining required to achieve a similar production. As a result, mine organization and management simplify considerably. Safety and Savings - Most US longwalls use shield supports that cover the roof with solid canopy and isolate a gob completely from the face area. Thus, if the supports are properly selected and operated, the potential for roof fall accident is almost zero. Furthermore, it is not unusual that a well-run longwall face is much more orderly and cleaner that most well-run machine shops. The ventilation system for longwall mining is the most ideal type. It is simple and unique. No auxiliary fans are required. The fresh air sweeps through the whole face. Its volume and velocity can be adjusted as demanded. Recovery - In spite of multiple entries layout for US longwall panels, the longwall method recovers up to 40% more coal than the continuous mining method (Dangerfield, 1981). The typical recovery for longwall mining is 70% to 85% versus 45% to 80% for continuous mining. Versatility - Longwall mining has been employed successfully in seam heights ranging from 0.8 to 3.7 m (2.7 to 12 ft); in seam inclinations from horizontal to 35°; in overburden depths from 46 to 914 m (150 to 3000 ft); in single or multiple seam mining; and in uniform or irregular seam characteristics. For seam height less than 1.2 m (4 ft), the plow is used instead of a shearer. However, in spite of recent developments, the plow still is unsuitable for hard coal seams. Slow Acceptance How come longwall mining, with so many advantages, has not spread more rapidly? Undoubtedly, the major reason is the large capital investment required. Under normal market conditions, the capital required for a longwall panel ranges from $7 to $11 million. Another factor is the uncertainty of its applicability to any specific coal seam of interest where longwall has not been used or operated successfully. Although longwall mining elsewhere has proven its applicability to wide-ranging seam conditions, there have been several failures in the past two decades. Analyses of those cases show that most failures can be attributed to inexperience, both operational and technical, including equipment selection. Therefore, personnel training on the longwall mining technique is absolutely necessary before its initial operation. Some earlier statements about adverse surface subsidence associated with longwall mining were misleading. Research has proven that surface subsidence under longwall mining is controllable and predictable. And, if longwall mining was mandatory since the onset of coal mining in the US, there would be no surface subsidence problems over abandoned mined land today. It is a blessing that surface subsidence occurs

Jan 3, 1985

By Sandy Clamage

"Seeing the elephant" was a term often heard from 1849 to 1859, the period of the great California Gold Rush. The phrase was used by those who dreamed of instant wealth that was believed could be found in California's virgin earth and mighty rivers. When news of fabulous gold strikes throughout the Mother Lode reached far away places, thousands of gold seekers left home and family to join in this incredible adventure. The barren, placid state of California soon became one of the most bustling, populous areas in the West. Before the Rush Before 1848, Mexico ruled California. It was then a remote region, isolated from the urbane world of the East by 2900 km (1800 miles) of scorching desert and impassible mountains. By sea, it was 29 000 km (18,000 miles) via Cape Horn. Spaniards and Mexicans settled the coastal lands on tracts donated to them by the Mexican government. The inland area was the domain of Indians and a few settlers who also had been granted estates by the government. Among those settlers was Captain John Sutter. He had been fortunate enough to obtain about 11 leagues of land (spanning 100 km or 60 miles in length) from Governor Alvarado of Mexico. Sutter was somewhat of a visionary and possessed a gifted tongue. He managed to receive most of what he desired with minimal trouble. Enchanted with Sutter's personality, Alvarado promised him Mexican citizenship. Alvarado also commissioned him to become "representative of the government and officer of justice on the Northern frontier." With uncanny foresight, Sutter began building a fortress on his land in the Sacramento Valley. It later became known as Sutter's Fort. It was more than just a fort, however. It also became a stopping place and home for many foreigners and Americans who traveled to California, and it eventually became the mecca for overland pilgrims. Sutter engaged in many projects. These included a cattle ranch, fur trade and trapping, and the construction of an irrigation system. With the influx of immigrants over the years, the community around the fort grew rapidly. Lumber was much in demand and Captain Sutter agreed to supply the necessary capital for a community sawmill. The site chosen was some 72 km (45 miles) northeast of the fort on the south fork of the American River in the town of Coloma. During the course of its construction, Sutter's carpenter, James Marshall, discovered a problem with the tailrace on the mill. First Strike Early in the morning on Jan. 24, 1848, Marshall was checking the tailrace. He noticed an object shining in a foot of water at the bottom of a ditch. He reached down and picked it up. His heart began to thump wildly as he realized he was holding a gold nugget. Sutter planned to keep the find a secret for as long as possible. He knew very well that he could become an extremely wealthy man. The ever loyal Marshall remained faithful to his employer and the pair did their best to obtain more

Jan 3, 1985

By Russell L. Wood

Introduction It is the morning after and there is one monumental hangover among many, if not most, of the oil companies that invested in mining in the past decade. How an oil company looks at mining depends on the time period. A few years back, around the time of investment, they were probably looking at a balance sheet of their own that was beginning to go wild. Many of their commodity prices already increased two-, three-, or fourfold, with no end in sight. There was a need to invest their earnings someplace before the stockholders or the government got too interested. And that someplace needed to be an industry where their own management skills could be applied. In mining there was an industry amazingly similar to their own. Both worked with nonrenewable natural resources, dealt with the same types of government agencies, and had the same type of critics and pressures from the general population. Oil executives saw mining as an industry that was somewhat backward as compared with their own. They also saw how a generous ration of the capital and management skills, so handsomely bestowed upon the oil industry, could be used to great advantage. But, looking at mining through the eyes of an oil company today, this is what might be seen: • An industry that has been spectacularly unprofitable for the past few years; • An industry of many commodities, any of which can go bad on short notice for protracted periods, for a variety of unpredictable and uncontrollable reasons, or for no reason at all; • A labor-intensive industry, often beset by labor problems. And with only limited potential for further economic mechanization or automation in today's primitive mining environment; • An industry confronted with external, foreign, and political problems, with no reasonable expectation of near-term relief; and • An industry that does not appear to have many "up" periods in its immediate future. And, there is little chance for either big, fast bucks or long periods of large, steady earnings. What Went Wrong? The visions of a few years back seemed as correct then as today's viewpoints seem to be now. What happened to change these views? What went wrong? The simplest and easiest answer is that if the economy was normal back then, nothing would have gone wrong. This is an easy answer but, unfortunately, probably incorrect. Let us take a broad overview. Certain events enabled and prompted oil companies to invest heavily in mining. These same events were major factors in precipitating the worldwide recession that has grievously injured mining and has brought those mining investments into disrepute. Taking a somewhat narrower, but still broad overview, the simi-

Jan 3, 1985

By S. D. Thompson

An AIME transaction by P.L. Allsman (1960), "Analysis of Explosive Action in Breaking Rock," contains many useful concepts applicable to blast design. Of special interest was the derivation of a heave blasting burden formula, which is important in establishing the maximum burden. Unfortunately, its derivation contains a fundamental error and then a compensating one. This formula was: [ ] The derivation used the impulse-momentum principle, with a 0.3 m thick (1 ft thick) radius of rock mass being acted on by an explosive impulse. However, the rock weight was not converted to mass by dividing by the gravitational constant. This mistake can be verified by checking the units in the formula, which resolve into m%-sec instead of meters. Adding the gravitational constant corrects this: [ ] If the minimum velocity is now taken as 0.3 m/sec (1 ft per sec), as was recommended, excessively large burdens result. Any appropriate rock velocity should be capable of throwing the rock mass a minimum distance so that the swell needed for breakage can occur. Unless the burden is extremely small and the bench height is very high, it is unlikely that a velocity of only 0.3 m/sec (1 ft per sec) will be sufficient. A review of the literature indicates that average rock velocities observed by camera studies typically range from 15 to 30 m/sec (50 to 100 ft per sec) (duPont deNemours and Co., 1977; Tansey, 1979). On this basis, a minimum rock velocity of about 15 m/sec (49 ft per sec) would be expected and not 0.3 m/sec (1 ft per sec). When a velocity of 15 m/sec (49 ft per sec) is inserted into the corrected formula, the results approximate those of the original formula with a velocity of 0.3 m/sec (1 ft per sec). The errors were approximately self-compensating [ ] References Allsman, P.L., 1960, "Analysis of Explosive Action in Breaking Rock," Transactions, AIME, Vol. 217, pp. 475-476. E. I. duPont deNemours and Co., 1977, Blasters' Handbook, 175th Anniversary Edition, Dupont, Wilmington, DE, pp. 233. Tansey, D.O., 1979, "The DuPont Sequential Blasting System," CIM Bulletin, Vol. 72, July, p. 80. Thompson, S.D., 1981, "Critical Review and Revision of Surface Blasting Practice," MS thesis, West Virginia University, pp. 308-316.

Jan 3, 1985